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Public opinion polls have become an integral part of the coverage of presidential
elections.  The story of the campaign is often told through the lens of the horse-race;
candidates are leading or trailing, gaining or losing ground in their efforts to capture the
White House.  These polls, which provides important information to the public about the
views of their fellow citizens, may also serve to shape the opinions and actions of that
public, particularly in determining which candidate to support, whether or not to show up
on Election Day, and whether to vote sincerely or strategically.  Using both an analysis of
a well-established national survey over the past ten elections and the results of a set of
experiments done at the University of Texas, this study examines the effects of polling
information on those decisions, keeping in mind that not all individuals will to react to
the same information in the same way.  The results of this study indicate that while polls
do have an impact on the opinions and behaviors of those exposed to them, the effects
vi
themselves are minimal, and tend to largely reinforce existing predispositions.  Those
who have already chosen a candidate to support in an election tend to use the poll results
to reinforce those preferences.  Potential voters who are exposed to information
suggesting a close election are more likely to participate, but only marginally so.
Individuals who are considering whether or not to vote for a third party candidate do
react to the strength of that candidate in the polls, but seem unimpressed by the strategic
situation.  Overall, this study indicates that the strong emphasis by the media on the
relative popularity of the candidates does not seem to make a significant difference in the
actions of individuals, and thus in the results of presidential elections.
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At the heart of the democratic process is a belief that the will of the people should
have a profound impact on the actions of those who govern them.  For most of the history
of the United States, that will has been explicitly expressed only at the ballot box, with
elected officials relying upon the volunteered opinions of constituents, face to face
contact with citizens of their districts, reason, and simple intuition to ascertain what that
will was outside of any particular Tuesday in November.  Over the past 70 years or so,
however, efforts have been made to make this will more easily and scientifically manifest
on a day-to-day basis.  As the technical and political sophistication of polling houses has
improved, the use and importance of polling information has increased dramatically.
Like any advance in the political process, however, the introduction of this type of
information has not been without a significant impact.  Much of this impact is well
studied and understood.  It has become clear, both in academic research and in the
popular press how government, media, campaigns, and even respondents have changed in
response to polling information.1  Its impact on the wider citizenry, however, has been
sorely understudied, especially given the importance of those citizens in maintaining and
directing the entire process.
In this project I evaluate the relationship between the public and the polls in
greater detail.  In order to understand the importance of polling in politics, I will first
explore the growth and use of polling information over time and the problems internal to
                                                 
1 For examples see Broh 1983, Patterson 1994, Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, and  Clausen 1968.
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the industry.  Second, I will review the existing literature on the impact of polling on
individual citizens’ decisions to vote, their preferences, and their strategic considerations
in races involving more than two candidates and discuss its strengths and weaknesses.
Next, I will examine public opinion about polling and the use of polls in politics.  Finally,
after reviewing several key principles from studies about how individuals process
information, I will examine how these insights can add to our understanding of the
impact of the polls on voters.
The Growth of Polling
From its origins in the unscientific straw polls of the nineteenth century, modern
political polling operations have grown to an astonishing scale.  While early attempts at
polling came from commercial houses such as Gallup and Roper, the number of polls
conducted and the number of enterprises conducting them has increased steadily over the
past 70 years.  Today, academic institutions, campaigns, government offices, and the
media all rely upon polling information and many have created their own internal polling
organizations.  While Gallup concluded its final polling for the 1948 election in
September, and thus incorrectly predicted a Dewey victory, the 2000 election saw a huge
upsurge in the number and availability of polls.  One source (www.pollingreport.com)
reported 298 polls from 34 distinct sources or combinations of sources between August
3rd and November 6th 2000.2  This source is not comprehensive, as it excludes private
                                                 
2 Some media outlets were involved in several different combinations, and each combination was counted
separately.  For example, CNN was concurrently involved in a polling effort with Time/Yankolevick and
with USA Today/Gallup.
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polls, but provides a good illustration of the sheer number of polls released over this three
month period, all of which sought to measure public opinion on the same question.  The
mere existence of such a resource is itself telling.  Clearly, at least among the elite, there
are a number of people obsessed with following the race closely.  The effects, however,
are at least perceived to extend well beyond the elite.  Although there is little systematic
information about how the public views this process, it at least seems that the public
believes that this matters – that reporting the results of the polls has an impact on voters.
Of course, this is nowhere more evident than the discomfort of many with the reporting
of exit poll results on the East Coast while polling places are still open on the West Coast.
The difference, however, in the view of the public between that and pre-election day polls
is probably one of degree.
Problems With Polling
The growth in the scope of and interest about polls has brought some problems
with the polling enterprise into focus.  First and foremost, evidence indicates that
participation rates in polls are dropping, raising important questions about the
representativeness of the remaining samples (Steeh 1981, Brehm 1993, CMOR 1997).  In
fact, Brehm found systematic differences between survey samples and the general
population based on age, income, education, and gender.  There are a number of possible
explanations for this, but the most compelling involve the mode of interview.  Early polls
were conducted either through the mail or face to face.  While some surveys are still
conducted in these ways, the majority of polling is now done over the phone.  The
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penetration of phones into American households, the speed with which phone surveys
can be completed, the relative inexpense of telephone surveys compared to sending
pollsters across the country to the living rooms of respondents, the ease with which phone
numbers can be randomly generated, and the subsequent improvements in sample
representativeness all make telephone surveys a logical choice for polling houses.
However, the increased reliance on telephone interviews, coupled with the overall
increase in the number of polls conducted, has begun to crowd the field.  To further
complicate the situation, telemarketing organizations have grown in similar numbers, and
combined there can be an annoying number of unsolicited phone calls made to the same
household in any given week.  It should not be surprising under these circumstances that
individuals are less enthusiastic about participating.  At the same time, technology has
given individuals a greater ability to screen phone calls through answering machines and
caller identification services, and thus avoid any unexpected phone calls altogether.3
Given this development, as well as the variety of methods used to analyze and
weight survey results, there are noticeable problems with accuracy and stability in poll
results.  During the 85 days of the presidential campaign for which poll results are
reported on pollingreport.com, there were 41 days in which the margin between Bush and
Gore in various polls differed by greater than five percentage points.  Included in that
total were ten days in which the maximum and minimum margins reported differed by
more than 10 percentage points.  This disparity may have been completely
understandable had it come early in the campaign.  An argument could be made that in
                                                 
3 For a fuller account of the potential pitfalls, and the reactions of various pollsters, see Harwood and
Leung (2002).
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the late summer many voters were still undecided, and thus the responses which they
gave to interviewers could be expected to vary in seemingly random patterns, which may
make results less precise.  Of course, if this were driving the phenomena, one would
expect the disparities between polls to be dampened over the course of the campaign as
more and more voters made up their minds.  Yet this is not the pattern that emerges.  The
average weekly difference between the maximum and minimum gap projected by polls
on any given day actually began at a fairly low level and if anything increased overall by
the end of the campaign (see Table 1.1).   Although several of these gaps were within a
predictable margin of error, the media coverage stemming from different polls could
Table 1.1
The Average Daily Poll Disparity During the
2000 Presidential Campaign, By Week4
Week Largest Disparity Average Disparity
8/3 – 8/11 8 2.14
8/12 – 8/18 10 3.86
8/19 – 8/29 3 0.71
8/31 – 9/11 9 4.71
9/12 – 9/18 12 6.86
9/19 – 9/25 15 7.29
9/26 – 10/2 8 4.44
10/3 – 10/9 13 9.14
10/10 – 10/16 7 3.86
10/17 – 10/23 10 7.86
10/24 – 10/30 11 7.44
10/31 – 11/6 9 6.29
                                                 
4 Each period represents seven days on which polls were reported.  Since polls were not reported every day
during August, early “weeks” may not line up with the calendar.
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differ dramatically.  Thus, while a gap of 9 points may be completely unsurprising
statistically, the presentation of information to the public can be problematic because of
that disparity, especially because the media have not demonstrated a commitment to
emphasizing the importance and interpretation of the margin of error.  Additionally, of
the 16 final predictions reported on the web site, two predicted a Gore lead in the popular
vote, two predicted a tie, and twelve predicted a Bush lead, with three of these expecting
a solid five point lead.  Although it is true that most of these results were within the
margin of error, it is troubling that 75 percent of them predicted the wrong result.
There are additional questions about the stability of individual polls.  While some
polls, such as those conducted by ABC News and Voter.com were relatively stable,
others such as CNN/USA Today/Gallup and Newsweek varied wildly during the course
of the campaign.  ABC News had a standard deviation of 1.53 across its 20 polls
reported, while Voter.com had a standard deviation of 2.82 for its 47 polls.  Meanwhile,
CNN/USA Today/Gallup had a standard deviation of 5.81 across 67 polls, and
Newsweek had an even larger standard deviation of 7.87.  Of course, variation across
time in a single organization’s poll results is not necessarily a problem.  It may be that
public opinion was particularly volatile during this campaign, and it was instead the more
stable polls which were missing something important.  However, the pattern of
movement was in some cases so extreme as to be difficult to believe.  For example, on
October 4, CNN/USA Today/Gallup reported a Gore lead of 11 points.  Two days later,
the same organization reported a Bush lead of 7 points.  Over the same span, no other
organization reported a lead of greater than six points for either candidate.  These
7
differences may have been the result of different methods used to contact respondents,
different strategies or guidelines for reaching people who are not immediately available,
or differences in the weights used in the analysis of the raw data.  Even if there are
understandable and predictable technical differences between the polls, however,
consumers are not informed of them, much less about the magnitude or direction of the
potential biases introduced by these differences.
Two other areas of concern about polling have become more important in recent
years.  The first is the appearance of “push polling.”  This innovation, which has been
most noticeable in presidential primaries, involves campaigns calling targeted voters and
presenting negative information about the opposing candidate under the guise of
conducting a poll.  Apart from the ethical concerns over this type of polling, this may
only add to the lowered response rate and public opinion of legitimate surveys.  Another
polling problem which has gained great visibility recently is the reliability of exit poll
data.  Election Day coverage of the 2000 presidential race was shaped dramatically by
errors in assumptions, problems in communication, and data entry mistakes within the
Voter News Service and between it and its constituent media outlets.  These problems led
to the erroneous projection of Al Gore as the winner in Florida before the polls in the
Panhandle had closed, the need for the networks to rescind that call shortly after, and the
premature projection of George W. Bush as the winner in Florida in the early hours of the
next morning, which was also quickly reversed.5  These events sparked a renewal of the
                                                 
5 For detailed descriptions of the event of that evening, see Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg (2001) and
Mason, Frankovic, and Hall Jamison (2001).
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debate which had followed the 1980 election about the effect of election night projections
prior to the close of voting in other parts of the country.6
Polling’s Impact:  Policy, Media, Candidates, and Respondents
Despite these concerns, polls have been and continue to be important sources of
information for a variety of institutions and individuals.  It has been clear since the
Kennedy administration that polls have an impact on government policy.  Every president
since Kennedy has used a professional polling agency or had a professional pollster on
staff, providing the administration with frequent updates on the popularity of both
important political figures and policies in or soon to be on the agenda (Edwards and
Wayne 1994).  This reliance on polling information reached new heights during the
Clinton administration, serving as a fundamentally important leg on which the
triangulation strategy relied (Morris 1997).7  Perhaps the most notorious use of polls by a
sitting president was the decision by President Clinton not to admit his involvement with
Monica Lewinsky after learning from poll that the American public was unlikely to
forgive him for lying about it (Morris 1998).  This does not mean that all government
policy is guided by the polls, but it is still extremely important to understand the shape of
public opinion on an issue when deciding how to approach that issue, even if the response
is merely to place more of an emphasis on “educating” the public about the president’s
                                                 
6 No strong evidence has ever been found to indicate that voters react to exit polling information when
deciding whether to voter or whom to vote for.  This relatively unsurprising, since the results are not known
until very late in the day when most people who are going to vote have already done so, and the people
who are likely to know at 4:00 pm Pacific Time who won Florida are disproportionately likely to vote
anyway.
7 The triangulation strategy involved finding a position on issues, most notably welfare reform, that
incorporated the more popular portions of the traditional Republican and Democratic positions.
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position or changing the ways that policy options are framed (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).
Similarly, there is reason to believe that members of Congress may be influenced by the
popularity of particular proposals or of a president who sends those proposals to them
(Kernell 1996).  Certainly, politicians in each branch are happy to point out to the media
and to their opposition when their position is favored by a majority of the potential
electorate.
The availability of polling information has also had a dramatic impact on the
media.  During the 2000 presidential election cycle, several different media outlets
performed daily tracking polls over the last two months of the campaign, and countless
others publicized, analyzed, and discussed that information.  Although the pervasiveness
of polling information may have been at an all time high, the difference was merely one
of degree from other recent campaigns.  In fact, “horse race” coverage has come to
dominate election coverage, much to the chagrin of most academic observers (Broh 1983,
Johnson 1993, Patterson 1994, Stanley and Niemi 1994, Just et al 1996, Just et al 1999).
Even if the polls themselves have no impact on the results of elections, there is a concern
that such coverage crowds out information about the candidate’s positions on issues and
qualifications, information which should be more useful to voters in reaching a decision
about whom to support and whether or not to vote in the first place.  If it does have an
impact, however, then that creates an even larger problem.  Not only is relevant
information crowded out, but it is being replaced by information which most would agree
should not influence voters.  The media are one of the most important sources of
information about elections for voters, if not the most important, and the quality of the
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information which they present, particularly if that information is affecting important
decision, is certainly worth of closer scrutiny.
It is not difficult, however, to see why the coverage of polls has become so
prevalent.  In an era in which journalists are often accused of an ideological bias in their
reporting, information on the views of the public must have a strong appeal to journalists.
After all, it is difficult to accuse the press of favoring one candidate or the other if its
main focus is on what the audience thinks.  Additionally, reporting poll results, especially
those done by another organization, is cheap and easy compared to sending reporters out
to research stories.  The focus on the horse race may also represent the fundamental
difference in the goals of the media and campaigns.  While campaigns have an incentive
to focus on a narrow message throughout the election season, news organizations are
constantly looking for new information to present to their audience.  Reporters who listen
to a candidate give the same speech day after day are understandably more interested in
talking about the results of the latest poll rather than the rehashing the details of the
candidate’s plan for Social Security reform.
The tenor of media coverage can also be traced to poll results, even if the polls
themselves are not mentioned (Ratzan 1989, Patterson 1993).  Candidates are seen as
leading, trailing, stagnant, having or losing momentum, or facing an uphill battle,
depending on the current state and recent trends reported in the poll.  If a candidate who
has enjoyed double digit leads in the polls suddenly finds himself running even with his
opponent, the press is likely to focus their coverage of his campaign on what mistakes he
has made or why he is running out of steam.  Similarly, a candidate who makes great
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gains in the polls is likely to receive media coverage of the strategy and the appeals
which have helped her gain support.  Again, if voters are influenced by this information,
this phenomenon should be more closely analyzed and understood.
The candidates themselves are strongly influenced by polling information.
Whereas 30 or 40 years ago it would have been difficult to convince candidates to pay for
an in-house polling operation, now almost all major campaigns make extensive use of
such services (Hamilton 1995).  This information is invaluable in helping campaigns
determine which issues to emphasize, which issues to avoid, which districts or states to
campaign in, and what groups of people to target.  It is also invaluable in keeping up with
the success or failure of the campaign to persuade undecided voters and mobilize the
support of core constituencies.  In the 2000 campaign, it is unlikely that Bush would have
emphasized Social Security reform or proposed a prescription drug plan without polling
information telling him that he was vulnerable to Gore on those issues.  Similarly, Gore
might not have been as vocal about targeted tax cuts and his opposition to stricter gun
control legislation if not for the advantage that Bush had over him on those issues.  In
neither case is it clear that the candidates embraced a position which he found unpleasant.
However, these were certainly not their core issues, and it was clear from their
discussions of them that these were not the issues that they were most enthusiastic about.
Finally, additional research has even shown the impact that being polled can have
on respondents themselves.  Several studies have indicated that individuals contacted for
a survey before an election become more interested in the issues and more likely to vote
than their counterparts (Crespi 1948, Clausen 1968).  Being contacted by someone about
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his opinion on the issues or on the candidates serves both to remind a voter about the
election and the issues involved and to apply a subtle social pressure to become more
informed and participate.  People do not like to appear uninformed or derelict in their
civic duties.  Being put on the spot by a pollster seems to push respondents to study,
perhaps to be ready in the event of another “pop quiz”.
Polling’s Impact on The Electorate:  Preference, Turnout, and Strategic Voting
While these effects of polling are relatively well understood, the impact that this
information has on voters is still a matter of dispute.  Although there is support in the
literature for the theory that polls have an effect on the behaviors of average citizens on
Election Day, the nature of that effect is less certain.  Several studies have indicated that
voters tend to bandwagon with the majority in pre-election polls.8  Others, however, have
found just the opposite effect, with voters moving away from the leading candidate and
gravitating toward the underdog.9  Similarly, there is disagreement in the literature over
what effect polling information has on voters.  Some have argued that close elections
should spur greater participation, since individual votes may become more important as
the gap between the candidates narrow (Downs 1957, Fiorina 1976, Cox and Munger
1986).  This conclusion, however, has been brought into question by others who argue
that this increase is actually the result of increased candidate and party efforts to turnout
likely supporters (Key 1949, Aldrich 1993), an artifact of the data (Gray 1976), or
nonexistent (Wald 1985).  Finally, there is a dispute over how polls impact strategic
                                                 
8 See for example Skalaban 1988, Holbrook 1996, and Gimpel and Harvey 1997
9 See for example Fleitas 1971, and  Ceci and Kain 1982
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voters.  The evidence seems to indicate that voters react to information about candidates’
chances of winning when deciding how to vote (Cain 1978, Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino,
and Rohde 1992, and Abramson, Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and Rohde 1995), but this
evidence is not without its detractors (Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport 1981).
These debates in the literature may be the result of the way these studies treat
voters.  In general, scholars looking at how polls affect voters have tended to both treat
all voters the same way, not allowing for the possibility that the information contained in
polls may have a different impact on different individuals, and to rely on one empirical
test in one election year, whether it be survey research or controlled experiments.
What Voters Think About Polls
Implicit in this discussion is the assumption that voters actually pay attention to
polls and take their results seriously.  Although there is less information available about
public opinion about surveys than about other more standard political questions, there is
some evidence to show that voters generally have a high opinion of polling, at least in
general, and that potential voters are paying attention to the polls.  Gollin (1987) found
that public opinion about polls and polling had improved over time, and that citizens
tended to view them as legitimate representations of public opinion.  Schleifer (1986)
also found voters had a positive opinion of the survey research industry in general, with
over 80% of respondents agreeing that polls serve a useful purpose across four separate
samples.  They were not as pleased about participating in surveys, however, and Schleifer
found a slight downward trend in the proportion of respondents who agreed that
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participation in a survey was a pleasant experience.  Respondents’ attitudes toward
participating, however, seemed to have less to do with real survey research than it did
with concerns about sales pitches being disguised as surveys or privacy issues, neither of
which applies as strongly to political polling, except as it may reduce their participation
rates.  A 1996 Gallup survey about the polling industry also showed a generally positive
affectation toward polling by the public.  Although public opinion and opinion polls are
not completely synonymous to respondents, they are clearly linked.  The survey asked
half of the respondents if they believed that the country would be better off if national
leaders more closely followed the views of the public, and asked the second half the same
question but using public opinion polls instead.  More people agreed that leaders should
follow the views of the public, but the difference was relatively slight (80% to 73%).
Responses to questions about whether polls work for the best interest of the public, are
generally a good thing for the country, and about the accuracy of polls were also
generally positive.  In fact, the only area where faith in polls began to break down was in
the area of statistical sampling, which seemed too improbable to the general public.
However, since this was entirely independent of their faith in the reliability of polls
themselves, even these doubts seems largely unimportant.  These results should be read
with some amount of caution, however, since people who do not like or trust polls almost
certainly self-select out of surveys in the first place.  Unfortunately, there is no way to
know what people think about surveys without asking them, and no way to force
individuals to answer if they object to the practice of asking them the question.
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Another Gallup survey conducted that same year found that about 60% of
respondents could recall seeing the results of a pre-election poll, and of those
respondents, over 80% knew that Clinton seemed certain to win, with almost all of the
remaining respondents believing that either Clinton or Dole could still win it.  It is
encouraging for this project that fewer than two percent of those who claimed to have
seen a poll believed that Dole was the clear favorite.  Information from the American
National Elections Study also indicates that the information from polls is reaching
potential voters (see Table 1.2).
Table 1.2
Percentage of NES Respondents Correctly Predicting
















While the percentage of respondents correctly predicting the winner in
presidential elections varies widely from year to year, it varies in understandable ways.
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The largest percentage of respondents were able to predict the winners in 1964, 1972,
1984, and 1996, years in which one candidate led by a considerable margin from the
outset and never seemed to be in any danger.  Respondents had the most difficult time
predicting the winner in 1976, 1980, and 2000, years in which the polls themselves did
not provide a clear or consistent expectation about the state of the race.  In each of these
years, both candidates spent some time as the leader in the polls, and the final Gallup poll
was within the margin of error.  The information from polls definitely seemed to be
reaching the audience.  This alone, of course, does little to explain why polls should have
an impact on voters.  A more thorough explanation of the rationale for relying on polls is
therefore necessary.
How Voters Use Polls
 Voters, of course, tend to fall short of our ideals.  While the model democratic
citizen devotes considerable effort to researching the relevant issues, understanding the
candidates’ positions on those issues, and analyzing the qualifications and characteristics
of the candidates pursuing elected office, real citizens tend to be much less informed
about and interested in the particulars of any given election, or even the political process
in general.  In fact, most citizens do not make use of the most basic form of participation
available to them.  Nearly half of all eligible voters stay away from the polls during
presidential elections, with closer to 65 percent opting out of off year elections.  The
numbers are even lower for local or state races that take place at other times.  Even those
who do show up are not guaranteed to know much of anything about the candidates they
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vote for or about the issue debates that may rage between those candidates.  This may be
disappointing in some respects, but it is not truly surprising.  Although citizens do have a
direct input into the system, that input is limited in its impact by the number of other
votes cast.  When presidential elections draw 100,000,000 voters, and even local
elections draw participation in the thousands or tens of thousands, the impact of any one
vote on the outcome of an election is clearly negligible.  Additionally, the connection
between casting a vote for a particular candidate and eventual policy outcomes which
will impact the voter is so distant and convoluted that it becomes hard for even close
observers to see.  In addition to the near impossibility for any voter of finding a viable
candidate who agrees with her on every important issue, the separation of powers and the
federal nature of the American system make such connections almost impossible to find.
Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to imagine voters devoting any great
effort to the political process, when so many other areas of their lives demand attention.
People do still show up at the voting booth, however, and those who show up still
make a choice.  In doing so, however, many have incentives to minimize the cost of
information necessary to make that choice (Downs 1957, Popkin 1994).  One way to do
this is to let other people do the work for you.  Credible and respected opinion leaders can
serve to inform and guide individual level opinion and candidate preference (Berelson,
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, Downs 1957, Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987).  It is
reasonable to believe that in a society in which individuals are taught from a young age
the importance of the will of the people in guiding the state that a manifestation of that
will should be seen as both credible and respected, as the discussion above would seem to
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indicate.   If this is the case, it would not be surprising if those with little information on a
particular issue could be influenced by polling information.  In fact, this idea has a long
history, with discussions in political science going back almost 50 years (Simon 1954,
Baumol 1957).
Additionally, the polls may provide important information to help guide behaviors
without changing preferences.  The closeness of the race, for example, should have a
powerful impact on the value that an individual puts on his own vote, and thus should
affect the probability that he will vote.  In a tight race, an individual should be more
likely to expect that her vote is needed, while an election in which one candidate is
expected to win handily should discourage people from placing a high value on her own
vote, and thus decrease the probability that she will vote.  In elections in which there are
more than two candidates, the polls can also affect the strategic decisions that voters
make.  A close race between the first and second place candidates, or a lack of support in
the polls for the candidate in third place may spur individuals who prefer the last place
candidate to abandon that candidate.  While this may lead directly to strategic voting,
which would involve voting for the next-most-preferred candidate in order to prevent the
least preferred candidate from winning, it may also lead some to simply abandon the
process altogether, or to be guided in their preferences in the same way that voters may
be in two candidate elections.
19
Information Processing
To stop there, however, would be too simplistic.  New information must be both
received and assimilated into an individual’s existing psychological framework in order
to have any type of effect.  Polling results with which a potential voter is unfamiliar will
clearly have no impact on her, and neither will poll results that she dismisses or resists.
To understand how polling information is received by the electorate, it is necessary to
provide a brief overview of several arguments in the literature on information processing.
The first factor to consider when attempting to understand how new information affects
voters is a potential difference in the propensity to accept or resist the information.
According to cognitive psychology, the way that new information is incorporated by an
individual depends on how well the new information lines up with existing preferences,
the strength of those preferences, and the reservoir of supporting or contradicting
information which the individual has to draw on which may overwhelm any new
information (Lodge and Hamill 1986, Zaller 1992, Popkin 1994, Morwitz and Pluzinski
1996, and Huckfeldt et al 1998).  In other words, information which fits neatly with an
individual’s preconceptions or beliefs is readily accepted, while information that
questions those preconceptions or beliefs is resisted or even ignored entirely.
Additionally, the most informed are the most likely to be attuned to obscure messages,
especially those that are favorable to their candidate, even when the vast majority of
messages are not.10  Thus identical exposure to identical information may not have the
                                                 
10 An example of this would be optimistic statements made by a candidate about his chances for victory in
the face of poor showings in the polls, such as those made by both George H. W. Bush and Bob Dole
during the 1992 and 1996 election campaigns, respectively.
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same effect on different individuals.  In fact, other insights from the literature on political
psychology suggest that the same information may have exactly the opposite impact on
different individuals.
The actual mechanism by which individuals process information to form
evaluations is in dispute, but three distinct psychological theories are useful in this
discussion.  The first theoretical framework, the on-line model of candidate evaluation,
posits that individuals keep and continuously update a net evaluation of candidates,
which is then used to decide which candidate is preferred.  In this model, the actual
information that influences the decision becomes irrelevant once it has been incorporated
into the overall evaluation, and thus is frequently forgotten (Graber 1984, Lodge,
McGraw, and Stroh 1989, Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995).11  Under this model,
then, it is clear that polling information can serve as such background information,
having an impact on voting behavior, without necessarily being recalled as a contributing
factor toward making a particular choice.  It is not necessary, therefore, to find voters
who agree or admit that the results of public opinion polls played a role in the formation
of their opinions or in their behavior.
                                                 
11 It may seem contradictory to pull from both Zaller’s understanding of opinion formation (his RAS
model) and the on-line model, which Zaller presents as a competing hypothesis.  I believe that the
difference between the two models is not quite as clear as he presents.  It makes great intuitive sense that
individuals responding to an unexpected survey, expressing opinions about issues which are often relatively
unfamiliar or unimportant to them, should answer based on a seemingly random sample of related facts
which they carry in their heads.  Elections, however, present a different type of choice.  Even the most
uninformed voters should know at some point ahead of time that they will be asked to make a choice on a
given day, and have a general idea about the nature of that choice.  Under these very different
circumstances, it is much more reasonable to assume that they will incorporate information gleaned during
the campaign into an overall evaluation which they can then use when entering the voting booth in
November.
21
The second theoretical framework deals specifically with the role of the
“impersonal other”.  This theory stresses the importance of mass opinion on individual
opinion formation and change.  Individual’s beliefs about the opinions of others have
become increasingly important to opinion formation over the past few decades.  As the
world which is seen as relevant becomes more and more detached from everyday
experience, individuals have come to rely more and more on the opinions of others who
are assumed to be effected either more directly or simply differently by events and issues
that are important in politics (Mutz 1998).  According to cognitive response theory,
individuals presented with the results of public opinion polls often try to put those results
in context.  Thus, those who agree with the results try to understand the reasons that the
majority believes what it does, and in the process can firm up their existing preferences.
On the other hand, those who disagree with the poll results may strengthen their resolve
by working through the reasons that they disagree with the majority, and thus further
polarize themselves from the majority  (Mutz 1997).  Individuals without sufficient
background information to come up with logical reasons for mass opinionation tend
instead to use these results as a consensus heuristic, positioning themselves with the
majority (Mutz 1998).
A final psychological concept that is necessary to introduce is the false consensus
hypothesis.  Due to either selective integration of information or a desire to believe that
others share one’s beliefs, individuals tend to overestimate the support for their own
preferences and beliefs, both in their local environment and in the general population
(Lee, Green, and House 1977, Mullen et al 1985).  This holds true not only for a variety
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of everyday subjects, but also directly for presidential preferences (Brown 1982).
Although the introduction of contrary information can affect an individual’s expectations,
the response to new information is sluggish (Mutz 1998).
In general, therefore, we should expect that poll results should be most readily
accepted by individuals who have weak or non-existent preferences, who have low levels
of prior information, or who agree with the direction of reported opinion.  They should be
most strongly resisted by those with large amounts of background information, those who
oppose the majority viewpoint, and those who are informed enough to be aware of
obscure, but more favorable, information about the campaign.  When internalized, polls
should contribute to the overall evaluations of candidates and the election, while not
necessarily being recognized as a particular reason for electoral choices.  Those lacking
information about the distribution of opinion, however, should generally assume that the
majority will side with them.
Preference and Perception – An Aggregate Look
Although a thorough, individual level analysis is necessary to actually examine
the effect of polls on voting behavior, an aggregate examination of perceptions can show
that the respondents’ preferences are helping to shape their beliefs.  A simple analysis of
the predictions that respondents made about the outcome of the elections demonstrates
two things (See Table 1.3).  First, it does show that the actual state of the race plays a
role.  The overall predictions do seem to move with the electoral situation.  For example,
more respondents predict a landslide victory in 1964, 1972, and 1984 than in any other
years.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, the respondents’ preferences seem to help
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Table 1.3
Electoral Prediction of ANES Respondents,
By Year and Pre-Interview Candidate Preference













1964 0.5 1.6 42.6 55.3
1968 0.2 5.2 62.2 32.5
1972 0.1 0.3 27.1 72.5
1976 2.5 15.1 65.9 16.5
1980 2.2 17.9 65.1 14.8
1984 0.4 0.8 34.5 64.3
1988 1.0 4.9 59.6 34.6
1992 1.5 12.1 63.3 23.2
1996 1.1 0.0 98.9 0.0
2000 1.6 14.0 73.4 11.0
Total 1.1 6.7 57.0 35.3













1964 5.0 27.3 42.2 25.5
1968 8.2 54.8 26.7 10.3
1972 3.1 21.7 32.8 42.4
1976 13.5 68.3 16.0 2.2
1980 16.5 70.7 12.0 0.7
1984 3.6 26.5 42.1 27.8
1988 8.8 42.4 37.6 11.2
1992 7.3 62.5 25.1 5.1
1996 26.9 0.0 73.1 0.0
2000 11.5 71.0 15.4 2.1
Total 11.0 48.9 29.1 11.0
shape their predictions.  In every case, more respondents who prefer the leading
candidate predict a landslide victory for that candidate than do the respondents who
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prefer the trailing candidate.  The reverse is true for predictions of a landslide for the
trailing candidate.  And while there are never more than 20.1% of those who prefer the
leading candidate predicting a victory for the opposition, there are never fewer than
24.8% of those who prefer the trailing candidate predicting victory for the underdog.
Clearly, both polls and pre-existing preferences have some impact on voter perceptions.
Whether or not those perceptions affect actual behavior is a more complicated question.
Evaluating the Impact of Polls on Voters
If polls do have an effect on voters’ preferences and actions, it is not likely that
that impact will be uniform throughout the electorate.  At a minimum, potential voters
who prefer the candidate leading in the polls should react differently to this information
than those who are pulling for the trailing candidate.  Those who are undecided should
make use of this information in different ways than those who have already reached a
preliminary preference.  In more complicated elections, in which voters have more than
two choices, the amount of information that voters have about their two less-preferred
candidates should effect the way that these individuals make strategic decisions.
Establishing empirical evidence for this belief, however, is a difficult process.
Although polls are very common in media coverage of campaigns, the amount of
attention that individual voters pay can only be guessed at.  While some polls have asked
voters what their expectations are, and those expectations seem to have been correlated
with the actual state of the race, this is hardly conclusive proof that public opinion polls
are driving these results.  This is especially true because pollsters so seldom ask their
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respondents about polls.  In polling, perhaps even more than in many other enterprises,
time is money. The longer an interview takes, the more expensive it is to conduct.  And in
this enterprise, additional questions mean additional time.  It is not surprising, therefore,
that few commercial or academic pollsters have been concerned to ask how often their
respondents see, pay attention to, or believe the results of public opinion polls.  The
difficulties, however, go beyond just good empirical measures of how much people pay
attention to polls.  Even if voters consciously rely on public opinion polls to help them
reach rational decisions on Election Day, there would likely be a strong cultural bias
against admitting that to an interviewer.  The same sense of duty (and guilt) that leads
many respondents to falsely claim to have voted probably causes voters to overreport the
importance of issue positions, candidate experience, and past party performance as the
major determinants of their vote choice.  After all, good citizens should be paying
attention to such things, and therefore respondents may well want others to believe that
they are.  The situation may, however, be even more complicated than that.  If the on-line
modeling theory of opinion formation is correct, polls are exactly the type of information
which could have an effect and then be quickly forgotten.  In other words, even if voters
are not trying to hide their reliance on polls, they may not be aware themselves that the
polls are having any effects.
This makes answering the questions posed in this study difficult, but not
impossible.  A thorough analysis, however, will require multiple methods which
correspond to the realities of voting to varying degrees in order to gain any real traction.
With this in mind, I chose to examine the potential effects of polls through a combination
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of survey research and experimental data.  Neither type of research alone is sufficient to
adequately support these hypotheses.  The effect of this type of information is likely to be
modest, and modest effects are notoriously difficult to pinpoint in survey data, especially
in cases where the impact is probably not a conscious one.  However, survey research has
the advantage of high external validity, since the survey measures actual voting behavior
instead of predicted voting behavior and is based on a representative sample.
Experimental research has much higher internal validity, since the researcher can
control the stimulus, but has problems with external validity, especially for issues such as
voting behavior.  It may be that immediately after exposure to polling information, an
individual will feel more or less likely to vote or to vote for a particular candidate, but
that the impact will fade by Election Day.  The combination of the two methods promises
a much stronger and more reliable test of the hypotheses.  The mixed results of prior
work in this area may be the result of reliance on a single one of these methodologies.
Therefore, only by testing my hypotheses in both settings can I attempt to settle the
debate.  The details of these analyses are presented in later chapters.
Plan of the Dissertation
Clearly, polls are an increasingly important and ever-present part of the story of
elections in the United States.  While a desire to be able to predict important events is an
understandable part of human nature, it is cliché to say that those predictions can become
self-fulfilling prophecies.  The hope in any democracy is that the people make important
decisions based on their understanding of what will be best for themselves or for the
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country.   While we know that, understandably, few voters devote the type of time or
attention to politics that we may wish that they did, it is clear that not all information
shortcuts are created equally.  While a reliance on party identification, positions on a
small number of issues, or even the state of the economy are understandable, and possibly
even entirely reasonable ways to make a choice, information about the relative popularity
of the candidates would be much less defensible.  Just as troubling, of course, is the
concern that voters use this information to determine whether or not to vote.  If poll
coverage causes individuals to devalue their own participation in the system by predicting
the outcome before they even have a chance to vote, then the subsequent loss of input by
segments of the population is troubling.  Finally, if polls cause people to abandon their
true preferences and act strategically, this compounds the problems which candidates
outside of the two major parties face.  While it is not only rational, but perhaps even
better for the system for voters to concentrate their efforts where they are most likely to
have an effect, these actions may cause us to underestimate the support in the population
for other ideas and other candidates, and thus limit the ability of those ideas to be
represented in government.
All of these issues were raised during the 2000 election, and all are likely to be
raised again during the 2004 election.  If polls were common during the 2000 campaign,
the very closeness of the 2000 election is only likely to spur greater interest in the polls
this year.  In fact, while daily tracking polls did not appear until August of 2000, at least
one major organization began releasing daily numbers as early as March of this year.12
                                                 
12 See www.rasmussenreports.com/Presidential_Tracking_Poll.htm
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Several others have started running weekly or bi-weekly polls.13  If polls have an effect
on voters, then, the potential is there for an even greater impact this year, with a more
sustained emphasis on the state of the race than existed four years ago, when the
electorate was likely polled more often and by more organizations than ever before.
Obviously, with Ralph Nader running again as an alternative to Bush or Kerry, the topic
of strategic voting will be very explicitly of concern to both the media and the
Democratic Party, and should be much discussed this year.
The subsequent chapters will examine these concerns more directly.  Chapter 2
examines how polls affect voters’ candidate preferences, both in terms of the actual votes
that they cast and the intensity of those preferences.  Chapter 3 then turns to the question
of voter participation, looking at how polls affect voters’ perceptions about how close
they expect the race to be and how those expectations affect the decision to vote.  Chapter
4 more closely looks at the question of strategic voting, examining how polls may
influence voters choices in situations in which their most-preferred candidate is trails two
other major candidates.  The results of these analyses, as well as their implications will be
summarized and discussed in Chapter 5.




The most intriguing question about the ways that polls may affect the electorate is
whether or not information about the expected outcome of an election helps to shape the
preferences of voters.  In a society that values the voice of its populace, and which in
some ways idealizes the voters as concerned citizens attempting to choose leaders who
will push for policies that benefit the whole country, the process by which voters come to
those choices is inherently interesting.  Previous studies of voting behavior have largely
deflated our idealized image, showing that things like party identification, the state of the
economy, and group affiliations are more likely to drive vote choice than a careful and
thoughtful comparison of the candidates’ qualities and policy preferences.14  An
electorate driven by the relative popularity of the candidates’, however, would be of even
greater concern.  If enough voters choose based simply on how others have already
decided, then the candidate with advantages in name recognition and early popularity
becomes much more difficult to defeat, even if he or she would not be the preference of a
more informed majority.
An Ongoing Debate
Whether or not polls have such an impact on the general public is still a matter of
debate.  Several studies have tried to identify such an effect on the preferences of voters
in an election, with conflicting results.  Some found that voters were swayed toward the
                                                 
14 See for example Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960), Markus (1988), Gelman and King
(1993), Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954).
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candidate leading in the race, while others found that voters in fact reacted against the
candidate in the lead.
Daniel W. Fleitas (1971) found mild support for the underdog effect in elections.
In a 1969 experiment with 625 students, Fleitas used a hypothetical mayoral election as a
testing ground for polling effects.  Using successive surveys to gauge movement, he
artificially inflated the support for one of the candidates in the previous polls to see if that
information, which was the only additional information the students had to work with
would move the actual survey results in the same direction.  Instead he found movement
away from the front-runner and toward the underdog.  However, the introduction of party
labels into the survey erased this effect.  He concluded that polling information may serve
as another cue for voters to determine their preferences, but only in low information
elections.
 Stephen J. Ceci and Edward L. Kain (1982) also found support for the underdog
hypothesis.  In their 1980 experiment during the presidential campaign, they used a
combination of in-class surveys and phone calls to the same students from a fictitious
polling organization to gauge the impact of polling information on vote choice.  Although
they found little movement toward better evaluations of the trailing candidate, they found
that students reacted to the polling information by judging the leading candidate more
critically, thus increasing support for the trailer.
Larry Bartels (1985), however, found the opposite effect.  In a study of the 1980
NES panel data, he analyzed the effect of momentum in primary elections.  Early in the
campaign there was a strong impact of changes in polling data on vote choice.  This
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effect, however, tended to plateau later in the campaign.  Of course, primary elections are
very different from general elections.  It may be more likely that primary voters will pay
attention to a candidate’s standing because they have an incentive to select the candidate
who has the best chance of winning office for their party in the fall, as well as to narrow
down the candidates that they learn about to those who seem viable (Lau and Redlawsk
2001).  They may also be low information elections compared to general elections, and
the diminishing of the effect over the course of the campaign suggests that additional
information about the candidates may be weighed more heavily than horse-race
information.
Other scholars have found a similar effect during the general election.  Using
CBS/NY Times polling data from the 1992 presidential election, James Gimpel and
Diane Hollern Harvey (1997) conclude that there is a bandwagon effect.  Like Bartels,
they find that the effect is strongest early in the campaign and declines as voters become
more informed about the candidates.  However, they argue that this does not decrease the
importance of this information, since new information is fit into existing evaluations of
the candidates.  If those evaluations of a particular candidate are more positive because of
the candidate’s popularity early in the contest, it will make it more difficult for that new
information to drive out that positive evaluation.  Thomas Holbrook (1996) finds
evidence for momentum effects in a model of daily tracking poll results during the 1984,
1988, and 1992 elections.  Andrew Skalaban (1988) also found evidence of a bandwagon
effect in the general election using the 1980 NES panel data.  Further, evidence from
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Great Britain also indicates the presence of a bandwagon effect (McAllister and Studlar,
1991).
Finally, Vicki Morwitz and Carol Pluzinski (1996) find a more mixed story.  They
conducted a study of 214 graduate students during the 1992 presidential election and 91
graduate students during the 1993 New York City mayoral election.  They argue that
polling information can have a bandwagon effect on voters, but that that effect is
tempered by preexisting preferences and expectations.  Therefore, they only find
evidence of a bandwagon effect in voters who expected the candidate they favored to lose
and had those expectations reinforced by polling data.  They found that those who
expected the candidate they favored to win discounted contrary evidence from the polls.
Concerns About Prior Work
The work done on vote choice to this point has tended to suffer from some
important shortcomings.  Much of the work has been done purely with experimental data
using college students.  This work has external validity problems of two types.  First,
college students may not be representative of the general population in the way that they
use polling information because of their age, education level, and weaker partisan
attachments.  Second, since experiments can only measure voting intention at some point
prior to the election, and not actual voting behavior, it is impossible to say whether or not
that effect is only short term.  All of these studies have focused on a single election or
elections taking place in the same year, which also limits the power of the model.
Although it is certainly true that potential voters’ evaluations of the state of the race will
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vary, there is, in fact, an actual measure which these voters are exposed to in varying
degrees.  Therefore, their examinations are limited to one actual electoral situation, while
a more comprehensive examination would need to look at multiple elections with
different competitive balances.  Additionally, with the exception of Morwitz and
Pluzinski, these authors do not address the way that voters process polling information
into their existing expectations.  There is reason to believe that not all voters are affected
by such information in the same way.
Theoretical Foundations
It is important at this point to recap exactly why we should expect the polls to
have any impact on the decisions that voters make.  Voters do not seem to have the desire
to learn large amounts of information about the candidates and the relevant issues in
order to improve their chances of choosing the better candidate.  Given the basic
characteristics of our electoral system, however, this is not surprising.  In a two-party
system, with a relatively narrow ideological range compared to many other industrialized
democracies, the chances of guessing correctly are fairly high, and the costs of guessing
incorrectly are fairly low.  Even with no information, a voter should have a fifty-fifty
chance of being able to choose the candidate that he would prefer if he did all of the
research.  Therefore, one must assume that with even a small amount of information
about the candidates, those odds should improve significantly.  Since Democrats and
Republicans tend to argue over specifics, and not over the basic structure of government,
the cost of helping to elect the wrong candidate are not prohibitive.  Finally, of course,
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each voter’s actual impact on the outcome of the election is infinitesimally small, which
only further reduces the costs of making the wrong choice.  If this is true, it is not only
unsurprising, but entirely rational for voters to rely on information shortcuts to help them
reach a decision on election day.
Many information shortcuts are well understood and establish.  Party
identification, a candidate’s position on a single issue of great importance to a particular
voter, a candidate’s race or gender, and the voter’s evaluation of the state of the economy
are commonly used and generally accepted information shortcuts for numerous voters.
The relative popularity of the candidates would seem to be a very likely candidate as
well.  The fact that a candidate is popular means that millions of other citizens have
decided to throw their support behind her.  For a voter looking for a way to reduce the
amount of time he has to spend learning about the candidates, that collective judgment
should be persuasive.  Not only is it likely that many of the people who have already
decided to support a particular candidate have put more thought into the decision than
those reaching a decision later in the race, thus adding to their credibility, but voters, even
more than the average citizen, should be expected to place some weight on the
preferences of the majority.  Advertisers certainly believe that the popularity of a product
can help to persuade consumers, frequently pushing their product as the one preferred by
more people, more experts, etc.
As discussed in Chapter 1, however, knowing what is popular is not enough.
Voters have pre-existing connections to particular parties and particular viewpoints which
precede the election.  New information must be filtered through these prior attachments.
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Therefore, the impact of the same piece of information may be dramatically different on
different individuals.  The cognitive psychology and cognitive response theory literatures
lead to very particular expectations about how people will react to such information.
Cognitive psychology argues that individuals readily accept information that fits their
view of the world and resist information that runs counter to that view.  Cognitive
response theory comes to similar conclusions, but posits a more active resistance to
contrary information, with consumers of that information tending to remind themselves
of the reasons that the majority is in fact wrong on a particular issue.  It also suggests that
those with no prior affect toward the majority or minority position will be persuaded by
the position of the majority.
Expectations
The previous discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
H1:  When exposed to information about the relative popularity of
presidential candidates, individuals whose candidate preference is
consistent with the majority opinion will generally intensify their support
for that candidate.
Voters whose preferences are in line with those of the majority in a poll
will have no affective resistance to that information.  In fact, the knowledge that
most other potential voters have come to the same conclusion that they have
should only serve to firm up their support for that candidate.  If the majority of the
population agrees with them, they must be on the right track.
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H2: When exposed to information about the relative popularity of
presidential candidates, individuals whose candidate preference is not
consistent with the majority opinion will resist this information, and
generally tend to move in the opposite direction.
This hypothesis predicts that individuals will act in exactly the opposite manner
that the Downsian framework would suggest.  Instead of using information as a shortcut
to determine or act on preferences, individuals use their preferences to determine which
information is valid or worthy of consideration.  Voters with preferences that are
inconsistent with the majority may well be exposed to polling information, but will resist
it on two fronts.  First, they will have an affective reaction to the information,
downplaying its importance because it does not fit into their view of the world.  Second,
cognitive response theory posits that their reaction to this information will be to remind
themselves of the reasons for their current preferences, and thus further polarize them
from the majority.  In essence, they convince themselves that the majority is wrong, and
thus convince themselves in the process that their original opinions are even more correct
than they had first thought.
H3: When exposed to information about the relative popularity of
presidential candidates, individuals who have not yet decided which
candidate to support will tend to bandwagon with the majority.
Since these individuals have been unable so far to choose between the two
candidates, information about the distribution of preferences in the electorate
should serve as a valuable information shortcut.  These voters will by definition
have no strong affective resistance to this information – they favor neither
candidate, and thus should be neutral toward their relative popularity, even if they
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tend to identify with one party over the other.  After all, those who identify with
one of the two major parties, yet who still cannot decide whom to vote for, most
likely fall in one of two categories.  Either their partisan attachment is not strong
enough to confer strong advantages to that party’s nominee, or their doubts about
the party’s nominee are great enough to neutralize their partisan attachments.
Methods
I first analyze the impact of polls on vote choice by examining American
National Election Studies data spanning the presidential election years from 1964
to 2000.  Using multiple years with a variety of electoral situations allows for a
much more thorough analysis of the problem than examining any one year.
Setting up this analysis, however, required several important decisions which
must first be outlined in some detail.
First, there are two ways in which the effect of a public opinion poll could
manifest itself.  The most obvious effect, of course, would be a change in an
individual’s preferences.  A change from one candidate to another or a change
from indecision to a preference would clearly be an important effect.  However,
this is not the only way that an individual can be affected.  Someone who already
prefers a candidate may move further in that same direction.  A voter who
becomes more certain of her choice is at the same time becoming less likely to
vote for the other candidate.  That effect may be less visible, but is certainly just
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as important to the candidates seeking a majority of the electorate.  Therefore, I
measure effects in terms of both the vote choice of the respondents as well as the
intensity of that preference, as measured by the difference in thermometer scores
that the respondents give for the two candidates.
The second decision to be made is how to actually measure polls.  The
actual impetus may be either the information that one of the candidates is leading
or the momentum that a candidate gains during the campaign.  The fact that a
candidate who is trailing is closing that gap or that a candidate who is leading is
losing support may sway potential voters.  Therefore, I use measures of both
possibilities in the analysis.  The measure of momentum reflects changes in
support for the leading candidate over the course of the race.  It is calculated by
taking the gap between the two major party candidates in the final poll before the
election, and subtracting the gap on the day that the respondent was first
interviewed.  Thus, if a candidate’s lead in the final poll is 10 points, but he was
leading by 15 points a month earlier when the respondent was first interviewed,
the momentum score would be a –5, reflecting that the trailing candidate had
narrowed the gap.15  Since the actual lead of the candidate is identical within each
year right before the election, and since it is arguably exposure to the message
                                                 
15 It is important to note here that a change of 5 percentage points across two polls would almost certainly
be within the margin of error for the polls, indicating, in reality, no actual change.  Unfortunately, however,
the media are not particularly effective at communicating this information.  While they tend to do a decent
job of letting consumers know when the difference between two candidates is within the margin of error in
one poll, it is much less common for them to mention the margin of error when comparing two or more
polls.  Thus, such a change of 5 points would be covered as if it did represent an actual 5 percentage point
shift in the relative support of the two candidates, and therefore can be treated as such an exact change in
the analysis.
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that is most important anyway, the effects of polling are measured by the
individual respondent’s self reported attention to media coverage of the campaign.
This variable is described in more detail below.
Third, since the basis of the psychological theories used in this analysis is
that information is filtered through pre-existing preferences, a measure of those
preferences must be employed.  Again, there are two major possibilities, both of
which are utilized in this project.  First, in the pre-election survey, respondents are
asked which candidate they prefer.  They can therefore be broken into three
groups – those who prefer the leading candidate, those who prefer the trailing
candidate16, and those who are still undecided.17  This is a very straightforward
way to classify respondents and would seem to line up neatly with the theory.
The only disadvantage is that the preference for a particular candidate at a
particular point in time may only be temporary, and may represent the effect of
information gained during the campaign, and not just the filter through which the
information passes.  In addition, therefore, I use party identification to break
respondents into Republican, Democratic, and Independent categories.18  These
do not line up as neatly with actual candidate preference, but party identification
                                                 
16 For elections in which one candidate leads throughout, the assignment of consistency is unproblematic.
However, for elections in which a different candidate is leading at the time of the pre-interview and at the
time of the election, it becomes more problematic.  Since the focus of the analysis is how the individual’s
mindset at the time of the interview affects new information, individuals will be assigned to the category
that they fit at the pre-interview.
17 At the time of pre-election survey, there are generally still a large number of undecideds in the electorate.
Individuals who prefer a different candidate are excluded from this portion of the analysis.  However, they
are discussed in the chapter on strategic voting.
18 Individuals who identified themselves as Independents who leaned toward one of the two major parties
were coded as partisans.  See Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, Westlye, and Wolfinger (1992).
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is much more durable, and therefore more likely to act as a filter for incoming
information in any given election.
Initially, I analyze the data with all of the cases pooled, which allows for
the greatest variation in the independent variables.  Next, I examine each year
separately, to see if the effects change over time, or are vary from election to
election.  Finally, I perform the analyses based on the electoral conditions.
Elections are grouped into three categories, based on the size of the gap between
the two major candidates.  Blowout elections include 1964, 1972, and 1984.  The
elections of 1988, 1992, and 1996 are grouped together as elections in which one
of the candidates enjoyed a moderate lead.  The elections of 1968, 1976, 1980,
and 2000 are coded as close elections.
 The two basic model which I use in the analysis are best represented as:
1. Pr (Vote = Leading Candidate) = F(β1 + β2 * poll movement + β3 * media
exposure+ β4 * poll movement * media exposure + β5 * party identification + β6 *
education + β7 * age + β8 * income + β9 *efficacy)
19
where F is the probit cumulative density function.
and
2. Post-election difference in thermometer scores = β1 + β2 * poll movement
+ β3 * media exposure+ β4 * poll movement * media exposure + β5 *
party identification + β6 * education + β7 * age + β8 * income + β9
*efficacy + ε
with appropriate modifications as needed.  For example, in the pooled analyses, a
dummy variable is added for all but one of the years included in the analysis.
                                                 
19 For a complete description of variables, see Appendix A.
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Additionally, in the models in which respondents are grouped by their party
affiliations, party identification is replaced by partisan intensity.  Each model is
run four times – on the whole sample, on those who prefer the leading candidate,
on those who prefer the trailing candidate, and on undecided voters.20
A Note on Media Exposure
The need to rely on exposure to media coverage of the campaign as a proxy for
exposure to polling information needs additional explanation.  This is clearly not a
perfect measure, and in fact there have been questions raised about the reliability of self-
reported media exposure (Chafee 2001).  However, as long as response error is not
correlated with actual exposure, the effect should be minimal.  Another concern, of
course, is that other aspects of media exposure are actually driving effects.  Although this
is possible, the heavy emphasis in media coverage of elections on the horse-race makes it
less likely.  Evidence presented in several previous studies of media coverage indicates
that between 15 and 47% of election coverage dealt with polls in some way, with a steady
increase from 1968 on in absolute terms, in prominence, and as a proportion of the whole,
with additional stories driven by the latest polls, even if they are not explicitly mentioned
(Broh 1983, Stovall and Solomon 1984, Gollin 1987, Ratzan 1988).  Additionally, an
examination of the Campaign Mapping Project database (an ongoing project under the
supervision of Rod Hart and Kathleen Hall Jamieson) found that in the period from 1964
to 2000, approximately 40% of all television and print stories about the presidential
                                                 
20 In the analyses in which respondents are grouped by party affiliation, the models are run for the whole
sample, for Republicans, for Democrats, and for Independents.
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election mentioned the results of horse-race polls (See Table 2.1).  This should actually
understate the frequency of poll coverage, as it neglects stories that discuss which
candidate is expected to win or is gaining ground without actually mentioning the word
“poll”.
Experiments
The experiments used in this section of the analysis were conducted at the
University of Texas at Austin with a relatively diverse group of 49 individuals who
participated in 15 separate simulated two-candidate elections.21  In these simulated
elections, the participants were given information about the state of the race, limited
information about the candidates’ position on a series of fictitious issues, limited
information about their own position on some of the same issues, and limited information
Table 2.1
Percentage of Campaign Stories Mentioning Polls22
Year Poll Stories Total Stories Percent
1964 47 257 18.3
1968 60 179 33.5
1972 95 257 37.0
1976 54 143 37.8
1980 104 349 29.8
1984 136 269 50.6
1988 165 349 47.3
1992 198 421 47.0
1996 220 535 41.1
2000 136 258 52.7
Total 1215 3017 40.3
                                                 
21 For a full description of the experiments and participants, see the Appendix.
22 Taken from the Campaign Mapping Project database.
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about the payoffs that they would receive, depending on the results of the election.  Thus,
respondents had to use the information about issue positions to figure out which
candidate would likely be worth more money to them.  Just as in the real world, where
voters can only estimate which candidate’s victory will be better for them, the
participants had better or worse information to figure out which candidate was associated
with which payout.  Any and all of these pieces of information could and did vary from
election to election.  Some simulations had poll results suggesting a dead heat, some
suggesting that one of the candidates had a modest lead, and some presented an election
that looked to be a blowout.  Similarly, the respondents’ payoff from the election could
vary from $0.75 to $0.25, depending on which candidate one in some cases, while in
other elections, the difference in payouts was only fro $0.55 to $0.45.  Finally, in some
cases, the information that respondents were given lined up neatly, thus allowing the
participant to form a clear picture about which candidate’s victory would result in the
higher payout for them, while in other cases, they might have information that presented
a much murkier picture.  Participants were also informed that choosing to vote in any
given election would cost them $0.05, but that they would receive the full payout after
the votes had been tallied, regardless of whether or not they voted.  At the end of each
simulated election, they were then asked whether or not they wanted to vote, and which
candidate they preferred, regardless of whether or not they intended to vote.  Altogether,
these conditions should have created voters with different preferences, different
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intensities of preferences, and different levels of information, who faced different
electoral situations.
Analysis
The major effect of polls on vote choice, when coded by pre-election preference,
seems to be to polarize the electorate, with a slightly stronger push away from the leading
candidate (See Table 2.2).  While momentum does not seem to drive voter decisions in
these cases, media exposure does play a very minor role in determining the vote choice of
respondents.  In the pooled analysis of all cases from 1964 to 2000, individuals who favor
the leading candidate in the race become more likely to vote for that candidate the more
they are exposed to media coverage of the race, and therefore information that that
candidate is leading.  However, the impact on the probability of voting for the leading
candidate is extremely small, changing by about 2 percent across the range of self-
reported media exposure.  Those who prefer the trailing candidate react in the opposite
way.  The more they are exposed to information that the candidate they initially prefer is
losing, the more strongly they react against that information. Again, however, the size of
this effect is hardly impressive, although it is about twice as large as the effect on those
who support the leading candidate.  Surprisingly, those who are undecided going into the
campaign are the least influenced by exposure to this information.  The overall effect on
the entire sample seems to favor the underdog, perhaps reflecting that those who prefer
the trailing candidate are being more strongly influenced than anyone else.
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Table 2.2
The Impact of Poll Movement on Vote Choice23



















































































































































N 10310 5505 3819 671
Pseudo R2 .406 .122 .139 .136
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
                                                 
23 This probit analysis was performed with Stata version 7 using pooled American National Election
Studies data from 1964 to 2000.
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When the analysis of all of the pooled cases is scaled instead by party
identification, rather than by pre-election preference, there is no measurable effect
on the vote choice of the respondents (See Table 2.3).  This, however, is not
entirely surprising. The races including in the analysis involve four elections in
which the Democratic candidate was leading and six elections in which the
Republican candidate was leading.  Since partisan supporters may be moving
toward the leading candidate in some years and away from the leader in others,
the effects may be masked in any pooled analysis.
When the analysis is run independently for each election year, the results
are less consistent, but perhaps more interesting (See Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and
2.7).  In the analysis scaled by pre-election candidate preference, those who prefer
the leading candidate still bandwagon, but only in three of the ten elections (1972,
1992, and 1996).  Those who prefer the trailing candidate still only ever move
toward the underdog, but again only in some of the elections (1964, 1968, 1972,
and 1996).  Once again, those who are undecided are entirely unaffected.
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Table 2.3
The Impact of Poll Movement on Vote Choice
By Party Affiliation


















































































































































N 10310 5469 4108 733
Pseudo R2 .019 .382 .485 .062
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 2.4
Vote Choice by Year, by Pre-Election Preference
Whole Sample









































































N 1150 796 1458 1013 685
Pseudo R2 .379 .429 .251 .329 .374









































































N 1168 1056 1135 922 928




Vote Choice by Year, by Pre-Election Preference
Prefer Leader









































































N 808 351 907 448 311
Pseudo R2 .173 .190 .085 .160 .270









































































N 643 527 616 520 375




Vote Choice by Year, by Pre-Election Preference
Prefer Trailer









































































N 250 338 400 422 278
Pseudo R2 .211 .141 .115 .154 .140









































































N 454 446 416 343 472




Vote Choice by Year, by Pre-Election Preference
Don’t Know



























































N 77 104 4 24 92
Pseudo R2 .131 .001 N/A .679 .096









































































N 68 78 100 49 75
Pseudo R2 .256 .077 .188 .167 .240
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
When the same analysis is run with respondents grouped by their partisan
affiliations, important differences again emerge (See Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, and
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2.11).  Democrats, when affected by media exposure (1976, 1988, and 2000),
always move in a pro-Democratic direction.  This is entirely consistent with the
Table 2.8
Vote Choice by Year, by PID
Whole Sample









































































N 1150 796 1458 1013 685
Pseudo R2 .079 .082 .038 .066 .084









































































N 1168 1056 1135 922 928




Vote Choice by Year, by PID
Democrats









































































N 740 447 738 539 353
Pseudo R2 .114 .111 .066 .056 .081









































































N 571 495 621 481 484




Vote Choice by Year, by PID
Republicans









































































N 351 286 596 375 273
Pseudo R2 .064 .026 .058 .079 .075









































































N 507 493 435 402 391




Vote Choice by Year, by PID
Independents
































































N 59 63 124 99 59
Pseudo R2 .314 .095 .023 .090 .147
































































N 90 68 79 39 53
Pseudo R2 .029 .096 .041 .320 .153
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
theoretical framework presented earlier.  Republicans, however, when they are
affected (1964, 1976, and 1980), always move toward the underdog, regardless of
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whether this is a Republican or a Democrat.  Independents, on the other hand,
react in the much more expected way.  In the two elections during which
Independents were noticeably affected by the polls (1976 and 1980), they moved
toward the leading candidate each time, regardless of which party's nominee was
in the lead.
When the respondents are grouped by the type of election, as well as by
their pre-existing preferences, it is clear that size of the lead in the polls does
make a difference (See Tables 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14).  Those who prefer the
leading candidate and those who prefer the trailing candidate follow their now-
familiar pattern of polarization, but only in blowout elections.  In races in which
either candidate could conceivably still win by the time the campaign is
underway, exposure to information about the state of the race is seemingly
irrelevant.  When the analysis is scaled along party lines, a slightly different
pattern emerges (See Tables 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17).  Democrats do not react
consistently in any of the three categories of elections.  We know that they were
affected in particular elections, but those effects do not seem to be linked to the
size of the lead in the polls.  Republicans, however, still only move in the
direction of the underdog in the race, but here it is clear that they most
consistently do so in elections in which one of the candidate has a seemingly
insurmountable lead.  Finally, Independents finally show an effect in this portion
of the analysis.  Surprisingly, however, it is not blowout elections, when the
message of the rest of the electorate is most clear, but rather in close elections,
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when the polls themselves are muddled, that Independents seem to take their cues
from the majority.  Only in these close elections does media exposure lead them
to favor the leading candidate over the underdog.
Table 2.12
Vote Choice by Electoral Condition and Pre-Election Preference
Blowout Years











































































Pseudo R2 .336 .114 .084 .132




Vote Choice by Electoral Condition and Pre-Election Preference
Moderate Gap Years











































































Pseudo R2 .482 .120 .198 .137




Vote Choice by Electoral Condition and Pre-Election Preference
Close Years



















































































Pseudo R2 .411 .165 .171 .156





Split Sample by Election Condition and Preference, Year Dummies
Blowout Years










































































N 3776 2049 1454 273





Split Sample by Election Condition and Preference, Year Dummies
Moderate Gap Years










































































N 3113 1597 1330 186





Split Sample by Election Condition and Preference, Year Dummies
Close Years


















































































N 3422 1823 1325 274
Pseudo R2 .014 .307 .488 .124
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
The second type of effect that polls may have on preferences is to affect
the intensity of those preferences, rather than the actual vote choice.  A
respondent may be reassured by a poll that his original preference is correct, or
even weaken his attachment to a candidate, without necessarily changing his
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Table 2.18
The Impact of Poll Movement on Intensity of Candidate Preference24




























































































































N 10529 5297 3741 1163
Adjusted R2 .387 .115 .093 .093
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
                                                 
24 This OLS regression analysis was performed with Stata version 7 using pooled American National
Election Studies data from 1972 and 1980 to 2000.
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behavior on election day.  The effects of exposure to information about the state
of the race on the intensity of candidate preference are very similar for the pooled
analysis of all respondents.  Individuals who initially preferred the leading
candidate strengthen their support for that candidate the more they are exposed to
media coverage of the campaign (See Table 2.18).  Individuals who prefer the
trailing candidate in the initial interview increase their attachment to that
candidate the greater their exposure to information about the state of the race, and
again the impact on those who prefer the trailing candidate is stronger than the
impact on those who prefer the leading candidate, which is reflected in the overall
negative effect on all respondent’s net evaluations of the leading candidate over
the trailing candidate.  Finally, those who had not reached a decision by the time
of the pre-interview were again unmoved by this information.
As in the analysis of vote choice, there are some differences in the effects
on respondents’ evaluations of the candidates when respondents are grouped by
party affiliation instead of pre-existing preference (See Table 2.19).  In this case,
only Democrats are moved by media exposure, tending to shift in the direction of
the trailing candidate.  For the first time in this analysis, however, the momentum
variable and the interaction term between media exposure and momentum take on
significant meaning, but again in a polarizing fashion.  The negative effect of
media exposure on Democrats’ evaluations of the leading candidate are further
enhanced when the candidate is gaining momentum.  In other words, not only do
65
Table 2.19
The Impact of Poll Movement on Intensity of Candidate Preference by Party
Affiliation


























































































































N 10529 5282 4126 1121
Adjusted R2 .023 .283 .450 .031
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Democrats tend to increase their support for the underdog, but they tend to do so
more strongly the worse the campaign is going for that candidate.  Republicans
react in a different manner.  While momentum in the campaign for one candidate
actually seems to push Republicans in the opposite direction, the more exposure
they have to media coverage of that momentum the more this effect is lessened.
Thus, if the leading candidate is gaining steam during the campaign, we would
expect Republicans to begin to increase their doubts about that candidate, yet the
more they are paying attention to the campaign, and thus the more likely they are
to be aware of that momentum, the more slowly they move away from him.
An examination of individual elections again reveals a limited, yet
polarizing effect of exposure to information about the state of the race (See Tables
2.20, 2.21, 2.22, and 2.23).  When affected (1972, 1980, and 2000), those who
prefer the leading candidate always strengthen their attachment to that candidate.
At the same time, when those who prefer the trailing candidate are affected (1972,
1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000), they become more firmly attached to their
candidate.  Yet again, undecided voters do not react at all to this information.
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Table 2.20
Intensity by Year, by Pre-Election Preference
Whole Sample












































































































N 1920 1058 1586 1529 1833 1351 1253
Adjusted
R2




Intensity by Year, by Pre-Election Preference
Prefer Leader






































































































N 1162 416 848 720 898 753 501
Adjusted
R2




Intensity by Year, by Pre-Election Preference
Prefer Trailer












































































































N 503 404 602 634 586 421 591
Adjusted
R2




Intensity by Year, by Pre-Election Preference
Don’t Know







































































































N 15 223 122 164 340 147 152
Adjusted
R2
.124 .065 .002 .007 .114 .134 .087
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
The year by year analysis of intensity of preference by party affiliation
introduces some interesting patterns (See Tables 2.24, 2.25, 2.26, and 2.27).
Democrats move in the direction of the underdog in all of the elections in which a
Republican was in the lead except 1980 (1972, 1984, 1988, 2000).  Republicans
were most affected when a Republican was in the lead in a close election,
increasing their support for the leader in 1980 and 2000.  They also increased
their support for the underdog twice, both in elections with a clear leader
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throughout (1984 and 1996), even though in the former case this meant moving
away from a popular Republican incumbent.
Table 2.24
Intensity by Year, By Party Affiliation
Whole Sample







































































































N 1920 1058 1586 1529 1833 1351 1253
Adjusted
R2




Intensity by Year, By Party Affiliation
Democrats











































































































N 969 543 772 728 925 714 631
Adjusted
R2




Intensity by Year, By Party Affiliation
Republicans








































































































N 714 383 655 652 700 527 496
Adjusted
R2




Intensity by Year, By Party Affiliation
Independents


























































































N 237 132 159 149 208 110 126
Adjusted
R2
.010 .046 .024 .017 .048 .027 .038
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
The last pair of analyses again looks at responses grouped by the type of
election (See Tables 2.28, 2.29, 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, and 2.33).  Blowout elections
once again produce the now familiar polarization of those who prefer the leading
candidate and those who prefer the trailing candidate.  At the same time,
Democrats again move away from the leading candidate in a blowout election, but
Republicans and Independents are unaffected.  In elections in which the
frontrunner has a moderate lead, the only effect is on those who support the
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trailing candidate, who once again move in favor of the underdog.  The
polarization of the electorate can also be found in close elections, both among
respondents grouped by preference and by party affiliation.  Undecideds and
independents, however, are not moved.
Table 2.28
Intensity by Electoral Condition
and Pre-Election Preference
Blowout Years




































































Adjusted R2 .328 .113 .061 .000




Intensity by Electoral Condition
and Pre-Election Preference
Moderate Gap Years











































































Adjusted R2 .421 .089 .122 .090




Intensity by Electoral Condition
and Pre-Election Preference
Close Years





































































Adjusted R2 .412 .137 .110 .091




Split Sample by Election Condition and Preference, Year Dummies
Blowout Years


































































N 3506 1741 1369 396




Split Sample by Election Condition and Preference, Year Dummies
Moderate Gap Years










































































N 4713 2367 1879 467




Split Sample by Election Condition and Preference, Year Dummies
Close Years


































































N 2311 1174 879 258
Adjusted R2 .039 .116 .122 .052
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
The experiments allowed for more precise control over the electoral
conditions and the respondents exposure to information about the candidates and
the state of the race.  In the experiments, all participants were exposed to identical
information about the state of the race, but the intensity of their preference for one
candidate over the other, as well as their ability to differentiate between the
candidates was systematically varied.25  Several important patterns emerged from
the examination of the results.  First, there is no overall significant effect on the
vote for the leading candidate as the poll results change (See Table 2.34).
                                                 
25 For a fuller discussion of the procedures used, see Appendix B.
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Second, although there is no statistically significant effect, within each payscale,
low information voters do seem to bandwagon with the leader when one is clearly
indicated.  Similarly, individuals with weak preferences also appear to
bandwagon, although again the effects do not reach the level of statistical
significance.
Table 2.34
The Effect of Polls on Candidate Preference*
All Voters Non-Voters N
Race Tied 65.7 67.9 57.7 245
5 Point Lead 67.8 67.8 67.7 245
15 Point Lead 66.9 72.2 55.3 245
Total 66.8 69.2 60.0 735
N 735 545 190
*Figures represent percentage preferring the Plaid Party
Table 2.35
The Effect of Polls on Candidate Preference, By Payout
All .75 L, .25 T .55 L, .45 T .25 L, .75 T N
Race Tied 65.7 81.6 81.0 32.9 245
5 Point Lead 67.8 82.5 88.9 33.3 245
15 Point
Lead
66.9 79.3 85.5 35.0 245
Total 66.8 81.1 85.2 33.7 735
N 735 249 243 243
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Table 2.36
The Effect of Polls on Candidate Preference, By Information Level
All High Information Low Information N
Race Tied 65.7 65.0 66.4 245
5 Point Lead 67.8 65.3 70.2 245
15 Point Lead 66.9 62.6 71.3 245
Total 66.8 64.3 69.3 735
N 735 364 371
Table 2.37
The Effect of Polls on Candidate Preference, By Experimental Condition































































N 245 245 245 735
Discussion
The results of this analysis indicate a marginal and polarizing effect of
polls on the electorate’s decisions about whom to vote for.  Exposure to
information about the state of the race seems to weakly reinforce pre-existing
preferences over the course of the campaign.  This is very consistent with the
83
theoretical expectations of the framework used in this study.  Surprisingly,
however, the least affected were those who could potentially gain the most by this
information.  Respondents who had not made up their minds by the time of the
pre-election interview were completely unaffected by exposure to the polls.
The partisan effects did not follow a pattern that fits as neatly.  During this
period, Democrats were only moved by polls to reinforce their beliefs, following
the general pattern found above.  When their candidate was leading, exposure to
that information tended to move them closer to the majority.  When their
candidate was trailing, they tended to react against the majority.  Republicans,
however, were only moved away from the leader, regardless of which party the
leading candidate represented.  They are the only group that ever acted in the
exact opposite direction of the one predicted.  The reasons for this are not clear,
but may have something to do with a greater Republican distrust of government
power.  Since the strongest effects among Republicans were found in
uncompetitive elections, they could represent a tendency to doubt anyone given
too much credit by the rest of the electorate, even when that person is the standard
bearer of their own party.
In general, the strongest effects were found in blowout elections, when the
message that one candidate is expected to win should be the most strongly
communicated.  This was true, for almost all respondents.  The only exception
was among Independents.  The only time that Independents seemed to react to
media exposure at all was in close elections, when they moved marginally in
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favor of the leading candidate.  It is ironic that polls should have no effect on the
group with the least prior attachments, except in the case when that information is
the most muddled, and perhaps even meaningless.
The results are very similar when the intensity of candidate preference is
measured.  Again, there is an overall marginally polarizing effect on the strength
of support for the two candidates, with respondents moving closer to their most
preferred candidate with greater media exposure.  For the party-scaled equations,
the only meaningful effects occurred in elections when the Republican candidate
was in the lead.  This may be purely coincidence, since Republicans were more
likely to be the leading candidate during the period studied.  It may also suggest
that Republicans were in general more favorably inclined toward their party’s
presidents than Democrats were toward Democratic presidents.   One important
difference between the vote choice and intensity of preference models is that
Independents, while mildly affected during close elections in terms of their
decision about whom to vote for, are unaffected in their net evaluations of the
candidates.  This suggests that whatever effect exists is purely a surface change,
an indecisive voter making a decision she is not truly certain about.  This would
appear to be consistent with polls serving as a useful shortcut, rather than with
persuasion by facts about the candidates positions on issues or character.
The experiments, of course, hint at some role for both uncertainty and
ambiguity in the ability of polls to affect voters.  Neither would be particularly
surprising.  In fact, it is hard to believe that participants with little information or
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with weak preferences were not more likely to seek out polls as a solution to their
dilemma.
Overall, these results point to a surprisingly small, and in many cases non-
existent, impact of polls on the preferences and voting decisions of citizens.  The
marginal effects which can be found indicate that polls do more to reassure people
who have already decided than to persuade those who have yet to decide.  This is
hopefully an indication that citizens take their decisions about whom to vote for
somewhat seriously.  Rather than relying on an easily accessible and increasingly
prevalent shortcut which lets them know how the majority of their peers are
planning to vote, voters are most often ignoring this information.  Of course, this
analysis itself says little about what, besides party identification, actually is
driving these decisions.  It does, however, reassure us that voters are not merely
accepting what is popular as a substitute for what is best in politics.
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Chapter 3
Tracking polls, of course, do more than simply indicate which candidate is more
popular among the electorate at a given moment during the campaign.  They also provide
predictions about what is going to happen on election day itself.  In fact, most pollsters,
when attempting the gauge the popularity of the major party candidates in a presidential
election ask respondents not which candidate they prefer, but whom they would vote for
if the election were held on that day.  If the polls provide a prediction about the likely
outcome of the election, and if those predictions are viewed as relatively accurate, it is
not unreasonable to assume that that information could affect the chances of an individual
showing up at the voting booth.  After all, if an election is predicted to be a landslide,
individuals with better things to do on the day of the election could very possibly decide
that voting would be a waste of their time.  Either their favorite candidate is a lock to
move into the White House the following January, or he is doomed to go down in defeat.
In either case, no single vote is going to change the outcome.  It is not difficult to imagine
citizens who would be susceptible to this type of reasoning.
People do still show up to vote, obviously, and some supporters of the losing
candidate are always surprised with the way the election turned out, even when their
candidate had been trailing badly in the polls during the entire campaign.  There are good
reasons to believe that people vote for reasons other than just to affect the outcome of
elections (Riker and Ordeshook 1986), which would explain a very large portion of
turnout in uninteresting elections.  However, individuals may still be reacting to the polls,
but, as we have seen before, incorporating that information in different ways.  Some
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evidence we have already examined is instructive in this regard.  In 1964, 1972, and
1984, election years in which it should have been obvious to anyone paying attention to
the campaigns that the incumbent president was an overwhelming favorite, between one-
fifth and one-third of the challenger’s supporters still believed that the incumbent would
be defeated (See Table 1.3).  Clearly, these individuals were interpreting the coverage of
the campaign differently than were the rest of the audience.
Previous Work on Closeness of the Race and Turnout
The idea that polls could affect turnout is not a new one.  Anthony Downs’ (1957)
analysis of the rational voter model originally included three major components:  the
probability that an individual’s vote will change the outcome of the election, the relative
benefits to the individual of a victory by his preferred candidate, and the costs associated
with becoming informed about the choices in the election and actually voting.26  Since in
most elections, the chance that an individual vote will change the outcome of an election
is infinitesimal, he expected that few people would show up to vote at all, unless they did
so out of fear that no one would come, thus disrupting the democratic process.  An
implication of his theory, however, is that the closer a given election is, the more likely
an individual will be to vote, since the closer a race becomes, the greater the chances of
affecting the outcome .  Downs’ work was continued by Riker and Ordeshook (1968),
who added to the Downsian model the benefits that an individual receives from
performing her civic duties by participating in the political process.  This duty term is
                                                 
26 Down’s equation is generally represented as R = P*B – C.
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often credited with the surprisingly large turnout that actually occurs, despite Downs’
original and more pessimistic model.
Subsequent authors have focused on the relationship between closeness of the
race and turnout.  Skeptics of the Downsian model have argued that the relationship
between closeness and turnout is illusory.  Some have posited that increases in turnout in
close elections, rather than resulting from individual level calculations of the probability
of affecting the outcome of the race, are instead driven by increased efforts on the part of
elites to mobilize voters in competitive districts, where differential rates of participation
can be decisive  (Key 1949, Alrdrich 1993).   Others, such as Virginia Gray (1976), argue
that the relationship is actually an artifact of the data, and that time-series analysis of
aggregate data do not show any significant relationship between the two, or that the
relationship disappears when individual characteristics such as attention to the race are
controlled for (Wald 1985).   Additionally, alternative theories have also been suggested,
such as the minimax regret model, which holds that voters show up to prevent their least
favored outcome, even when it seems extremely unlikely (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1975).
Subsequent studies, however, have found empirical evidence that citizens do show up at
the polls in larger numbers when the race is close, even controlling for increased efforts
by parties and candidates (Fiorina 1976, Cox and Munger 1989).
Problems with Previous Analyses
Although there are good theoretical reasons to believe that individuals should
value their own vote more highly the closer an election is expected to be, the work done
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so far examining this question suffers from several shortcomings.  First and foremost, the
tendency of these authors to measure the closeness of the race in terms of either the
difference in percentage of the actual vote received or the difference in raw vote total is
conceptually and operationally questionable.27  It is conceptually questionable because it
uses information which is only available after the election to model a decision made on
election day.  That information is simply not known to voters before election day.  It is
operationally problematic because, although these numbers are likely correlated with pre-
election expectations, they are obviously not as accurate as those expectations
themselves.  If measures of actual expectations and the information available to potential
voters on election day are available, it only makes sense to use them, rather than an
imperfect proxy.  The vote count variable is particularly problematic.  Although it does
provide the benefit of allowing for differences between races based on the relative
number of voters, it is information which very few voters should be expected to know.28
They may well realize that more people will vote for the president than for their
governor, but are unlikely, even if pressed, to be able to accurately estimate the
difference.  The expectations about the race, and even the results of past races, are almost
exclusively presented to media consumers in terms of poll percentages.  It is therefore
                                                 
27 For examples and a defense of the raw vote count over percentage difference, see Cox and Munger
(1989) and Cox (1988).
28 Although I know of no study that has attempted to measure voter knowledge about the number of votes
expected to be cast in any given election, a study of respondents’ ability to estimate minority populations
may be illuminating in this regard.  Nadeau, Niemi, and Levine (1993) found that most respondents had
great difficulty in determining the percentage of the population that was African American.  In fact, over
50% of the respondents believed that African Americans made up over 30% of the population (more than
twice the actual percentage), while almost 15% of the sample believed that this racial minority was actually
a majority of the population.  Obviously, this is not directly related to voting, but if it is any indication of
the numerical abilities of the general population, it casts doubt on operationalizations of closeness that rely
on very specific numerical information.
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reasonable to assume that any rational calculations about the impact of an individual vote
should be couched in the same units that the information is presented to them.  If this is
the case, it provides another reason that turnout would be higher than Downs expected,
since a difference of 2 percent in an opinion poll does not sound nearly as daunting to
potential voters as the realization that that may mean a vote count difference of up to two
million votes, especially if the press are responsible and let consumers know that such a
race is too close to call.
An additional problem with the literature on closeness and turnout is that it
assumes that all voters react to the information in the same way.  It ignores the fact that
voters may process information about the closeness of the race in different, yet
predictable ways.  There are two very different reasons to expect that an individual’s
preference in the race may change the way that she reacts to information about the
candidates’ relative popularity.  The first again draws on information from the
information processing literature.  As already discussed, cognitive psychology argues that
the impact of any new piece of information on an individual’s opinion or expectations
depends on the information which that individual already has, as well as their beliefs
about what should be the case.  In other words, individuals who prefer the leading
candidate should be much more likely to accept information that indicates that that
candidate is winning.  Independent confirmation that what we want to be true is actually
true is rarely difficult to accept.  On the other hand, individuals who want the trailing
candidate to win will be much more likely to resist such information.  New information
which contradicts our hopes and expectations about an election is much more likely to be
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dismissed, or at the least to be viewed much more critically.  The legitimacy of the polls
themselves may well be questioned, or their importance diminished, perhaps under the
belief that, as people learn more about the challenging candidate, they will come around
to the proper viewpoint.
Even if this is true, of course, it does not mean that these individuals will start
with an optimistic outlook.  They could believe from the start that their favorite candidate
is likely to lose.  This, however, does not seem to be the case.  As the false consensus
theory posits, people are much more likely to overestimate support for their views among
the general population.  If a voter has thought about the race and come to a firm
conclusion about which candidate is better, then surely other reasonable people should be
able to reach the same conclusion.  Therefore, lacking any evidence to the contrary, we
would expect that most people would predict that their favorite candidate will win,
regardless of which candidate that is.  In fact, Brown (1982) found exactly this in an
analysis of voters’ predictions about the outcome of presidential elections.  This is also
consistent with the predictions of respondents in the ANES survey.
We would expect, therefore, that the impact of the polls on potential voters would
differ depending on which candidate they prefer.  That difference should only increase,
however, during the campaign, because there is always a political actor with an incentive
to try to provide evidence that is contrary to the results of the polls.  The best examples of
this come from the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections.  In both of those elections, it
became increasingly clear as election day neared that Bill Clinton would be victorious
over his Republican opponent.  Theoretically, George H. W. Bush and Bob Dole could
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have chosen to concede at some point prior to the actual election, yet understandably
neither chose to do so.  Both candidates remained publicly optimistic about their chances
of victory.  To do otherwise would be unfathomable for someone who had devoted as
much time and effort over the previous year, if not over the course of their entire career,
in an effort to win (or keep) the presidency.  If a candidate is not ready to throw in the
towel, yet is constantly faced with public opinion polls predicting his defeat in
November, there is an obvious strategy which that candidate can pursue:  attack the polls
themselves.  In fact, both Bush and Dole chose to attack the polls late in the campaign,
urging their supporters to ignore the results and promising that the pollsters would be
proven wrong by the voters on election day.  For supporters of these candidates, or for
supporters of any underdog, statements by the candidate calling into the question the
evidence that the campaign is not going well can serve as a lifeline.  These voters can
grab hold of and lend more weight to this information than the information which they
are already predisposed to resist.  In fact, individuals do seem to engage in just such
reasoning, looking for potentially obscure, but more reassuring information and using it
to resist information which they do not want to be true (Zaller 1992).
Expectations
The effect of polls on voters, therefore, should follow three very distinct patterns.
Most citizens who favor one of the two major party candidates should begin the election
cycle with an optimistic outlook, expecting that their most preferred candidate should
also be the favorite of the majority of the population.  As information about the actual
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state of the race begins to trickle in, the effect of that information should begin to diverge.
Those who favor the candidate in the lead should readily accept this information.  Since
the candidate in the lead should be no less likely to be optimistic in his predictions as the
candidate who is trailing, information from the campaign itself should only further
reinforce the original expectation of a positive outcome on election day.  These
individuals should therefore become less and less likely over the course of the campaign
to believe that the race will be close, and that their votes will subsequently be less needed
to ensure that victory.
Individuals who have no preference entering the campaign may have no
predisposition to predict a victory for either candidate.  They will also, however, not have
any reason to resist the information gleaned from public opinion polls.  If the polls show
one candidate consistently leading by a wide margin, these individuals should be very
likely to accept that as the truth.  They also, therefore, should become less likely to
believe that their vote would matter as the campaign goes on.
The reactions of supporters of the underdog, however, should be vastly different.
Since they begin the campaign with an expectation that their favorite candidate should
win, they will resist information to the contrary.  With reassuring messages coming from
the candidate, the incentive and perhaps even the ability to resist contrary information
will only increase.  However, resisting such information does not mean completely
ignoring it.  As more and more evidence begins to accumulate over the course of the
campaign that election day will not end well for them, it would be hard to avoid
beginning to doubt their optimistic expectations.  The transition from great confidence in
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the outcome to despair, however, is unlikely to be a quick or a smooth one.  It is much
more reasonable to assume that such supporters will first begin to suspect that their
candidate will not win by much, and then perhaps that they may lose, but clearly in a
closer race than the polls are predicting.  Only when the evidence is overwhelming and
consistent in the long term would we expect that these individuals would change their
expectations entirely, predicting that their favored candidate has no chance to win.
Ironically, therefore, supporters of the trailing candidate should generally come to believe
that their votes are even more important over the course of the campaign.
If an individual’s evaluation of the importance of his vote does vary with his
perception of how close the race is going to be, then, we should see that polls could lead
to opposite pressures on individual citizens who are deciding whether or not to show up
on election day.  Since those who support the leading candidate or those who have no
strong attachment to either candidate will believe the polls, and thus devalue the
importance of their own votes, large margins in the polls should decrease the chances that
these individuals will show up to vote.  On the other hand, since supporters of the trailing
candidate should only increase the importance which they place on their votes as their
candidate falls further behind in the polls, they should actually become more likely to
vote as the gap widens.
Put more formally, this theory leads to three hypotheses:
H4: As the margin in the polls increases, individuals who favor a
candidate leading in the polls should become less likely to expect the race
to be close, and thus less likely to vote.
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H5:  As the margin in the polls increases, individuals who have not
decided which candidate to support should become less likely to expect the
race to be close, and thus less likely to vote.
H6: Individuals who favor the underdog in the polls should become more
likely to expect the race to be close as the margin in the polls increases,
and thus become more likely to vote.29
A comparison of the results of recent presidential elections with the predictions of
the final Gallup poll before election day in each year provides some initial support for
these hypotheses (See Table 3.1).  In eight of the previous ten presidential elections, the
final pre-election poll has overstated support for the leading candidate.  In six of those
cases, the difference was well within the margin of error of the poll, which could very
well explain the discrepancies.  The fact that error was in the same direction 80 percent of
the time, however, raises the possibility that there is instead something systematic about
the differences.  If supporters of the trailing candidate have a greater incentive to vote
than do supporters of the candidate in the lead, this could help to explain the consistency
of these errors.
                                                 
29 The resistance which an individual has to the margin will likely vary with the intensity of their preference
for that candidate, however, since major party presidential candidates in the United States are rarely
separated by more than 15% of the vote, margins greater than that in the polls would likely begin to
seriously erode hopes of victory among the trailing candidate’s supporters.
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Table 3.1
Actual Vs. Predicted Margin of Victory30















To test these hypotheses, I use both the results of the experiments conducted in
the fall of 2002, as well as an analysis of American National Elections Studies Data from
1972 to 2000.  Just as with the analysis of candidate preference, such an analysis needs to
incorporate multiple years to provide variation on the main independent variable.  While
the perception of the closeness of the race may vary from voter to voter within any one
given election, the actual state of the race is constant for all respondents.  These seven
elections provide a wide range of poll results in the days leading up to the election.
When examining the impact of polling on candidate preference, it was possible to
look directly at how the polls affected vote choice and intensity of preference, because in
                                                 
30 1976 data represents margin for Gerald Ford, who was leading in the final Gallup poll, but lost in the
election.  2000 data represents margin for George W. Bush, who was leading in the final Gallup poll, but
lost the popular vote.
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that case, one would expect that polls could affect the voters’ perceptions of the
candidates themselves, or at least the voter’s confidence in their pre-existing preferences.
The impact of polling on turnout, however, is an entirely different thing.  Instead of polls
providing information about which candidate the voter should prefer, polls are providing
information about how likely it will be that any one person’s vote will be important in
determining the outcome of the election.  Thus, it is actually the perceived closeness of
the race that should have a direct effect on the probability that any given respondent
would show up.  In this model the polls themselves, and respondents’ exposure to them,
would instead drive the respondents’ perceptions about how close the race actually is.
As with the previous chapter, there are two ways that the effects of polls can be
measured.  First, I will again use the respondents’ exposure to media coverage of the
campaign.  The more that someone is paying attention to the campaign, the more likely
they are to have been exposed to the true gap between the leading candidates.  Obviously,
however, the actual size of the lead of one candidate over the other must also play a role.
Being exposed to the message that the race is too close to call should have a very
different effect than being exposed to the message that one candidate is leading by a
significant margin.  Therefore, I also use the actual lead in the polls in the analysis.  The
question, however, is which lead to use.  The race may vary over the course of the
general election campaign in important ways.  Additionally, there are methodological
reasons for caution in choosing which gap to use.  If, for example, I were to use the size
of the lead immediately prior to election day, then all respondents within a given election
year would have the exact same value in the analysis, which would make the effects of
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polls indistinguishable from any other year-specific effects on voters.  Just as
importantly, however, there is a theoretical reason to try something else.  Since the
argument presented here is that polls affect potential voters’ perceptions about how close
the race is going to be, which in turn affect the decision to vote, it is clearly necessary to
have some measure of the respondents’ perceptions of the closeness of the race.
Respondents are asked about their predictions for the upcoming presidential election
during the pre-election interview, however, this question is asked over the two month
period preceding the election.  Therefore, the value assigned to each respondent for the
difference between the leading and trailing candidates in the race is the gap in the latest
poll to which the respondent could have been exposed at the time of the pre-election
interview.  For example, a respondent who was interviewed on October 6, 1996 would be
assigned a value of 17, which was the size of Clinton’s lead over Dole in the October 5th
Gallup poll.  Someone interviewed a week later would be assigned the value of the
Clinton’s lead in the October 12th poll, which was 13 points.  Thus, the effect is measured
by looking at the information which could have played a role in determining their
perception of the closeness of the race on the one day for which that information is
available.
The moderating effect of pre-election preferences is also examined in two
different ways.  As in the last chapter, potential voters may use their expressed preference
between the two candidates as a filter.  This would obviously be the most direct frame of
reference for understanding information about the relative popularity of the two
candidates.  However, since those preferences may be transitory or even affected by the
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polls directly, I also examine the same information using party affiliation to break the
respondents into different groups.
The analysis of ANES data consists of two basic models.  The first, a model of the
perception of closeness of the race uses as the dependent variable the respondents’
answer to a question asking them whether or not the race is going to be close.  This probit
analysis uses as independent variables the margin in the polls immediately prior to the
date of interview, the respondent’s self-reported media exposure, an interactive term
between the two, as well as four other factors (education, age, income, and efficacy)
which may be related to the respondent’s experience and ability to make good predictions
about the outcome of the race.  This model is best represented as:
3. Pr (Prediction = Close Election) = F(β1 + β2 * poll movement + β3 * media
exposure+ β4 * poll movement * media exposure + β5 * education + β6 * age + β7
* income + β8 *efficacy)
31
where F is the probit cumulative density function.
The model is first run with all respondents from all years pooled, thus requiring the
addition of dummy variables for each year except 1972.  It is then run on each individual
year.  In all cases, the model is run for the entire sample, for those who prefer the leading
candidate, for those who prefer the trailing candidate, and for those who are undecided.
Then it is run with respondents broken into Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.
                                                 
31 For a complete description of variables, see Appendix.
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The second model then analyzes the impact of perceiving the race to be close on
the probability that a respondent will turnout to vote, while controlling for age, education,
income, efficacy, partisan intensity, and length of residency, all of which are expected to
be positively correlated with voting.  This model is best represented as:
4. Pr (Voting) = F(β1 + β2 * close race + β3 * age + β4 * education + β5 *
efficacy + β6 * income + β7 * partisan intensity + β8 * length of residency)
where F is the probit cumulative density function.
Experiments
In addition to analyzing the experiments described in Chapter 2, I also
looked at the results of a separate set of experiments run during the same
weekend, with a different set of participants.32  These 91 individuals participated
in a very simple experiment in which they were given a pre-treatment survey,
exposed to one of three instruments, and then given a post-treatment survey.  The
pre-treatment survey asked for their party affiliation, as well as asking a series of
demographic and otherwise unrelated questions, but did not ask specifically about
their vote intention, as questions which were too explicitly tied to polling or
voting behavior may have primed the participants to view the information that thy
were given differently.  After completing the pre-treatment survey, each
participant was given a packet of articles to read.  These articles, which were
taken from the Austin American Statesman, covered a wide variety of subjects,
from an NCAA hearing about the eligibility of a college swimmer to a group of
                                                 
32 For a complete description of the experiment, see the Appendix.
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well-established novelists who had begun to write stories aimed at children.
Those in the control group received only the packet of explicitly non-political
articles.  The second group received the same packet, but with the addition of a
fictitious article about the Texas gubernatorial election campaign, which was then
less than a month from completion.  This article reported that the latest poll of
likely voters indicated that incumbent Governor Rick Perry and his Democratic
challenger Tony Sanchez were in a statistical tie, and that no one knew who
would win.  The third group received the same basic packet, but with the addition
of a fictitious article stating that Perry had a large lead over Sanchez in the latest
poll.  When they finished reading the packets, the participants were then given the
post-treatment survey, which asked them, among other unrelated questions, about
their voting intentions and expectations about the race.
Results
The results of the survey analysis reveal a surprisingly small effect of polls
and media exposure on the predictions of respondents.  In the pooled analysis in
which individuals were separated by their pre-election preferences, there was no
impact of any of the key variables except for a statistically significant but
extremely small negative effect of the interactive term on the perceived closeness
of the race (See Table 3.2).  In other words, as the gap between the two candidates
grew and as respondents paid more attention to it, those who prefer the leading
candidate moved very slightly toward expecting a landslide election.  The
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Table 3.2
The Impact of Polling Information on Perception of the Closeness of the Race
Dividing the Sample by Pre-Election Preferences






























































































































N 11948 6027 4299 1183
Pseudo R2 .157 .250 .067 .103
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 3.3
The Impact of Polling Information on Perception of the Closeness of the Race
Dividing the Sample by Party Affiliation






























































































































N 11948 6027 4554 1239
Pseudo R2 .157 .250 .219 .134
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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substantive effect, however, is negligible.  In fact, few of the variables in the
analysis had any effect, except for the year dummy variables.  The exceptions
were that, for those who prefer the trailing candidate, education and age are
positively correlated with expecting the race to be close.  It would not be
surprising if experience and knowledge help to dampen the false consensus effect.
In the partisan-scaled pooled analysis, the results again show very little effect (See
Table 3.3).  In fact, Democrats and Republicans were completely unmoved by the key
independent variables.  Counter intuitively, as the gap between the candidates widens,
Independents become more likely to expect that the race will be close, although the
interactive term again shows a weak, negative relationship with expecting a close race.
A closer look, in which the analysis is repeated for each election from 1972 to
2000, again shows only a sporadic relationship between the polls and voter expectations.
When all respondents are considered as a whole, the interactive term is only significant in
1972, and then with an unexpected sign (See Table 3.4).  Media exposure is also only
significant in 1972, and in this case the impact is comparatively sizeable and in the
expected direction.  Since this election was never close, this is perhaps not surprising.  On
the other hand, the actual gap between the candidates has a positive effect on predicting a
close race in both 1984 and 2000.  If the polls moved in a linear fashion during either of
those races, this could be construed as simply a time effect.  So, for example, if the gap
narrowed slightly over the course of the campaign, it could be that people interviewed
earlier were more likely to expect a close race than those interviewed later.  However,
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this is clearly not the case, since in both years the poll results fluctuate over the course of
the campaign, with each candidate gaining support at various points during the race.
For those who prefer the leading candidate, there is again almost no effect (See
Table 3.5).  In fact, only one of the three key independent variables, poll margin, has any
effect, and then only in one election – 1976.  Those who are undecided going into the
campaign are also almost entirely unaffected (See Table 3.7).  Again, there is only one
significant effect for this group, a positive impact of the interactive term in 1996.  Finally,
those who prefer the trailing candidate have an almost identical set of results to the
sample as a whole, suggesting that it is this group that is driving those results (See Table




The Impact of Polling Information on Perception of the
Closeness of the Race in Each Election, from 1972 to 2000
Dividing the Sample by Pre-Election Preference
Whole Sample









































































































































N 2169 1243 1037 1564 1509 1824 1332 1270
Pseudo
R2
.025 .054 .009 .025 .015 .021 .013 .050
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 3.5
The Impact of Polling Information on Perception of the
Closeness of the Race in Each Election, from 1972 to 2000
Dividing the Sample by Pre-Election Preference
Prefer Leader









































































































































N 1343 571 407 842 710 894 752 508
Pseudo
R2
.024 .077 .018 .026 .024 .015 .071 .005
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 3.6
The Impact of Polling Information on Perception of the
Closeness of the Race in Each Election, from 1972 to 2000
Dividing the Sample by Pre-Election Preference
Prefer Trailer









































































































































N 583 501 403 586 636 585 411 594
Pseudo
R2
.024 .037 .028 .011 .015 .054 .042 .067
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 3.7
The Impact of Polling Information on Perception of the
Closeness of the Race in Each Election, from 1972 to 2000
Dividing the Sample by Pre-Election Preference
Don’t Know

































































































































N 14 12 212 122 153 337 142 157
Pseudo
R2
.119 1.000 .034 .031 .033 .065 .164 0.115
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
The story is similar when the sample is divided along partisan lines (See Tables
3.8, 3.9, and 3.10).  For Democrats, all three variables are significantly correlated with
expectations in 1972.  While they become less likely to expect a close race as the gap
widens, and as they are exposed to more information about the race, the interactive term
is positive, suggesting that they were resisting the message.  The effect is similar, if
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weaker in 1976.  Then, however, they are entirely unaffected until the 2000 race, when
only the actual gap on the date of the interview has an effect, as they became more likely
to believe the race would be close as the gap widened.  For Republicans, as for those who
prefer the leading candidate, there is only one significant effect across the range of the
analysis, this time a positive and significant effect of the poll margin in 1984.  This in
counterintuitive, since their party’s nominee was in the lead, and this information should
have been readily accepted.  Independents had more mixed results.  The interactive term
was negative and significant in 1988, but positive and significant in 1992.  This is
surprising because the poll results were actually closer in 1988.  It would seem logical
that exposure to the larger gap would have the more expected effect of leading
respondents to expect a landslide.  Just the opposite was true.  Meanwhile, media
exposure itself had exactly the opposite effects in the two elections.  The more someone
paid attention to media coverage in 1988, the more likely they were to expect a close
race, while the more someone paid attention to media coverage in 1992, the less likely
they were to expect a close race.  Finally for Independents, the larger the gap and the




The Impact of Polling Information on Perception of the
Closeness of the Race in Each Election, from 1972 to 2000
Dividing the Sample by Party Identification
Democrat









































































































































N 1115 669 534 754 722 913 709 634
Pseudo
R2
.024 .056 .015 .016 0.011 .018 .041 .070
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 3.9
The Impact of Polling Information on Perception of the
Closeness of the Race in Each Election, from 1972 to 2000
Dividing the Sample by Party Identification
Republican









































































































































N 785 418 373 647 637 689 512 493
Pseudo
R2
.024 .074 .017 .038 .033 .056 0.032 .024
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 3.10
The Impact of Polling Information on Perception of the
Closeness of the Race in Each Election, from 1972 to 2000
Dividing the Sample by Party Identification
Independent









































































































































N 247 148 122 147 138 206 105 126
Pseudo R2 .057 .054 .030 .028 .051 .052 .057 .272
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
All of the above, of course, has focused on how the polls affect an individual’s
perceptions about the state of the race.  This begs the question, obviously, of whether or
not the respondents’ perceptions about the state of the race affect turnout.  The result is
that there is surprisingly little effect (See Table 3.11).  Although believing that the race
will be close is positively and significantly correlated with turnout, the actual effect of
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predicting a tight race is to increase the probability that a given respondent will vote by
about two percent, holding other variables to their means.
Table 3.11
































N 11749 Pseudo R2 .174
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
The first experiment, which used information about the actual Texas Governor’s race
as the backdrop for gauging voter decisions,  shows a pattern that is consistent with the
aggregate survey analysis of respondents’ expectations about the outcome of the race
(See Table 3.12), if it does not approach the level of statistical significance.  It is clear
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that the participants in the experiment were affected by the results of the polls presented
to them.  The control group was fairly evenly split in its expectations about who would
win the governors race.  Those who were told that Perry was slightly in the lead, but well
within the margin of error, were more convinced that Perry would win the election, while
those in the last group overwhelmingly
Table 3.12
Respondents’ Predictions of the Outcome of the Gubernatorial Election33
All Democrats
PB PC SC SB PB PC SC SB
Control 9.7 38.7 38.7 3.2 30.0 50.0 20.0 0.0
Race Tied 3.3 56.7 40.0 0.0 0.0 61.5 38.5 0.0
Perry Big
Lead
43.3 50.0 6.7 0.0 41.7 50.0 8.3 0.0
Total 18.7 48.4 28.6 1.1 22.9 54.3 22.9 0.0
N 17 44 26 1 8 19 8 0
N 91 35
Republicans Independents
PB PC SC SB PB PC SC SB
Control 0.0 60.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 56.3 6.3
Race Tied 0.0 80.0 20.0 0.0 8.3 41.7 50.0 0.0
Perry Big
Lead
57.1 42.9 0.0 0.0 36.4 54.5 9.1 0.0
Total 23.5 58.8 11.8 0.0 12.8 38.5 41.0 2.6
N 4 10 2 0 5 15 16 1
N 17 39
                                                 
33 PB – Perry wins in a blowout.  PC – Perry wins in a close race, SC – Sanchez wins in a close race, SB –
Sanchez wins in a blowout.  Some rows do not add up to 100%, as some respondents predicted that
someone else would win the election.
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predict a Perry victory.  Democrats and Republicans in the control group show
surprisingly few differences in their expectations.  There are, however, slight differences
in the way that they react to information about the race, with a larger percentage of
Republicans predicting both a Perry victory, and a Perry landslide than Democrats in
each group.  Self-identified Independents are surprisingly confident of a Sanchez victory.
Whether this was because of a lack of information about the race, or because these
Independents were disproportionately likely to lean toward the Democratic Party is
unclear.
An analysis of the participants turnout intentions shows a much clearer pattern,
although one that, again, does not reach the level of statistical significance, except in one
case.  Self-identified Democrats and Republicans react in very different ways (See Table
3.13).  For Democrats who were told that Tony Sanchez was running in a virtual tie with
Rick Perry in the latest poll, expected turnout increased dramatically over those in the
control group, from 60 to 85%.  Those who were told that Perry enjoyed a large lead in
the race, however, expected to turnout to vote at a 75% rate.  Meanwhile, Republicans
acted in just the opposite directions.  Those who were told that the race was tied were less
likely to predict that they would vote, dropping from 80 to 60%.  Every Republican in the
group which was told that Perry was well ahead in the polls expected to vote in
November.  Why would these differences result?  The most likely explanation has to do
with the respondents expectations.  Although few poll results were released during the
course of the campaign, Perry seemed comfortably ahead for the bulk of the campaign.
(In fact, he won the election by a very comfortable margin, despite being outspent by his
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opponent.)  To Democrats, then, who were told that their candidate had managed to pull
into a tie, the poll results would only increase the chances that they would want to show
up.  The article gave them hope that their candidate could win.  For Republicans,
however, the result was just the opposite.  A candidate they felt would win easily
suddenly seemed in trouble.  It is possible that this was disheartening for them, and
therefore fewer of them wanted to show up on election day.  The other experimental
condition, in which they were given an article which told them that Perry was well in the
lead would have confirmed for Democrats what they most likely expected to be true
anyway, while for Republicans, it confirmed what they wanted to be true.  Thus, a
smaller percentage of Democrats felt the urge to vote than did when they were told that
the race was close.  At the same time, Republicans, encouraged by the results were
perhaps more motivated to show up.  In both cases, however, respondents from this group
were more likely to want to plan on voting, which is most likely the result of being
reminded about the election itself, something that the control group did not come across
until being asked this question near the end of the second survey.
Table 3.13
The Effect of Polls on Turnout, By Party
Experiment 1
All Democrats Republicans Independents N
Control 61.3 60.0 80.0 56.3 31






Total 63.7 74.3 82.4 46.2 91
N 91 35 17 39
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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The second set of experiments also reveal some interesting differences.  When all
participants are considered as a whole, their behavior follows a very Downsian pattern,
with a neat and statistically significant decline in turnout as the gap between the two
candidates widens (See Table 3.14).  This pattern is replicated by the first group, which
had a strong incentive to support the candidate of the plaid party.  For those in the second
group, which had a significantly weaker incentive, turnout does not decline until the race
is clearly out of reach, with statistically significant declines as the gap moves from zero
to fifteen points, and as the lead moves from five to fifteen points.  Moving from a tied
race to a five point lead for their candidate, however, produced no effect on turnout.  The
Table 3.14
The Effect of Polls on Turnout, By Payout
Comparison within Payout
Experiment 2
All .75 L, .25
T34
.55 L, .45 T .25 L, .75 T N
Race Tied 78.8 85.1 77.2 73.4 245












Total 74.1 78.3 75.7 68.3 735
N 735 249 243 243
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
                                                 
34 In these tables, the figures in this row represent the payout for the participants, depending on the outcome
of the vote.  Thus, .72 L, .25 T translates to 75 cents for the participant if the leading candidate wins and 25
cents if the trailing candidate wins.  For more information about how the experiments were conducted, see
Chapter 2.
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results are even weaker for the third group, which had a strong incentive to support the
trailing candidate.  For this group, the only significant decline comes in the comparison
between a deadlocked race and a race in which their candidate is trailing by fifteen
points.
Discussion
From the survey data, we can conclude that when polls have any effect on
individuals’ decisions about whether or not to vote, they do so to a surprisingly small
degree.  The impact of the state of the race on an individual’s perceptions about the
closeness of the election is generally very small and extremely sporadic.  Although there
are some instances, especially in 1972, a race in which a popular incumbent president had
a large lead from start to finish, in which there is a notable effect, those effects do not
carry over to comparable elections like 1984, or to a slightly lesser extent, 1996.
Furthermore, the impact itself is not very predictable.  If, for example, an increase in one
candidate’s lead over another always caused people to doubt that the race were going to
be close, it would be clear that people were reacting directly to the information presented
in the press.  If the impact varied systematically with the respondents’ expressed
preferences or party identification, it would be easy to argue that those preferences were
effectively filtering new information from the campaign, and thus helping to shape each
individual’s reaction to that new information.  Instead, we find little, if anything.  This
fact is in and of itself extremely surprising.  If the actual measure that is available to
voters of the relative standing of the candidates is not driving their perceptions, we are
left to wonder about what is driving citizen’s perceptions.  It is clear from the aggregate
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picture that people, if they do not just believe what they want to believe, are at least
affected in their beliefs by what they want to believe.  Just as surprising is the weak affect
that the individual’s perception of the closeness of the race has on the turnout decision.
There is an undeniable logic to the argument that individuals should give more weight to
their votes when an election is close than when the outcome is easily predicted.  Clearly,
however, something else is driving the decision.
The experiments, which allowed for much greater control over the poll results and the
participants exposure to them, present a slightly different effect.  Here, visible differences
did emerge, correlated with respondents’ preferences.  In the first election, Democrats
and Republicans reacted very differently to reports about the state of the race in the Texas
gubernatorial election.  Although the small number of participants kept the results below
the threshold of statistical significance, the results make a lot of sense.  Democrats who
were given unexpectedly good news seemed energized, while those who received more
realistic news were less enthusiastic about showing up to vote.  Republicans given
unexpectedly bad news were deflated, while those who were told that their expectations
were accurate were very likely to show up on Election Day.  Similarly, the second
experiment showed a different reaction to the same information.  Those with a clear
preference for the candidate in the lead made the rational decision to abstain as the gap
between the candidates increased.  Those with weaker preferences or those with a strong
preference for the trailing candidate reacted more slowly to the same information.  This
hints at a resistance to the information, born out of either uncertainty or a resistance to
negative information.
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How, then, can we explain the discrepancies in the results?  The most likely
explanation is that the tendency to be affected by polls and to consider how close the race
is going to be before deciding whether or not to vote is present in average citizens.  They
very likely could recognize the Downsian prediction in their own thoughts.  It also seems,
from the experiments and from the aggregate analysis, that their preferences do play a
role in helping to shape those perceptions and decisions.  However, those tendencies are
swamped in an actual election by other considerations.  Whether it is an attachment to
one of the political parties, an attachment to one of the candidates, or simply, as Riker
and Ordeshook posit, a sense of duty that is ingrained in them as part of their political
socialization, the real impetus about whether or not to vote is influenced by something
other than our ability to actually affect the outcome of an election.  In the experiments, in
which these things were either weaker or entirely lacking because of the artificial
environment, individuals were more free to act in accordance with these expectations.  In
some ways, this is actually encouraging.  If one assumes that, all else being equal, higher
turnout is better than lower turnout in an election, then the fact that there is some factor
creating a base of voters in presidential elections, regardless of the actual circumstances
of elections is a positive one.  It also means that the heavy emphasis by the media on the
horse-race during presidential election campaigns is not likely a contributing factor in the
decline in turnout over the past half century.  Since polls are unlikely to go away any time
in the near future, and since presidential elections are won by a comfortable margin at
least as often as they are within the margin of error on the eve of the elections, this can
only be a positive finding.
122
Chapter 4
The intense media coverage of public opinion polls may also affect those who are
considering voting for someone other than the two major party candidates in an election,
particularly because that information may increase the chances that voters may act
strategically in presidential elections.  An individual is considered to have voted
strategically when he weighs not only his relative preferences among the candidates, but
also their relative viability among the rest of the electorate.  If a voter’s most preferred
candidate is unlikely to win, he may opt to vote for his second choice if doing so can help
prevent his least preferred candidate from winning.  Strategic voting is often explained
either as an individual level phenomenon, in which voters attempt not to waste their votes
on a candidate with no chance of winning or a system level phenomenon, in which the
electoral structure (SMSP) forces minor parties out of the running.  In fact, it is likely that
both are at work.
Logically, voters are more likely to act strategically as their preference for the second
candidate in the polls increases over the leader, and as the gap between these candidates
decreases.  The more that an individual fears a victory by the leading candidate, the more
incentive he has to try to prevent that victory, and the best way to do that is to turn to the
most viable alternative.  Additionally, the closer the race becomes between the top two
candidates, the greater the chance that a third party’s supporters will be able to influence
the outcome.  These ideas fit well into the Downsian vote model used in earlier chapters,
since it includes both comparative preferences and the probability of influencing the
outcome (Ordeshook and Zeng,1997). Obviously, this concept is not limited to political
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science, as evidenced by the arguments made by many Democrats in 2000 that Ralph
Nader’s supporters cost Al Gore the election.
Research seems to indicate that many voters do act strategically.  In both general
elections and primaries with crowded fields, voters seem to react to the viability of
candidates when deciding whom to vote for (Cain 1978, Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and
Rohde 1992, and Abramson, Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and Rohde 1995). There are
doubters, however, as other authors have failed to find strategic voting in primary
elections, particularly when voters cross over to the other party’s primary (Abramowitz,
McGlennon, and Rapoport 1981).  The very idea of strategic voting, of course, relies on
the voter having the necessary information to act strategically, information which most
commonly comes through the results of tracking polls publicized during the campaign.
Although the literature on strategic voting does more explicitly deal with polling
information than the work on turnout or candidate preference usually does, it is somewhat
limited.  First, most of the work in this area deals with primary elections.  This is both
useful and reasonable, since primary elections are themselves interesting and important
events, and because primary elections are more likely than general elections to have more
than two nationally known candidates.  However, there is reason to believe that general
election voters faced with multiple candidate fields may act differently than primary
electorates.  In a primary, all of the candidates are of the same party, decreasing the
chances of voters have strong preferences among the candidates on the order of the
differences possible in a general election.  Certainly, the differences between the
Republican and Democratic candidates are more likely to matter to voters than are the
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differences between two members of the same party.  Additionally, this literature still
assumes that people react to the polls in the same way.  Strategic voting should really be
considered to be a three-fold decision – first to abandon the third place candidate, second
to choose to show up on election day and cast a vote anyway, and finally to support the
candidate in second place in the election.  While some voters undoubtedly act in this way,
information about the state of the race can just as easily have other effects on these
potential voters.  Some may instead simply opt out of the election, while others may, in
fact, abandon the trailing candidate and instead use the polls as an information shortcut to
decide which of the two major party candidates they should support.  Therefore, I will
examine these decisions in more detail.
Three Key Decisions
There are several reasons to abandon a third party candidate in an election, even if a
voter likes that candidate.  Some potential third party supporters may have their normal
party affiliations reawakened during the campaign by the actions of their party’s
nominee.  For example, some Democrats who flirted with the idea of voting for Nader in
2000 may have improved their evaluations of Gore during the campaign, and thus simply
decided to return to their habitual party support.  Others may abandon the last place
candidate because, after learning more about that person’s policy positions and
background, they realize that they would not prefer that that person become president.
John Anderson, Ross Perot, and Ralph Nader were all public figures to varying degrees
before they announced their bids for the presidency, but undoubtedly much of the public
learned far more about them during the course of the campaign than they knew
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beforehand.   It is extremely unlikely that everyone who was initially intrigued by these
candidates maintained a positive view of them by Election Day.  Potential third party
supporters may also abandon a candidate because of a realization that this person is
simply not going to win.  Although people may well be able to fool themselves into
thinking that their candidate has a chance to win despite the contrary evidence, this is
probably much easier to do for supporters of a candidate with double digit support in the
polls than for supporters of a candidate whose level of support in the latest polls is lower
than the margin of error.  In fact, many third party candidates try to deal with this
expectation directly, as Anderson did in a campaign brochure sent to potential supporters
in 1980 which informed them that “Most polls show that if people believe John Anderson
can win, he will win”35 This reasoning, of course, would be entirely consistent with
voting strategically, but it is not necessarily strategic in and of itself.  If an individual
simply wants to avoid wasting her vote, there is no reason that she cannot just as easily
vote for a candidate with a comfortable lead, as easily as she could vote for a candidate
with a small deficit to overcome in the polls.  Finally, a third party supporter may
abandon a candidate because the race between the two leading candidates tightens, and he
does not want his vote to cost his second most preferred candidate the race.
Abandoning a third party candidate, however, does not guarantee that an individual
will then throw her support behind one of the other candidates.  Some third party
supporters may simply become disillusioned by their candidate’s inability to win support
among the rest of the electorate and decide to abandon the election altogether.
                                                 
35 http://www.4president.org/brochures/andersonlucey80.pdf
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Individuals who most strongly prefer the last place candidate would seem to be the most
likely to refuse to participate once they had decided that voting for the candidate they like
the most is not worth the effort.  The state of the race may also play a role here.  If the
two major party candidates are locked in a tight race, it should increase the incentive for
former third party supporters to stay involved.  If, on the other hand, the results of the
election seem inevitable, they should be more likely to choose not to get involved.
Finally, those who do decide to vote must then choose from the two remaining
candidates.  They could, of course, fall back on party identification, which would be very
likely for those whose latent partisanship was activated by one of the two major party
candidates during the election.  They may also act purely strategically, opting for the
candidate who is closer to them on the issues or whom they prefer for other reasons, such
as charisma, character, or experience.  It is also possible, however, that some voters in
this category may look to the polls as a guide to determine which candidate to prefer.
Not only can this serve as an information shortcut to determine which candidate is better,
but people who abandon a candidate that they have become convinced cannot win may
also simply want to jump on the winner’s bandwagon.
Methods
In order to examine these decisions I again utilized both National Election Studies
data, as well as data generated from experiments.  Perhaps even more than in the earlier
chapters, the use of multiple methods is essential to a study of potential strategic voters.
Since voting for someone other than one of the two major party candidates for president
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is strongly discouraged, both by partisan attachments and by the realities of a system
which lead many to argue that voting for a third party is the equivalent of wasting a vote,
identifying those who would consider voting for a third party in the real world is tricky,
and finding vastly different real elections involving more than two nationally recognized
candidates is extremely difficult.  Experiments, therefore, which allow these potential
third party voters, as well as the varying situations which third party supporters may face,
to essentially be created, provide an opportunity to judge how people would act in a range
of situations, with much greater control over the information affecting their decisions.
Experiments alone, however, are not enough.  Those who do vote for third party
candidates, or even seriously consider voting for third party candidates are acting in an
unusual fashion in American elections.  Their behavior may suggest either a very strong
attachment to candidates, parties, or ideas generally outside of the mainstream, or a
particular dislike of the major party candidates.  In either case, the intensity of their
feelings about the candidates is not something that can be sufficiently replicated in an
experimental setting.  Real citizens, with real preferences need to be examined in a
strategic voting context, something that can best be done by survey research.  While both
of these methods have their limitations, the combination of the two can provide a much
greater insight into the way that these individuals act.
For the survey research portion of the analysis, I used a pooled sample of voters
from the 1980, 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections, the most recent elections in which a third
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party candidate received a significant amount of media attention during the campaign.36
These candidates, John Anderson, Ross Perot, and Ralph Nader, clearly had varying
levels of success, and also competed in very different situations.  Anderson was a long
time Republican Congressman, and, alone among these third party candidates, had
competed and lost in his party’s primaries.  His campaign was also unique in its attempt
to cast itself as the only centrist campaign in the race, painting Reagan as too
conservative, and Carter as too liberal to meet the demands of the mainstream.  His
campaign generated a level of support that is historically significant for a third party
candidate, but which fell short of preventing Reagan from winning a majority in the
election.  Interestingly, however, his supporters may have felt more pressure than those
most to switch, as polls showed that the race between Reagan and Carter remained within
the margin of error until the weekend before the election.  Perot was a very different type
of candidate, and his supporters faced a much different situation in 1992.  Unlike
Anderson or Nader, Perot essentially positioned himself as a contrast to both the
Democrats and Republicans on a platform of reform and government responsibility,
rather than as either more liberal, more conservative, or more centrist than the other
candidates.  Perot also entered the race as an outsider, who had been involved in political
issues, but never served in government, and relied on his business credentials in favor of
any direct political experience.  Perot, of course, had the best showing of any third party
candidate since Teddy Roosevelt, and, at least over the summer, even seemed like a truly
viable candidate.  Certainly, his 19% of the vote was enough to tip the election toward
                                                 
36 The 1968 election is not included because several key questions used in this analysis were not asked by
the NES at that time.
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George Bush, or to ensure a Bill Clinton landslide, had his supporters defected and
thrown their support behind one or the other.  However, because of his relatively high
level of support, his backers probably were best able to convince themselves that victory
was possible of any third party supporters in recent memory.  Perot’s campaign in 1996,
however, faced a much different situation.  Rather than facing a relatively unpopular
incumbent, and a relatively unknown challenger, Perot faced a popular incumbent and a
relatively well known challenger.  For this reason, as well as perhaps because of his
failure in 1992, he was able to generate less than half of the support in 1996 that he did in
1992.  His supporters probably felt the least pressure to defect, however, since the
coverage of the race throughout the campaign focused on the almost inevitability of
Clinton’s reelection.   Nader, on the other hand, presented a classic example of a situation
ripe for strategic voting – he was very clearly on the same side of the ideological
spectrum as the candidate in second place for most of the campaign, and the race between
the two major parties was so close that his supporters, though relatively few in number,
could either tip the election toward Gore if they acted strategically, or cost him the
election, as they likely did, if they voted strictly based on their preferences.  The voters in
this pooled analysis, therefore, faced essentially the entire range of possible scenarios for
third party supporters.
This analysis is based on three models, each relating to one of the decisions
mentioned above – the decision to abandon a third place candidate, the decision to vote,
and the choice of which major party candidate to support.  The first model starts with all
voters who considered voting for a third party candidate at some point during the
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election.37  I examined the probability that they would abandon this candidate, either by
voting for one of the two major party candidates or by deciding not to vote in the election
at all.  Several key independent variables were included in the analysis.  First, I included
the lead of the first place candidate over the second place candidate in the most recent
Gallup poll on the day of their pre-election interviews, as and indication of the closeness
of the race.  Second, I included the gap between the second and third place candidates in
the race from the same poll, which indicates the viability of the third place candidate.  If
these respondents are acting strategically, then they should be more likely to abandon a
third place candidate the smaller the gap between the first and second place candidates,
but less likely to abandon him as the distance in the polls between the second and third
place candidates narrow.  After all, if a third place candidate can surge ahead of one of
the two major party candidates, it is no longer strategic to abandon him.  As noted above,
those who abandon a third party candidate may be responding to their prior party
affiliation or become interested in supporting one of the two major party candidates,
rather than acting from any strategic considerations.  Therefore, I also include the
respondents’ partisan intensity and their feeling thermometer ratings for all three
candidates.  Stronger partisans, and those who like one or both of the two major party
candidates should be more likely to abandon a third party candidate, while those who
favor the third party candidate the most intensely should be less likely to abandon him.
Of course, candidate preference may also come from issue positions, rather than a feeling
                                                 
37 These respondents reported voting for a third party candidate, expressed a preference for a third party
candidate during the pre-election interview, or listed a third party candidate as someone they considered
voting for, or would have voted for if they had been allowed to cast more than one vote.
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of “warmth” toward a particular candidate.  For that reason I also include a measure of
issue distance from the leading and trailing candidates.38  Finally, I include a dummy
variable identifying those respondents who reported that they were either “extremely
liberal” or “extremely conservative”.  Since our system tends to force both major parties
toward the center of the ideological spectrum (Downs 1957), individuals who not only
have opinions that put them on the wings of the American ideological spectrum, but who
also are willing to identify themselves as “extreme” should be less likely to abandon a
third alternative.  These are likely to be among the same people who are unhappy with
the two party system itself, and would therefore have an incentive to try to prop up third
parties in an attempt to make them viable in the long term.  I also control for education,
income, age, efficacy, media exposure, and political knowledge, all of which could affect
an individual’s ability to act strategically in an election.  This model is best represented
as:
5. Pr (Abandon 3rd Party = 1) = F(β1 + β2 * Gap between 1
st and 2nd place
candidates + β3 * Gap between 2
nd and 3rd place candidates + β4 * Partisan
intensity + β5 * Feeling Thermometer (Leading Candidate) + β6 * Feeling
Thermometer (Trailing Candidate) + β7 * Feeling Thermometer (3
rd Party
Candidate) + β8 * Issue Distance to Leading Candidate + β9 * Issue
Distance to Trailing Candidate + β10 * Education + β11 * Age + β12 *
Income + β13 * Efficacy + β14 * Political Knowledge + β15 * Self-
described extreme ideology + β16 * Media Exposure + β16 * year dummy
variables)
where F is the probit cumulative density function.
                                                 
38 This scale is created by summing the absolute value of the respondents’ differences, on a 1 to 7 scale, of
the respondents’ self reported positions on government services, abortion, and ideology from the mean
score of all respondents in that year for each of the candidates on each of the issues.
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The second model then looks at those who have abandoned the third party
candidate and examines whether or not they vote on Election Day.  This model again
looks at the information available to respondents about the state of the race.  I expect that
as the race between the top two candidates in the election tightens, individuals who have
abandoned the third place candidate should be more likely to remain part of the process
by voting, as the strategic voting literature would predict.  I also expect that turnout
should decline as the gap between the second and third place candidates increases.  The
further the third party candidate falls behind, the more likely that some of these voters are
abandoning him, not out of strategic considerations, but because they have given up.  For
some reason, whether it be the ignorance of the masses, the bias of the media, the fact
that their candidate was excluded from the debates, or unfair advantages in fundraising
available to Democrats and Republicans, their most preferred candidate seems doomed to
failure, and they give up on the process entirely.  Since those who abandoned a third
party candidate may actually come to prefer one of the two major party candidates, I also
include partisan intensity and the feeling thermometer ratings for these two candidates.  I
expect each of them to be positively related to turnout, since individuals with strong party
attachments or positive opinions of one or more of the remaining candidates should be
more likely to vote.  I also include the respondents’ feeling thermometer rating of the
third party candidate.  I expect this to be negatively related to turnout, since those who
like the third party candidate the most, but have still abandoned him are more likely to be
despondent than to be acting strategically.  I also control for a series of variables
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generally considered to be related to turnout – education, age, income, efficacy, length of
residency, party contact, and political knowledge.  This model is best represent as:
6. Pr (Turnout = 1) = F(β1 + β2 * Gap between 1
st and 2nd place candidates +
β3 * Gap between 2
nd and 3rd place candidates + β4 * Partisan intensity +
β5 * Feeling Thermometer (Leading Candidate) + β6 * Feeling
Thermometer (Trailing Candidate) + β7 * Feeling Thermometer (3
rd Party
Candidate) + β8 * Education + β9 * Age + β10 * Income + β11 * Efficacy +
β12 * Residency + β13 * Contacted by one or more of the parties + β14 *
Political Knowledge + β15 * year dummy variables)
where F is the probit cumulative density function.
The final model then examines the vote choice decisions of those who do decide to
participate in the election.  If these are voters who have simply abandoned a losing cause,
they may well be influenced by the popularity of the candidates.  Therefore, the model,
which has as its dependent variable whether or not the individual voted for the candidate
who is leading in the polls, includes the measure of the leading candidate’s margin over
the trailing candidate on the day of the pre-election interview.  If this is positively
correlated with voting for the leading candidate, then it would indicate that
bandwagoning was driving at least some of these voters, rather than strategic
considerations.  The model also tests for strategic voting by including the measures of
issue distance and thermometer scores for each candidate.  If these are significant and in
the expected direction, it would lend support to the hypothesis that these individual are
acting in a strategic fashion.  Of course, again, this in and of itself would not disprove the
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theory that they were moving instead to support a major party candidate that they have
decided they prefer over the third party candidate.  The model also controls for other
correlates of vote choice – party identification, education, age, income, and efficacy.  It is
best represented as:
7. Pr (Vote for leading candidate = 1) = F(β1 + β2 * Gap between 1
st and 2nd
place candidates + β3 * Issue distance to the leading candidate + β4 * Issue
distance to the trailing candidate + β5 * Feeling Thermometer (Leading
Candidate) + β6 * Feeling Thermometer (Trailing Candidate) + β7 * Party
ID (scaled toward the leading candidate) + β8 * Education + β9 * Age +
β10 * Income + β11 * Efficacy + β12 * year dummy variables
where F is the probit cumulative density function.
Experiments
In addition to the survey results, I also examined the results of a series of
simulated elections run as part of the same experiments described in Chapter 2.39  After
the participants had completed the 15 simulated elections involving two-candidate races,
they then used the same procedure to run 10 additional simulated elections involving
three candidates.  While the basic procedure for these simulated elections was the same,
there were some key differences between these and the two-candidate races.  First, in
contrast to the earlier experiments, these participants were explicitly told that the
candidate in third place was closest to their views on issues and would carry for them the
                                                 
39 For a full description of the experiments, along with examples of the instrument used, please see the
Appendix.
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highest payout if elected.  Second, of course, the poll results had to change from the
earlier set of elections.  In some of the elections, the polls indicated a relatively tight
three-way race, in which their most preferred candidate had substantial support, but was
still clearly in last place.  In others, the polls showed a close race between the first and
second place candidates, in which the third place candidate had very little support, but
enough to swing the election to the second place candidate.  Finally, some polls reflected
a large gap between the first and second place candidates, with the third place candidate
trailing without enough support to affect the outcome.  Third, the payouts were also
different.   While the participants knew in each case that the highest payout was
associated with a victory by the third place candidate, they still had to determine which of
the other two candidates was associated with which payout.  In each election, one group
was given a payout schedule in which a victory by the third place candidate would be
worth $0.75, with the other two candidates worth either $0.15 or $0.50.  A second group
was also told that a victory by the third place candidate would be worth $0.75 to them,
but that victories by one of the other two candidates would either be worth $0.20 or $0.30
to them.  For the third group, a victory by the third place candidate would only be worth
$0.50, while a victory by one of the other candidates would be worth either $0.35 or
$0.40.
The rest of the procedure was identical to the previous simulated elections.  Once
again, they were given limited information about the issue preferences of the first and
second place candidates, as well as limited information about their own preferences on
the same set of issues, so that some respondents would easily be able to tell which
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candidate should be their second choice and which their third, while others had much less
useful information to work with.  Once again, they were told that voting would cost them
$0.05, but that their payout would be determined solely by the results of the election,
regardless of whether or not they participated.  Finally, they were again asked at the
conclusion of each simulated election whether or not they would vote and which
candidate they would choose, if they were to vote.
Expectations
This preceding discussion can be summarized through the following eleven
hypotheses:
H7:  As the gap between the first and second place candidates narrows,
individuals considering voting for the third place candidate should become more
likely to abandon that candidate.
H8:  As the gap between the second and third place candidate increases,
individuals considering voting for the third place candidate should become more
likely to abandon that candidate.
H9:  Individuals with strong partisan attachments and individuals who have
positive views of or shared opinions with one or both of the major party
candidates should be more likely to abandon the third place candidate.
H10:  Individuals with positive evaluations of the third place candidate should be
more likely to continue to support that candidate.
H11:  Individuals who consider themselves to be ideologically extreme should be
more likely to continue to support the third place candidate.
H12:  As the gap between the first and second place candidates narrows,
individuals who have abandoned the third place candidate should be more likely
to turnout to vote.
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H13:  As the gap between the second and third place candidate increases,
individuals who have abandoned the third place candidate should be less likely to
turnout to vote.
H14:  Individuals with strong partisan attachments and individuals who have
positive views of one or both of the major party candidates should be more likely
to turnout to vote.
H15:  Individuals with positive evaluations of the third place candidate should be
less likely to turnout to vote.
H16:  As the gap between the first and second place candidates increases,
individuals who have abandoned the third party candidate should be more likely
to vote for the front runner.
H17:  The more positively that an individual who has abandoned the third party
candidate feels about a candidate, and the closer the individual is to a candidate
ideologically, the more likely he will be to vote for that candidates.
Results
The results of the first model show no support for the idea that the tightness of the
race at the top influences the decision to abandon the third place candidate (See Table
4.1).  The gap between the first and second place candidates seems to have no impact on
the probability that an individual who considered the third party candidate will abandon
that person during the campaign.  The other key independent variables in the model,
however, are much more significant.  The gap between the second and third place
candidate in the race does have a strong effect on the probability that an individual will
abandon the third party candidate, but it is a surprising one.  Instead of meeting the
expectation that viability would encourage further support, it instead seems to discourage
it.  In fact, a change from a candidate with Perot-like support to a candidate with Nader’s
level of support decreases the probability that an individual will abandon the third party
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candidate by about 12%.  And individual’s thermometer rating of the third party
candidate, on the other hand, is significant and acts in the expected direction.  Those who
like the third party candidate the most are, in fact, the least likely to abandon him.  Those
who are neutral toward the third party candidate are roughly 30% more likely to abandon
him than those who give him a rating of 100.  Similarly, those who identify themselves as
politically extreme are also significantly less likely to abandon the third party candidate,
as expected.  Partisan intensity and the thermometer ratings of the two leading candidates
are also significantly correlated with abandoning the third party candidate and act in the
expected fashion.  Stronger partisans, as well as those who feel positively about one or
both of the two major party candidates are more likely to choose to do something other
than vote for a third party candidate.  The major party candidates’ issue proximity to the
participant, however, acts in a way that contradicts my expectations.  The issue distance
to the leading candidate has no significant impact on the decision to abandon the third
place candidate, while the distance to the trailing candidate is actually negatively related
to abandoning the third party candidate.  So, respondents’ distance from the leading
candidate, which would seem to be an important part of the strategic voting calculus, is
unimportant, while individuals who are ideologically close to the trailing candidate are
actually less likely to leave the third party candidate than are those who differ greatly
from the trailing candidate.  In fact, moving across the range of the sample, from those
who were virtually indistinguishable from the trailing candidate’s positions on issues to
those who differed from that candidate by an average of four points on a seven point
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Table 4.1
The Probability of Abandoning the Third Party Candidate
Variables Respondents who considered voting for
the third party candidate
























































scale, increases the probability of abandoning the last place candidate by about sixteen
percentage points.
The second model also produces mixed results (See Table 4.2).  This table
presents both the results for those who abandoned the third party candidate, as well as for
all respondents, to gauge not only what the impact is of these independent variables, but
also to see if the effect is different on those who have abandoned the third party candidate
than it is for all respondents.  Once again, the gap between the two leading candidates in
the race has no effect on the decision to vote.  Individuals who have abandoned the third
party candidate do not seem to be weighing the chance that their vote will influence the
election in deciding whether or not to show up in November.  This holds true for both
groups.  The gap between the second and third place candidates, however, matters,
although again it acts in an unexpected manner.  Instead of discouraging people who have
abandoned the third party candidate from voting, a large gap between him and the second
place candidate instead seems to encourage participation.  The impact, while relatively
small, is greater for those who have abandoned the third party candidate than it is for all
respondents.  As you move across the range in the sample, the increase in the probability
of turning out to vote for all respondents is about 3 percentage points, while it is about 8
percentage points for those who have abandoned the third party candidate.  The
respondent’s partisan intensity is also positively and significantly related to turnout for
both groups.  The thermometer ratings of the candidate, however, present a contrast
between the two groups.  While the thermometer ratings of the leading and trailing
candidates show a weak, but positive and statistically significant effect on the
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Table 4.2
The Probability of Turning Out to Vote
Variables Respondents who
abandoned the third party
candidate
All Respondents















































































Psuedo R2 .341 .226
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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probability of voting for those who have abandoned the third place candidate, these
variables have no impact whatsoever on the sample as a whole.  Similarly, the
thermometer rating of the third place candidate has the expected negative and statistically
significant impact on the probability of voting for those who have abandoned the third
party candidate, but is insignificant for the sample as a whole.  The other controls,
education, age, income, efficacy, length of residency, political knowledge, and party
contact, are all positively and significantly related to turnout in both sets of results, as
would be expected.
The results of the third model continue this theme (See Table 4.3).  While the gap
between the two leading candidates does have a slight underdog effect for the entire
sample (which is consistent with the findings in Chapter 2), it is entirely unrelated to the
vote choice decisions of those who have abandoned a third party candidate.  Instead,
they, like the entire sample, are moved most by party identification, issue distance, and
thermometer ratings.  For both samples, the issue distance variables have a very strong
impact on vote choice.  Moving across the range of the sample from being essentially
indistinguishable from one candidate to disagreeing strongly with that candidate on every
issue decreases the chances that the respondent will vote for that candidate by about 50
percentage points, for both the leading and trailing candidates, and for the whole sample,
as well as for those who have abandoned the third party candidate.  The thermometer
rating scores have an even more powerful effect, particularly the respondents’ feeling
thermometer ratings of the trailing candidate.  For both sets of respondents, a change
from being indifferent to the leading candidate to giving that candidate a 100 rating on
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Table 4.3
The Probability of Voting for the Leading Candidate
Variables Respondents who
abandoned the third party
candidate
All voters





































































Psuedo R2 .788 .789
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
the thermometer scale increases the chances of voting for the candidate by at least 35
percentage points.  The impact is even greater for the trailing candidate’s thermometer
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ratings.  The same move, from indifference to complete approval decreases the chances
of voting for the leading candidate by 80 percentage points for those who have
abandoned the third party candidate and by 70 percentage points for the entire sample.
The experimental results tell a different story.  When examining all participants in
the study, it is clear that the poll results do matter, at least in an experimental setting (See
Table 4.4).  In these experiments, the viability of the third place candidate had a major
impact on the likelihood that an individual would abandon the third place candidate.
Participants whose most preferred candidate had a significant level of support (28%),
were far less likely to abandon that candidate than those whose most preferred candidate
had single digit support.  Interestingly, however, the distance in the polls between the top
two candidates did not have any impact, as there was no significant difference between
the race in which the leading candidates were separated by two percentage points and the
race in which the first place candidate was likely to win in a blowout.  As in the survey
analysis, the impact of preferences on the decision to abandon the third place candidate is
also mixed (See Table 4.5).  The intensity of preferences for the first and second place
candidates does not seem to matter, but the intensity of preferences for the third place
candidate has a powerful impact.  A significantly larger percentage of the sample chose
to abandon the third place candidate when the payout for a victory by that candidate
shrank to 50 cents from 75 cents.  The difference in payouts between the first and second
place candidates, however, did not lead to any change in behavior.  Finally, the level of
information that individuals had about the candidates did not significantly affect the
decision to stay with or abandon the third place candidate (See Table 4.6).  These
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differences remain, even in a multivariate analysis in which poll results, payouts, and
information levels are all considered (See Table 4.7).
Table 4.4
The Effect of Poll Results on the Chances that Experiment
Participants Would Abandon the Third Place Candidate40
 All Participants:
Poll Result Defected Voted for 3rd Party N
37, 35, 28 19.70 80.30 147
49, 47, 4 38.87*** 61.13 195
55, 40, 5 35.81
***
64.19 148
    * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 4.5
The Effect of Payoff Levels on the Chances that Experiment
Participants Would Abandon the Third Place Candidate
    All Participants:
Payoff Defected Voted for 3rd Party N
20 L, .30 T, .75 3rd 28.57 71.43 161
.15 L, .50 T, .75
3rd
27.67 72.33 159





    * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
                                                 
40 (*)’s next to a figure indicate the significance of the relationship between that figure and the one
immediately above it.  (*)’s below a figure indicate the significance of the relationship between that figure
and the one two lines above it.  This convention will be used in all tables stemming from the experiments.
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Table 4.6
The Effect of Information Levels on the Chances that Experiment
Participants Would Abandon the Third Place Candidate
    All Participants:
Information Level Defected Voted for 3rd
Party
N
High 33.98 64.02 256
Low 30.34 69.56 234
    * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 4.7
The Effect of Poll Results, Payout, and Information Level
on the Probability of Abandoning the Third Party Candidate
Variable
Poll Result – 49, 47, 4 0.569***
(.150)
Poll Result – 55, 40, 5 0.484***
(.160)
Payout – 20 L, .30 T, .75 3rd -0.308**
(.145)








       *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
For the turnout analysis, I examined the impact of the different experimental
conditions on all participants, on those who had decided to abandon the third party
candidate, and on those who still said that they preferred the third party candidate,
regardless of whether or not they actually voted.  The last two groups overlap, as anyone
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who still preferred the third party candidate but decided not to vote would be counted in
both groups.  Given the results from the first set of tables, it is not surprising that those
who had the option to support a seemingly viable third place candidate are more likely to
vote than those in the true strategic voting scenario (See Table 4.8).  This relationship
holds true, both for the participants as a whole, and for those who still expressed support
for the third party candidate.  This relationship disappears, however, when examining
those who chose not to cast a vote for that candidate.  What is also surprising is that,
across the board, those who were given the option of an insignificant amount of support
for their own most preferred candidate, and a large gap between the first and second place
candidates at the top seem to turnout at a level in between those two groups.41  Just as in
the first set of results, it is only the payoff structure in which the third place candidate
offered the lowest payout that there is a significant effect on turnout (See Table 4.9).
Again, with a less intense preference for the third place candidate, participation decreases
significantly, even though there is no difference in turnout when the intensity of
preference remains constant and the difference in payout from the first and second place
candidates is varied.  The level of information that a participant has in the experiment
only mattered for the group of defectors, with low information participants being more
likely to drop out of the election (See Table 4.10).  Finally, these differences remain
present in the probit analysis, as well (See Table 4.11).
                                                 
41 Technically, there is no significant difference between this group and either of the other options.
However, since it is clear that more people voted in the first scenario than in the second, if the third group
are indistinguishable from either, it is most likely that it falls somewhere in between.
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Table 4.8
The Effect of Poll Results on the Chances that Experiment
Participants Would Choose to Vote
    All Participants:
Poll Result Voted Did Not Vote N
37, 35, 28 88.44% 11.56% 147
49, 47, 4 77.95** 22.05 195
55, 40, 5 83.78 16.22 148
    * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
    Defectors:
Poll Result Voted Did Not Vote N
37, 35, 28 41.38 58.62 29
49, 47, 4 43.42 56.58 76
55, 40, 5 54.72 45.28 53
   * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
    Participants who listed the third party candidate as their first choice:
Poll Result Voted Did Not Vote N
37, 35, 28 90.77 9.23 130
49, 47, 4 75.32*** 24.77 158
55, 40, 5 82.61
*
17.39 115
   * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 4.9
The Effect of Payoff Levels on the Chances that Experiment
Participants Would Choose to Vote
   All Participants:
Payoff Voted Did Not Vote N
20 L, .30 T, .75 3rd 85.71 14.29 161
.15 L, .50 T, .75 3rd 85.53 14.47 159
.35 L, .40 T, .50 3rd 77.65*
*
22.35 170
   * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Defectors
Payoff Voted Did Not Vote N
20 L, .30 T, .75 3rd 50.00 50.00 46
.15 L, .50 T, .75 3rd 47.77 53.23 44
.35 L, .40 T, .50 3rd 44.12 55.88 68
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Participants who listed the third party candidate as their first choice:
Payoff Voted Did Not Vote N
20 L, .30 T, .75 3rd 84.56 15.44 136
.15 L, .50 T, .75 3rd 85.82 14.18 134
.35 L, .40 T, .50 3rd 76.69* 23.31 133
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 4.10
The Effect of Information Levels on the Chances that Experiment
Participants Would Choose to Vote
    All Participants:
Information Level Voted Did Not Vote N
High 85.16 14.84 256
Low 80.34 19.66 234
    * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
    Defectors
Information Level Voted Did Not Vote N
High 56.32 43.68 87
Low 35.21*** 64.79 71
    * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
    Participants who listed the third party candidate as their first choice:
Information Level Voted Did Not Vote N
High 84.50 15.50 200
Low 80.30 19.70 203
    * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
151
Table 4.11
The Effect of Poll Results, Payout, and

















































N 490 158 403
Psuedo R2 .030 .037 .049
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
I next looked at the actual vote choice of participants who decided to cast a vote
for either the first or second place candidates.  Since a significant majority of the
respondents decided to support the third party candidate, regardless of all other variables,
this analysis contained a significantly smaller sample than the others (74 participants, as
compared to 490 – itself a telling statistic), which raises problems for finding statistical
significance.  While this raises questions about the validity of several of the results
below, they still suggest some interesting findings.  First, while there is not statistically
significant difference in support for the leading or trailing candidate based on the poll
results, there was a larger majority supporting the leader in the blowout election scenario
than in either of the others, which is at least consistent with the idea that voters may
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bandwagon with the majority (See Table 4.12).  Similarly, the largest percentage seemed
to support the leading candidate in the scenario in which the difference in payoffs
between the first and second place candidate was the smallest (See Table 4.13).  Third,
low information voters were more likely than their counterparts to bandwagon with the
majority (See Table 4.14).  Although these findings are not statistically significant, they
are consistent with the idea that polls may guide some types of voters to bandwagon in
multi-candidate elections.  In fact, in the multivariate analysis, the level of information
does reach statistical significance, although none of the other variables do so (See Table
4.15)
Table 4.12
The Effect of Poll Results on the Chances that Experiment
Participants Would Vote for the Leading Candidate
    Of Defectors:
Poll Result Voted for Leader Voted for Trailer N
37, 35, 28 58.33 41.67 12
49, 47, 4 51.52 48.48 33
55, 40, 5 65.52 34.48 29
    * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 4.13
The Effect of Payoff Levels on the Chances that Experiment
Participants Would Vote for the Leading Candidate
    Of Defectors:
Payoff Voted for Leader Voted for Trailer N
20 L, .30 T, .75 3rd 52.17 47.83 23
.15 L, .50 T, .75 3rd 52.38 47.62 21
.35 L, .40 T, .50 3rd 66.67 32.33 30
   * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 4.14
The Effect of Information Levels on the Chances that Experiment
Participants Would Vote for the Leading Candidate
    Of Defectors:
Information Level Voted for Leader Voted for Trailer N
High 53.06 46.94 49
Low 68.00 32.00 20
    * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 4.15
The Effect of Poll Results, Payout, and
Information Level on Vote Choice
Variable
Poll Result – 49, 47, 4 -0.168
(.442)
Poll Result – 55, 40, 5 0.509
(.484)
Payout – 20 L, .30 T, .75 3rd -0.440
(.367)








      *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Discussion
These results generally do not support the idea that individuals who are
considering voting for the third party candidate in a presidential election act strategically
and throw their support behind their second most preferred candidate in order to prevent
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their least preferred candidate from winning.  If voters are acting strategically, we would
expect that the closeness of the race between the top two candidates, the viability of the
third party candidate, and the issue positions of the leading candidates should all
influence these third party supporters.  The survey respondents and experiment
participants analyzed in this study only seem to follow part of this pattern.
One thing that is very clear from the results is that the closeness of the race at the
top did not spur individuals to abandon the third place candidate.  This is particularly
surprising, and damaging to the strategic voting theory, because strategic voting decision
must include some indication of the value of the vote.  It only makes sense to act
strategically if the respondent believes that there is some chance, even if minor, that his
or her vote will matter.  The larger the value of the vote, therefore, the more that one
should consider using it strategically, rather than simply opting for the candidate that is
most preferred.  Since that value is determined solely by the closeness of the race, the
difference in the poll numbers between the first and second place candidate should
matter.42  This does, not however, seem to be the case.
This study does present some evidence that the other two influences on a strategic
decision do seem to have some effect.  The viability of the third place candidate
definitely matters in the experiments, as participants who were given reason to believe
                                                 
42 As discussed in Chapter 3, I do not believe, as do some who study the impact of the closeness of the race
on turnout, that voter’s perceive the value of their vote to be essentially zero.  While this may be true in
most elections that do not involve voting by raised hands, voters do not have the knowledge to accurately
estimate the number of votes that will separate the two candidates, and are instead given this information in
the form of percentages, and percentages with a margin of error.  Since these numbers are significantly
smaller than the vote total difference, and since poll results are not infrequently within the margin of error,
and thus a statistical dead heat, it only makes sense that individuals who choose to vote should be
overestimating the value of their own vote.
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that the third place candidate could be competitive were significantly less likely to
abandon that candidate than those who were told that this candidate had only a small base
of support among their fellow likely voters, regardless of the distribution of support for
the top two candidates.  This would support the idea that those who abandon the third
party candidate are concerned about the possibility of throwing their votes away by
supporting a candidate who cannot win, an idea which is certainly consistent with
strategic voting.  The survey respondents, however, reacted quite differently.  Instead of
meeting the expectation that less viable candidates should see even more of their
potential support slip away as it becomes clear that they cannot win, these supporters
actually became less likely to abandon the candidate as his viability declined.  Although
at first counterintuitive, this result does make sense, even given the experimental result.
While the experiment participants were acting in an entirely artificial world, with no
particular attachment to a candidate outside of monetary incentives, the survey
respondents were making decisions in the real world, where the attachment to a candidate
can become much more than a simple economic calculation.  Every candidate with any
noticeable level of support is likely to have a core of followers who are committed to the
cause, or to the candidate personally, or both.  As the level of support for a candidate
falls, you are essentially clearing away the dead wood.  In other words, a larger
percentage of Nader’s supporters in 2000 were likely true believers, who would not even
consider abandoning his campaign, than were Perot’s supporters in 1992 or 1996, even if
Perot had a larger number of core supporters.  Therefore, those who are prone to act
strategically are probably long gone from less popular campaigns before the general
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election campaign even begins, making their actions more difficult to measure.  In the
experiments, of course, there are no true believers.
The last thing that should matter, according to the strategic voting model, is the
individual’s relative evaluations of the three candidates.  Individuals who are indifferent
between the first two candidates, or who feel positively about all three should be the least
likely to abandon the third place candidate.  The evidence, here, is again mixed.  The
experiment participants did not seem to react to the difference in value between a victory
by the first place candidate and a victory by the second place candidate in deciding
whether or not to abandon the third place candidate.  The survey respondents, however,
did react based on their partisan intensity and their thermometer ratings of the two
leading candidates.  The more intensely they identified with one of the two major parties
and the more warmly they felt toward the two major party candidates, the more likely
they were to abandon the third party candidate.  Interestingly, however, the differences
between the respondents and the candidates on issues did not play the expected role in
encouraging people to abandon the third place candidate.  Instead, the distance to the
leading candidate, which would seem to be a very important influence on strategic
voting, had no effect, while the distance to the trailing candidate had the opposite effect
from the one anticipated.  While the latter is perhaps more surprising, the former is
probably more damaging to the strategic voting model.  The incentive, after all, to accept
a second choice candidate in the strategic voting model is to prevent some unacceptable
option from reaching the White House.  The issue distance to the leading candidate,
therefore, should play a very powerful role in determining who abandons ship.  Instead, it
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does not influence this decision at all.  In contrast, those who are furthest from the second
place candidate are most likely to abandon the third party candidate.  This is completely
counterintuitive, and suggests that something other than strategic considerations are
driving these voters.
Two other factors which are consistent with voting strategically, but which are not
necessary for strategic voting, do seem to influence this decision.  In both the
experiments and the surveys, respondents who had stronger preferences for the third
party candidates were less likely to defect from that candidate.  This is hardly surprising,
and would certainly fit within the strategic voting model.  Additionally, survey
respondents who identified themselves as being ideologically extreme were also less
likely to defect.  Since strategic voting, and even simply the desire to not waste a vote,
require that the voter believe that there is something to be gained by electing one of the
two major party candidates over the other, those who are on the ideological wings should
be less likely to defect.  As stated above, the American political system tends to be
focused on the ideological center, which likely leaves the relative few at either extreme
feeling ignored by the parties and the government.  For these individuals, which should
definitely include individuals willing to identify themselves as “extreme,” voting for the
third party candidate is possibly more than just a statement about which candidate they
prefer.  It may also be a statement about the two-party system, and particularly an attempt
to try to broaden the two party system by making a third party viable in the long run, or
even just an expression of alienation.
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Overall, the decision to abandon a third party candidate seems to be driven most
powerfully by the respondents’ preferences and party attachments, rather than by
strategic considerations.  While the evidence does suggest that voters do not want to
“waste” their vote by supporting a candidate with no chance of winning, the chance of
actually influencing the outcome of the election does not seem to play any role in this
decision, either for respondents in the real world, or for participants in an experimental
setting.
Once individuals have abandoned the third party candidate, they then must decide
whether or not to still participate in the election.  If these voters are acting strategically,
they should be driven to participate by a closer election, as well as by their relative
evaluations of the candidates.  If they are simply abandoning a losing cause, then not only
would their intensity of preferences for the two major candidates matter, but likely their
feelings about the third party candidate would still matter.  Strong supporters of the third
party candidate who have abandoned someone they do not believe can win should be
more likely to stay home than to turn to one of the other candidates instead.  Again, the
evidence from the turnout analysis is mixed.  The closeness of the race played no role in
determining whether or not survey participants who had abandoned the third place
candidate voted in the general election.  This held true in the experiments, as well, where
defectors were not significantly affected by the closeness of the race, and when the
results at least suggested that the closeness of the race might matter, it was in the opposite
direction.  The viability of the third place candidate still played a role in determining
whether or not these individuals voted in the fall.  Those who abandoned a candidate with
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little support from the general public were actually more likely to show up.  This is
consistent with the idea that these voters are committed to participating, but simply trying
to avoid throwing away their votes.  In other words, the decision to abandon the third
party candidate was made because that person was seen as a lost cause, and thus the next
decision for these voters was actually about whom else to support, not whether or not to
support anyone.  On the other hand, individuals who abandoned a third party candidate
with more support would appear to be more disillusioned about the process, and thus
more likely to give up their chance to influence the outcome. Again, the experimental
results were consistent with these findings.  The viability of the third place candidate was
much more closely related to the turnout decision than the closeness of the race, and it
was actually those in a blowout election who at least seemed more likely to still vote.
The respondents’ feelings about the candidates also played a role in their turnout
decision.  Partisan intensity, as expected, strongly influenced participants to vote, both
when examining all voters, as well as when only looking at those who had abandoned the
third party candidate.  While the thermometer ratings for the three candidates were
insignificant predictors of turnout for the sample as a whole, they did play a role in
determining the decision to vote for those who had abandoned the third party candidate.
Respondents who felt positively about either the leading or trailing candidates were more
likely to vote, which certainly makes sense.  The most interesting thing about this
finding, though, is not that these variables have an impact, but that they have no impact
on the sample as whole.  For most voters, we would assume that a positive rating of one
of the candidates would be coupled with a negative rating of the other, and thus there
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would not be an overall effect.  Among those who have abandoned the third party
candidate, however, there are likely to be significant numbers who dislike both of the
major party candidates.  These individuals will be very unlikely to participate in the
election.  If, however, an individual has a positive evaluation of one or both of the major
party candidates, they are instead only more likely to remain part of the process.  The
participants’ evaluations of the third party candidate are also significant for those who
have abandoned him, but in the opposite direction.  Individuals who like the third party
candidate, but have chosen not to vote for him anyway, are among the most likely to be
acting out of disillusionment, rather than out of strategic considerations.  In the
experiments, the participants’ relative strength of preferences between the first two
candidates had no effect on the decision to vote.  The strength of their preference for the
third place candidate, however, did still play a role.  The less intensely that they favored
that candidate, the more likely they were to choose not to vote.
The final decision to look at is the choice between the first and second place
candidates.  The strategic voting model would predict that this decision would be driven
by issue proximity and relative evaluations of the candidates.  If on the other hand, voters
were coming in with no predispositions toward either candidate, then the state of the race
may itself serve as an information shortcut to determine which candidate to support.  The
evidence for the latter is decidedly weak in this study.  While the survey respondents who
had abandoned the third party candidate, but still decided to vote were entirely unmoved
by the results of the polls (even though the entire sample moved slightly in favor of the
underdog), there was an indication that experiment participants did bandwagon with the
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majority.  Although this finding did not reach the level of statistical significance, it is at
least consistent with other studies which have found that bandwagoning is most likely in
low information elections (Fleitas 1971).  Issue distance and evaluations, on the other
hand were strongly related to vote choice among the survey respondents, and seemed to
play a role in the experiments.  These findings, of course, are entirely consistent with the
strategic voting model.  That model, however, is not the only explanation for the vote.
Supporting the candidate who is closer to you on the issues among the two remaining
candidates you are considering does not necessarily mean this is all part of a strategic
decision.    It may, in fact be completely separate from any strategic considerations
Conclusions
These findings do not seem to support the idea that voters in multi-candidate races
are acting in a strategic fashion.  Although it does seem that potential voters are
concerned with the possibility of wasting their votes, the chance that they could actually
influence the outcome does not seem to play any role in deciding to leave the third party
candidate or to vote once that candidate has been abandoned.  Instead, the most powerful
influences on all three decisions analyzed in this study would seem to be partisan
attachments, relative evaluations of the three candidates, and issue proximity to the two
leading candidates.  For many who consider voting for the third party candidate, then,
that consideration would seem to be more of a flirtation than a serious commitment.  This
candidate presents an interesting alternative worth pursuing, but only as long as the two
major party candidates do not present attractive alternatives, or as long as the third party
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candidate seems to have any shot of winning.  These voters can easily be turned off by
what they learn about this new and exciting alternative, or have their party commitments
reawakened over the course of the campaign.  For the core supporters of the third party
candidate, however, the most likely alternatives seem to be to stick it out, even in the face
of certain defeat, or to give up on the election altogether.  Although some individuals
undoubtedly do act in the manner described by the strategic voting model, neither the
survey results nor the experiments were able to find significant numbers of them.  This
does not, of course, mean that these voters are in any way irrational or acting in a non-
strategic fashion.  Supporting a candidate who is doomed to fail can still serve an
important purpose by sending a message of support for that party, or of dissatisfaction
with the two major parties.  Realizing that the third party candidate is not as attractive an
alternative up close can be a very powerful sign of rationality – certainly it is better to
admit to yourself that you have made a mistake and go back to a safer choice than to
persist with a candidate you no longer approve of.  The lack of evidence for pure strategic
voting, however, suggests one of two things.  Either voters put so little value on their own
vote that they rarely believe that it is worth acting to try to prevent their least preferred
candidate from voting, which I find unlikely, given that so many people show up to vote
at all, or that those strategic considerations are less important, or simply less commonly
used than are issue preferences and candidate evaluations in determining voting behavior.
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Chapter 5
Coverage of American presidential elections has changed dramatically over the
past 70 years.  The advent of television, cable, and the internet have reshaped the way
that citizens learn about the candidates and issues in an election.  Improvements in
transportation and communication technologies have allowed candidates to cover a much
larger portion of the country in a much shorter period of time.  At the same time, the
ability of candidates, the media, and the voters themselves to guess what the public is
thinking has grown by leaps and bounds.  The increase in the frequency with which polls
are conducted and the attention paid to them during the campaign has been almost
exponential.  It is nearly certain that anyone who has paid even a moderate amount of
attention to the 2004 presidential election campaign has seen a poll, if not several polls,
reflecting the support for Bush, Kerry, and Nader, even six months before the actual
election.
It would be hard to imagine that so much money would be spent conducting polls,
and so much air time and so many column-inches used to report and discuss them if the
public were not interested.  After all, the media are a business.  Their primary goal is to
make a profit, and that entails giving the audience what it wants.  Polls do that.  People
are always interested in what their fellow citizens think about the world.  Whether the
topic is sports, entertainment, or politics, learning what our fellow citizens think allows
us to feel vindicated, feel superior, or even just satisfy our curiosity.   That interest,
however, does not just stop with the audience.  The media are themselves interested in
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the polls.  Presidential campaigns are somewhat monotonous affairs for those following
them closely.  Each candidate will likely give the same stump speech dozens, if not
hundreds of times.  Even when the speech changes, several core themes are likely to be
carried over to the new version.  The candidates themselves are generally guarded in their
comments and interviews, trying to avoid mistakes or stick to the central messages of the
campaign.  The polls present both a measuring stick for the success of these efforts and a
way to tie these events to a larger, often more interesting story – the battle for the support
of the voters.  In almost every recent presidential election, the state of the race has
fluctuated significantly over the course of the campaign, whether the two candidates trade
leads, or a large lead suddenly shrinks, making a prohibitive favorite suddenly seem
vulnerable.  And, since one of the goals for any media outlet is not just to get the big
story, but to get it first, any instrument which can help you predict what is going to
happen months ahead of time is worth paying attention to.
Given all the attention paid by the media to polls during presidential elections, it
is reasonable to wonder whether this type of information has any impact on the
electorate.  After all, most of the information that citizens have about the candidates and
issues is, by necessity, mediated – whether through news organizations or paid
advertisements – so the information that the press chooses to cover will represent a
significant percentage of what most people know about the election.  As discussed in the
previous chapters, it is not difficult to imagine the type of effects that this information
could have.  Information about who is leading in the race could easily serve as an
information shortcut, allowing individuals to rely on the collective wisdom of other likely
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voters to figure out whom to vote for, or reinforcing their own beliefs.  Voters do not
have the best reputation when it comes to gathering all of the pertinent information
during a campaign and objectively weighing that evidence to decide which candidate
would be the best fit for their interest or that of the country as a whole.  By their very
nature, polls aim to spoil the surprise on election day, predicting days, weeks, or months
ahead of time who will win.  With only about half of the electorate showing up at the
voting booth, and most Americans showing little enthusiasm for politics in general or for
our nearly permanent campaign season, it is reasonable to question whether this
information discourages some people from showing up, by making their actions seem
less valuable through predicting the outcome.  Clearly, if polls have consistently shown
one candidate with a large lead over the other during the entire campaign season, it would
be rational for some potential voters to decide not to waste their time going to vote when
they already know what is going to happen.  Finally, in cases in which an individual is
considering voting for someone other than the two major party candidates, polls could
have an impact on their strategic considerations, independent of their true preferences.
The knowledge that the candidate they most want to win has no chance may spur them to
focus on supporting the lesser of the two remaining evils.
If polls did have these kinds of effects on voters, we would have grounds to be
very concerned.  First, as illustrated in Chapter 1, the polls themselves provide potentially
flawed information.  The very frequency of polls, the competition from telemarketers for
the attention, time, and good will of the public, and the increased ability of individuals to
avoid unwanted or unexpected phone calls altogether has decreased the response rate of
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most polls to the point where some now question the representativeness of the remaining
samples.43  Whatever the reason, the last election cycle illustrated that there can be a very
large disparity from one day to the next, and from one poll to the next, in the results,
suggesting the possibility that at least some of these polls were completely wrong.  If the
public uses these polls to help guide their behavior, it would be a cause of concern if the
information that they are using were not accurate.  Of course, the accuracy of the
information is far from the most important concern that this possibility raises.  In a
system in which the public gets to select their officials, voters who are influenced by a
candidate’s popularity, rather than their qualifications or ideas would be troubling.  Not
only would that completely fall short of our democratic ideals, but it would also give
even greater advantages to incumbents, celebrities, and candidates who are able to raise
and spend money early in the race.  Candidates at a disadvantage in name recognition,
money, or media attention would not only have to worry about those problems, but also
that their very lack of popularity was weighing them down even further.   Second, while
it is extremely unlikely that all eligible voters will ever participate in American elections,
in general it is better for the system to have more people show up on election day.  The
larger the electorate, the more legitimacy the government has and the more that elected
officials have to worry about balancing different interests within the country.  Any
phenomenon which serves to discourage this participation would certainly be worth
study.  Finally, while strategic voting is far less problematic to the system as a whole than
                                                 
43 The National Do Not Call list may actually help to improve the situation if potential respondents lose
their sense of irritation about these phone calls as they decrease in volume.  However, it is also possible that
people who sign up for the list now expect not to get any phone solicitations, and thus may resent each one
that comes that much more.
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either low turnout or voting based on popularity, it does tend to dampen the legitimacy of
candidates outside the two major parties and overvalue the support for Democrats and
Republicans in our system.
Given these concerns about the potential impact of polling information on the
electorate, it is perhaps good that this analysis turned up only minimal effects of polls on
the decisions of potential voters, as described in the previous chapters.
Candidate Preference
The results of the analysis presented in Chapter 2 nominally support two of my
hypotheses.  It is true that, for those who already prefer the candidate leading in the polls,
exposure to this information tends to reinforce that support.  At the same time, those who
already prefer the candidate trailing in the polls tend to have exactly the opposite reaction
to the same information.  These findings held true both for the probability that an
individual will vote for the leading candidate, and for the intensity of the individual's
preferences for one candidate over another.  The size of the effects, however, was
extremely small, and not enough to make any real difference in an election.  This is
particularly true because the effects, not surprisingly, were most visible in elections in
which one of the candidates had a nearly insurmountable lead over the other.  In other
words, the information makes the strongest difference when the difference in the polls is
most pronounced.  However, when the difference in the polls is most pronounced, the
chances that any small change in preferences, in either direction, could matter in the
election are essentially nonexistent.
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A more surprising finding was that only undecided voters were entirely unmoved
by the polls.  These individuals, who have not yet been able to choose a candidate to
support, and who thus have the most need for an information shortcut, are the least likely
to be moved by the results of the polls.  This is particularly surprising given that there is
an effect, albeit a very minor one, on those who have already made up their minds.  If
anyone were to be affected by the position of the majority, it would seem that undecided
voters would be the most likely candidates.  Instead, they seem to completely ignore this
information.  The only exception to this finding was that voters who do not identify
themselves with either party seem to bandwagon slightly in close elections, the elections
during which the polls provide the least useful information to help someone pick a
candidate.
Turnout
The effects of polling information on turnout were also very weak.  Perhaps the
most surprising finding in this study is that there is no consistent impact of the state of the
race on individual’s perceived closeness of the race.  In other words, the best measure we
have of reality has no discernible impact on the subjective assessment of what is likely to
happen.  This is not to say that individuals simply make up their assessment randomly, or
always predict the same outcome, regardless of the actual state of the race.  As the
Table 1.3 illustrates, there is some connection between the race, preferences, and
predictions about the election, at least at the aggregate level.  More people predict a close
election during a close election.  Surprisingly, though, that relationship does not show up
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at the individual level when examining the actual results of election polls.  Of course, this
could still mean that these perceptions are shaped, for example, by the elite level
discussions about the race.  Since these discussions are likely driven by the polls, that
would mean that the polls would still matter in the larger picture, even if the exact
relationship is hard to find.  Even if this is the case, however, the individual’s perceptions
about the state of the race do not seem to matter much in determining whether or not that
person will vote.  Much like with the evidence for bandwagon and underdog affects
discussed above, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between
believing that the race will be close and showing up to vote on election day.  That
relationship, however, is substantively negligible.  The experiments, on the other hand,
did provide some evidence that poll results had an effect on turnout, with closer races
yielding more participation.  They even demonstrated a difference in the propensity to be
affected by this information based on candidate preference.  This, coupled with the
relationship found in the surveys, indicates that the Downsian notion that potential voters
react to the probability that their participation could influence the outcome of the election
has some validity.  These forces do seem to be at work on voters.  It even supports the
idea, derived from cognitive psychology, that the impact of information about that
probability must be mediated through existing preferences.  However, it appears that in
real elections in the real world, the effects are dwarfed by other factors.  Whether voters
are reacting to a sense of duty, to an attachment to one of the candidates, to a desire to
register their disapproval of one of the candidates, or simply to social pressure to
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participate, other things are much greater influences on the decision of whether or not to
vote.  The polls do not matter.
Strategic Voting
The polls also had little effect on those facing the possibility of acting
strategically in an election.  Contrary to expectations, the closeness of the race between
the first and second place candidates had no impact on the decision to abandon the third
party candidate or the decision to remain part of the process and vote once that candidate
had been abandoned.  If potential third party supporters were truly acting strategically,
then the strategic situation that the election presented to them should certainly affect their
decisions.  It is much more rational to act strategically when there is a greater chance that
that action will have an effect.  If an individual votes for a candidate trailing almost as
badly as the candidate her most-preferred candidate, it realistically gets her no closer to a
desired result.  In that case, it makes more sense to simply stay with the candidate she
really wants to win, or perhaps to even stay away from the election altogether.  These
types of calculations do not seem to have any influence on the survey respondents or
experiment participants.
The evidence was more mixed on whether the other key piece of information
presented in the polls had any effect.  The chance that the third party candidate could at
least catch the second place candidate, or even win the election, did have an effect on the
survey respondents and experiment participants.  The immediate results, however, were
contradictory, although the explanations for these differences may not be.  Candidates
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that had little support actually had a greater chance of holding on to their supporters in
the survey analysis than did candidates with stronger showings in the polls.  While this
could indicate an odd inclination to flock to a sinking ship, it may instead represent a
something else.  A candidate with two or three percent support in the polls may be more
likely to only attract core supporters and less likely to find voters who flirt with the idea
of supporting them.  In effect, the candidate’s obvious lack of popularity may prevent
people from even considering voting for him in the first place unless they are truly
committed to doing so, and thus unlikely to act strategically.  Additional support for this
idea is found in the analysis of turnout among those who have abandoned the third party
candidate.  The greater the gap between the second and third place candidates, the more
likely it is that those who have considered and then rejected the idea of voting for the
third party candidate will vote.  This is consistent with the idea that these individuals are
leaving behind a campaign they believe has no chance, and instead looking to play a role
in the more meaningful choice – the choice between the two candidates with some
realistic chance of winning.  The level of support that a third party candidate has much
more clearly influenced the decision of voters in the experiments.  Participants were more
likely to stick with a candidate if he had enough support to allow them to convince
themselves he had a chance, something that single digit support in the polls made much
more difficult.  As noted in Chapter 4, however, these decisions show that the impetus to
act in this fashion is present, but the decisions themselves, coming in an artificial setting,
lacked the emotional attachments to candidates and the chance to use the vote to signal
disapproval of the system that can exist in the real world.
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The evidence from this analysis, however, does indicate some support for the idea
that voters do not want to “waste” their vote on a lost cause.  This, however, should be
considered to be distinct from acting strategically, which would require some concern
about the strategic situation that the election presented, something that was entirely
lacking.  Once they have abandoned the third party candidate and decided to vote for one
of the two remaining candidates, however, their decisions are entirely consistent with
those of other voters.  Candidate evaluations, party identification, and issue distance are
all important factors in the choice of which candidate to support.  Additionally, just as
with the voters considered in Chapter 2, the polls themselves do not provide any
significant guidance for these individuals on how to vote.
Implications
The results of this analysis should largely be comforting to those concerned about
the decisions of an electorate that falls short of our ideals.  The decision to vote, and the
choices that voters make once they get their ballots, are ones that should be taken
seriously, and once that we would hope are driven by relevant and useful information.
While this study cannot completely exonerate voters of the charge that they may use
irrelevant or poor information to make decisions, it does at least indicate that the results
of public opinion polls are not widely used as such.  Clearly, the most popular candidate
early in the race may not be the best, particularly given that important information about
the candidates may not yet be available to the voters, much less widely known voters.
Voters who are not influenced by polls are at least not falling into this trap, and the
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effects that are present largely serve to reinforce their pre-existing ideas anyway.  While
this thought may not be a particularly welcoming one to the candidate who is trailing in
the race, since it merely reinforces the status quo, but it is a much less troubling result for
the system as a whole.  While the choice of which candidate to support is clearly
important, there is also a benefit to participating in the system that goes beyond simply
influencing the results of elections.  Larger electorates both increase the legitimacy of the
governments they elect and create more pressure on government to watch what it does,
by increasing the chances that someone will object to your actions.  Poll results likely do
nothing to improve the relatively low turnout in American elections, but at least they do
not appear to be part of the problem.  Finally, the analysis of potential third party voters
indicates both that those who are the most committed to third party candidates are likely
to stick with those candidates, at least allowing those opinions an opportunity to compete
with the more mainstream platforms, as well as that many voters care enough about who
wins to want to be a part of the real battle in an election, even if the actual odds in that
battle have no effect on them.
These findings are particularly comforting because polls are unlikely to become
less of a part of election coverage anytime soon.  Already, during the first half of this
election year, polls asking voters for their presidential preferences are ubiquitous, long
before many have even truly started paying attention.  As the number of media outlets
available to cover the campaign has increased, the outlets available for different polls has
only increased.  And with the increase in competition between media outlets, the desire of
these outlets to not only report the key stories, but to have some piece of exclusive
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information, should only encourage more polls to be taken.  The rise of cell phone use,
which will only make people more available to pollsters, once the companies that manage
these services begin to sell lists of their working numbers to polling organizations,
something that seems inevitable.  Now, more individuals within the same household are
likely to have their own numbers, and thus to be reached independently in a random
sample.  Even the spread of internet access is only likely to increase the ease and
decrease the costs of doing surveys.  As more and more people use the internet as part of
their daily lives, the chances of being able to generate a nationally representative sample
of likely voters through e-mail, for example, increases dramatically.  Since this would
allow thousands of surveys to be conducted at the same time, with little or no cost to the
polling organization, it would be nearly impossible to imagine that someone will not
figure out ways to make it work more generally than the few sustained attempts that have
been made already.   If anything, therefore, this type of information should only become
more common and more readily available to voters in future elections.
The lack of strong findings in this study, therefore, should perhaps lead us to give
voters more credit than we do.  While they are clearly far from perfect democratic
participants, I consistently found that the most powerful influences on their decisions
were at least reasonable ones.  Certainly, party identification and major issue positions
are more likely to get voters to the “right” candidate than is knowing who is leading in
the latest poll, and by how much.  The decision to vote seems much more closely related
to characteristics that affect the costs of voting or the perceived benefits of a victory by
one candidate over the other, such as age, education, length of residency, and partisan
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intensity, than to considerations about the chances that any single vote will affect the
results of the election.  On the whole, therefore, voters seem to be doing a reasonable job,
and the introduction of and emphasis on interesting, but ultimately less useful




Vote Choice – coded 1 if the respondent voted for the candidate leading in the polls and 0
if the respondent voted for the candidate trailing in the polls.  Non-voters and
third party voters were excluded from the analysis.44
Intensity of Candidate Preference – the respondent’s thermometer rating of the leading
candidate minus the respondent’s thermometer rating of the trailing candidate in
the post-election interview.
Movement – the gap between the leading and trailing candidate in the final pre-election
poll minus the gap between the leading and trailing candidate in the most recent
pre-election poll on the day that the respondent was interviewed.  Polling data
were taken from the gallup survey (Gallup 1964, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984,
1988, 1992, and 1996), as well as from www.pollingreport.com (2000).
Media Exposure – The respondent’s self-reported media consumption of television,
newspaper, and radio were all scaled 0 to 7 and then the three scores were
averaged.
PID – standard party identification scale, rescaled as necessary so that 0 represents a
strong partisan of the party of the trailing candidate and 6 represents a strong
partisan of the party of the leading candidate.
Education – the respondent’s highest level of formal education, from 1 (less than 8th
grade) to 7 (advanced degree)
Age – the respondent’s age in years
Income – the respondent’s total family income, rescaled from 1 to 22 for all years.
Efficacy – an additive scale created by summing the respondent’s answers to four
questions, such as “people in government care what I think” and “most people can
be trusted”.  Each question was scaled from 0 to 1, with 1 being the more
efficacious response before being added.
Candidate Preference – individuals were classified into three categories based on their
pre-election interview voting intention:  those who favored the leading candidate,
those who favored the trailing candidate, and those who had no preference or
                                                 
44 All data except the poll results taken from the American National Election Studies.
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favored a different candidate.
Year – a dummy variable was created for each year in the analysis, with individuals
assigned a 1 for the year in which they were interviewed and a 0 for all other
years.  In each analysis the first year included in the pooled sample was excluded




The final part of the study involved a series of experiments conducted in October
of 2002 on the campus of the University of Texas campus at Austin.  The experiments
were broken into three groups.  The first aimed to test the impact of exposure to polling
information in the context of a genuine election campaign, to come as close as possible to
examining these effects in real life.  The second set of experiments dealt with simulated
two candidate elections in which the participants’ preferences and level of information
about the candidates were systematically varied along with the results of public opinion
polls in order to test for candidate preference and turnout effects.  The final experiments
involved simulated three candidate races and examined the impact of polling information
on strategic voting behavior.  The simulated experiments lacked the characteristics of a
real campaign, but allowed for a better manipulation of polling results, preferences, and
information levels.  When combined with the NES survey data, these experiments allow
me to examine how polls affect voters first in actual voting situations, second in a
controlled setting, but maintaining all of the “baggage” that voters carry with them into
real voting booths, and third in a perfectly clean environment, where partisan
attachments, real issue preferences and issue salience, and characteristics of candidates
provide no meaningful information for voters to use as a guide.  This allows for a much
fuller analysis of the question, and hopefully a better understanding of the direction and
magnitude of any effects.
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Participants
In an attempt to bring a wider variety of individuals into the sample and avoid the
potential pitfalls of doing experiments simply on college sophomores enrolled in an
introductory government class, I sought participants for the study by placing classified in
the part-time employment sections of both the campus newspaper, The Daily Texan, and
the local newspaper, The Austin American-Statesman.  The ads ran concurrently over a
total period of about a week and read as follows:
Earn $25 to $40 in 1 hour.  UT grad student seeks volunteers to participate
in research survey on a weekend afternoon.  Must be at least 18 to
participate.  For more information, call ###-####.
Individuals who responded to the ad were asked pick one of five times over the course of
the weekend of October 19 and 20.45  To avoid any self-selection bias respondents were
not told about the differences between the sessions until after they had chosen a time.
Therefore, among those who replied to the ad, the assignment to a particular section was
essentially random, unless there is a distinction between choosing to participate on a
Saturday afternoon, as opposed to a Sunday afternoon.46  All respondents were told that
they would be asked to read over some information and to fill out a series of surveys.
They were then informed about the amount of money that they would be paid (see
below), and given directions to the campus and building if necessary.  A surprisingly
small percentage of the respondents asked what the purpose of the research was, or what
                                                 
45 This weekend was chosen to be near Election Day in order to provide the most difficult test of my
hypotheses by increasing the chances that individuals had prior information about the candidates for
governor.  It was also chosen as a weekend on which the University of Texas football team was playing an
away game in the evening, well after the last session had finished, to minimize the potential effects of
excluding large percentages of local football fans from the sample.
46 As will be explained below, the choice of a particular session was irrelevant to the assignment of a
particular condition within the same day.
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type of information they would be asked about.  Those who did were told that I was
examining “the way that individuals react to certain types of information presented in the
media.”  If they asked for more specific information, I informed them that I could not go
into any greater detail until after they had completed the surveys.  Thirty-five respondents
were signed up for each section, for a total of 175 potential participants.  In order to
increase the actual participation rate, each respondent was either phoned or e-mailed
during the two days before the sessions began to remind them about the sessions.
The respondents for the first set of experiments, which took place on Saturday,
were asked to fill out a pre-experiment survey which, among other things, asked a series
of demographic questions, the results of which are summarized below (See Table B.1,
B.2, B.3, B.4, and B.5).  Although the participants on the second day were not given a
similar survey, there was no obvious demographic difference between them and the first
day’s participants.  It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that these numbers are at least



































Some college 38 41.8
College degree 35 38.5




Years Lived in Austin
Frequency Percent
Less than 1 year 11 12.1
1-2 years 11 12.1
2-5 years 24 26.4
5-10 years 16 17.6





A quick examination of these numbers illustrates some of the strengths and
weaknesses of the sample.  First, although 18 to 24 year olds do represent a plurality of
the sample, a majority of the participants were above the normal college age.  Second, the
sample is fairly diverse racially, with almost 50% of participants categorizing themselves
as something other than Caucasian.  The participants’ length of residence also varied
considerably, with a significant number of both new and long-time Austin residents.  On
the other hand, the sample is clearly heavily dominated by women and by individuals
with above average levels of education.
Experiment 1
The first experiment was designed to measure the impact of information about
polls on respondents’ expectations about the outcome of the upcoming gubernatorial
elections, their preference among the candidates in the race, and their intention to vote in
the November elections.  The experiments followed a very basic format, with respondents
filling out a survey, then being given the experimental treatment, and finally being asked
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to fill out a second survey.  The easiest way to approach this would have been to ask
respondents for their expectations, candidate preferences, and turnout intention in both
the pre- and post-treatment surveys, however, this would have presented a serious
problem within the theoretical framework of the study.  The benefit of the experiment, of
course, is that the experimenter controls which information the participants are given.  In
this case, the only information relating to politics or to the specific race that I wanted to
give them was information about the results of public opinion polls.  To provide them
with other types of political information during the experiments would only confuse the
results.  However, if the respondents were aware before being given the treatment that the
purpose of the study was to measure their political preferences and intentions, the
reported polls would have clearly stood out to the participants as the crucial piece of
information they were supposed to react to.  This would create two problems.  First, it
might lead to an overstatement of the power of polls, since participants would likely
place an extra emphasis on this information when filling out the final survey.  Second,
since it is likely that the effect of polls is best explained by the on-line model of
information processing, the thought processes involved in such an experiment would be
very different from those I expect take place in the real world.  Therefore, the pre-
experiment survey asked only one explicitly political question, asking respondents to
identify which party they felt closest to.  This provided a baseline that is highly correlated
with vote choice without making it obvious what the point of the experiment was.
Additionally, to further confuse the purpose of the study, a series of questions completely
unrelated to the gubernatorial campaign was also asked in the preliminary survey,
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covering such topics as their reading habits, interest in sports, and participation in the
Texas lottery.47
The treatments in this experiment involved three packets of newspaper articles
given to the participants after they had completed their preliminary survey.  Participants
in the first condition received six newspaper articles taken from the Austin American-
Statesman’s web site in the week before the sessions.  These articles covered generally
non-political issues, such as a canceled youth soccer trip, an NCAA hearing about the
eligibility of a college swimmer, and a group of well-established novelists who had begun
to write stories aimed at children.  Participants in the second and third experimental
conditions were given the same set of articles as the first, but with an extra (and
fictitious) article included in the middle of the packet.  For the second group, this article
presented the results of a public opinion poll which showed the race for governor to be in
a statistical dead heat.  The remainder of the article emphasized how close the contest
was, as well as the fact that both candidates were still confident of their ability to win the
election.  The third group received an article which showed that Rick Perry, the
incumbent, had a 12 point lead over the challenger, Tony Sanchez, and emphasized that it
would be very difficult for Sanchez to make up that ground in the few weeks remaining
before the election.48
The post treatment survey then contained four political questions, along with a
series of unrelated questions, in order to maintain the participants uncertainty about the
point of the experiment.  The survey asked respondents about their intention to vote, their
                                                 
47 The full survey is reprinted in the appendix.
48 The text of the manipulated articles is included in the appendix.
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candidate preference, their expectations about who would win the election, and whether
or not they expected to race to be close.  The unrelated questions were connected to the
non-political articles in the packet, so as to make sure that those other articles seemed just
as important as the political one.49
Of the 105 individuals who signed up to participate in the Saturday session, 91
showed up over the course of three different sessions.  As participants entered the
classroom, they were greeted, their names were checked off on the sign up sheet, and
they were given a consent form which more fully explained what they would be asked to
during the experiment.  Participants were asked to read and sign the consent form, and
encouraged to ask any questions they may have had at that time.  The form described the
process of the experiment and described the purpose of the experiment as an attempt to
understand the way that different people react to the news articles.50  After they had had
their questions answered and signed the consent form, a research assistant then gave them
the preliminary survey and asked them to fill it out.  Upon completion of the preliminary
survey, the participants returned it to the research assistant and were given their packet of
articles to read.  After they had finished reading the articles, they were then given the final
survey to complete.  When they had returned the final survey, they were then paid $30 for
their participation.  Because no interaction among participants was required, and was in
fact discouraged, participants began the process when they arrived and finished at their own
speed.  In order to avoid any bias in the assignment of conditions and to maintain an equal
number within each condition, the packets were alternated so that the first participant was
                                                 
49 The complete post-treatment survey is included in the appendix.
50 The complete consent form is included in the appendix.
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assigned to the first condition, the second participant to the second condition, and the third
participant to the third condition.  This was then repeated for each successive group of three
participants.
Experiment 2 and 3
The second and third experiments were conducted in the same sessions with the
same participants, and were designed to measure the impact of polling information on
voters in a completely neutral setting through a series of simulated elections.  The first 15
simulated elections involved two-candidate races, while the final 10 elections involved
three-candidate races.  Of the 70 individuals who had signed up to participate in the two
Sunday sessions, 49 actually participated.  Each participant provided 25 separate cases,
reporting both a turnout and vote-choice intention for each election.  
The actual experiments were conducted as simulated elections in which all of the
participants were given a short period of time to read over some information about the
candidates’ issue positions, the poll results, and the candidates’ positions on a series of
fictitious and unidentifiable issues.  The problem in this experiment was to create both a
set of pre-existing preferences for the participants, as well as to leave them with sufficient
uncertainty about how to apply those preferences, that the poll results might matter in a
two-candidate race, as they should in real life.  Although voting strategically is
completely rational when more than two candidates are running for the same office, there
is no reason to vote strategically in a two-way race where preferences are completely
clear.  At most, a potential voter who believes that his or her preferred candidate will not
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win may simply choose not to vote.  In order to create the more realistic situation, in
which many voters may know what they want from politicians, but not know who will
give it to them, all of the information about the candidates’ stands on the issues was
incomplete.  In each case, the candidates’ positions and the voters’ positions were
compared across five issues.51  For each candidate, as well as for their personas in each
particular election, participants were given information about three of the issues.  In some
cases, the information lined up well enough that it should have been easy for participants
to come to a decision about which candidate they were ideologically closer to.  In other
cases, the information presented to them was significantly more difficult to use to choose
a candidate.
In order to give participants an incentive to take their task seriously, as well as to
vary the intensity of their preferences, they were given information for each election
about the possible payoffs they could get in each election, although not told which
candidate corresponded to which payoff.52  As in a real election, they had to try to figure
out whose victory would be better for them.  In the two-candidate elections, participants
were assigned to one of three conditions for each election.  In the first condition, they
would get .75 if the leading candidate won and .25 if the trailing candidate won.  In the
second condition, they would receive .55 if the leading candidate won, and .45 if the
                                                 
51 The five issues were intentionally worded in such a way as to not convey any actual information about
their content which might trigger the participants’ personal preferences, and thus confuse the results.  The
issues were presented as:  the treaty currently being considered by the Senate, the Miller Bill which is under
consideration in the House of Representatives, a recent Supreme Court decision, a proposal to reform the
current budget process, and recommendations of the current administrations panel on government
reorganization
52 It is not uncommon in voting experiments to assign payoffs to participants based on the outcomes of the
session.  See for examples McKelvey and Ordeshook (1990) and Dawes et al (1986).
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trailing candidate won.  In the third and final condition, they would get .25 if the leading
candidate won and .75 if the trailing candidate won.53  Of course, they were not given all
of this information, but merely told that in a particular election a victory for one of the
candidate’s would be worth .75 to them, while a victory for the other candidate would be
worth .25, and so on.  Therefore, the wording on the instrument was identical for the first
and third conditions.  In the three candidate elections, all of the participants were told that
a victory by the candidate who was in third place was worth the most to them, and then
given one of three payoff conditions.  The first group was told that one of the candidates
was worth .20 to them, a second was worth .30, and the third place candidate was worth
.75 to them.  The second group was told that one candidate was worth .15 to them, a
second was worth .50, and the third place candidate was worth .75.  The final group was
told that one candidate was worth .35 to them, a second worth .40, and third place
candidate .50.
Participants were also given the results of the latest public opinion polls for each
election.  These were varied from election to election, but constant for all participants
within each election.  In the two-candidate elections, the results either indicated that the
race was tied, that one of the candidates had a 5 point lead, or that one of the candidates
had a 15 point lead, although the actual numbers varied in different elections.  In the
three-candidate elections, the results either showed a very close race between the first two
candidates, with the third place candidate drawing a very significant share of the vote, or
a very tight race at the top, with the third place candidate with a very small share of the
                                                 
53 All of the conditions are outlined in the appendix.
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vote, yet enough to change the outcome, or in the third category, a large lead by the first
place candidate over the second, with the third place candidate far behind and lacking the
support to make a difference.
Finally, participants were told that voting in any given election would cost them
.05.  This was done to simulate the cost of voting, and thus provide them with some
incentive to consider not voting in any given election.  They were also told that they
would receive the payoff based on the results of the election, regardless of whether or not
they actually voted.
The candidate and party names used in the experiment were chosen carefully in
order to prevent this information from providing the participants with clues about whom
to vote for.  Therefore, within each election, candidates were all given names implying
the same gender, thus eliminating gender as a voting cue.  The candidates names were
also chosen to ensure that they did not suggest differences in race or ethnicity between
the candidates.  The names of the parties were also chosen to avoid any connection to real
politics, and thus the elections pitted candidates of the Plaid Party against candidates of
the Striped Party, with third party candidates of the Spotted Party participating in some of
the elections.
Examples of the information presented to the participants is presented in the
appendix, but a summary of the different possible conditions would be helpful.  For each
experiment, participants could fall in any of 18 different experimental conditions (See
Table B.6) Thus, in the two-candidate races, some individuals should have preferred the
candidate leading in the polls, with varying degrees of intensity, which others should
190
have preferred the trailing candidate.  Some elections were very close, increasing the
importance of any given vote, but giving no real guidance about which might be the
better candidate, while other elections had a clear leader without a safe lead, and
Table B.6
Two-Candidate Elections
Condition Pay Scale1 Sample Poll Result2 Level of Information
1 .75, .25 45, 45, 10 High
2 .75, .25 45, 45, 10 Low
3 .55, .45 45, 45, 10 High
4 .55, .45 45, 45, 10 Low
5 .25, .75 45, 45, 10 High
6 .25, .75 45, 45, 10 Low
7 .75, .25 47, 42, 10 High
8 .75, .25 47, 42, 10 Low
9 .55, .45 47, 42, 10 High
10 .55, .45 47, 42, 10 Low
11 .25, .75 47, 42, 10 High
12 .25, .75 47, 42, 10 Low
13 .75, .25 52, 37, 11 High
14 .75, .25 52, 37, 11 Low
15 .55, .45 52, 37, 11 High
16 .55, .45 52, 37, 11 Low
17 .25, .75 52, 37, 11 High
18 .25, .75 52, 37, 11 Low
1Payout if the leading candidate wins, payout if the trailing candidate wins
2Percent supporting leading candidate, percent supporting trailing candidate, percent
undecided.
still others presented a likely blowout.  Finally, some voters had relatively useful
information to help them choose a candidate, while others did not.
In the three-candidate races, all of the participants should have most preferred the
candidate in third place, with the second place candidate being their next best option.
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However, the difference in payouts between the candidates varied, with some having
strong incentives to act strategically and others not.  The polls created three scenarios.
The third party supporters might be able to swing the outcome by voting strategically, but
Table B.7
Three-Candidate Elections
Condition Pay Scale1 Sample Poll Result2 Level of Information
1 .20, .30, .75 37, 35, 28 High
2 .20, .30, .75 37, 35, 28 Low
3 .15, .50, .75 37, 35, 28 High
4 .15, .50, .75 37, 35, 28 Low
5 .35, .40, .50 37, 35, 28 High
6 .35, .40, .50 37, 35, 28 Low
7 .20, .30, .75 49, 47, 4 High
8 .20, .30, .75 49, 47, 4 Low
9 .15, .50, .75 49, 47, 4 High
10 .15, .50, .75 49, 47, 4 Low
11 .35, .40, .50 49, 47, 4 High
12 .35, .40, .50 49, 47, 4 Low
13 .20, .30, .75 55, 40, 5 High
14 .20, .30, .75 55, 40, 5 Low
15 .15, .50, .75 55, 40, 5 High
16 .15, .50, .75 55, 40, 5 Low
17 .35, .40, .50 55, 40, 5 High
18 .35, .40, .50 55, 40, 5 Low
1Payout if the leading candidate wins, payout if the trailing candidate wins, payout if third
place candidate wins
2Percent supporting leading candidate, percent supporting trailing candidate, percent
supporting third place candidate.
their candidate had enough support that they could persuade themselves that he or she
could still win.  The third party supporters sometimes faced a pure strategic voting
scenario – their candidate had enough support to change the outcome, but not nearly
enough support to be expected to win.  Finally, they may have found themselves in an
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election where strategic voting would not pay off – their candidate trailed badly and did
not have enough support to threaten the leading candidates margin of support.  Here,
again, some voters had relatively useful information to help them choose a candidate,
while others did not.
As participants arrived for the actual sessions, they were greeted by one of the
three research as assistants whom I hired to run the session and signed in.  They were
then given a consent form to read and sign after asking any questions they may have had
about the experiment.  The consent form explained that the purpose of the experiment
was to try to understand how voters make decisions about elections with limited
information.54  As before, the exact nature of the research was not revealed to the
participants in order to prevent them from placing any extra emphasis on the poll results
presented that they would not have otherwise.  Additionally, the research assistants who
ran the sessions were also kept in the dark about the true purpose of the experiments, in
order to prevent them from placing any undue emphasis on my expectations when
instructing the participants.
When all of the participants had arrived and signed their consent forms, one of the
research assistants provided them with verbal instructions about how to participate in the
experiment and walked them through a sample experiment.55  He then answered
participants questions, and began the experiment.  Each participant was given a packet of
25 election worksheets.  Each packet was unique, and the participants’ experimental
condition in any given election was random.  After reading the information about that
                                                 
54 The complete consent form is presented in the Appendix D.
55 The text of the verbal instructions is presented in the Appendix D.
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particular election, the participants were then asked to answer two questions each time –
whether or not they wanted to vote, and which candidate they would prefer, regardless of
whether or not they actually intended to vote.  At the end of each election, participants
passed the worksheet for that election to the side where they were collected and the votes
tallied by another research assistant.  I then kept track of how much money each
participant earned based on the outcome of each election.  For the two-candidate races,
the expressed preferences of all participant who had chosen to vote were simply added
up.  In the three candidate races, only votes for the top two candidates were counted,
since the third place candidate was not in a position to win any of the elections.  After the
last election results were tallied, participants were asked to present the research assistants
with a slip of paper with their participant number on it, and were paid for their
participation.  Each participant earned $20 for participating, plus whatever they earned
based on the results of the elections.  At this time, participants were debriefed about the
actual purpose of the experiments and given a chance to ask any questions.
Summary
Combined, these experiments included 140 participants, who provided data on
1366 individual voting decisions.  The controlled circumstances of the experiments, as
well as the variation in experimental design allow for a much more thorough and difficult
test of the possible effects of polling information on the voting behavior of average
citizens than an analysis of survey data alone could provide.  The next three chapters will
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make use of this data to examine how information about the state of the race in a





Informed Consent to Participate in Research
The University of Texas at Austin
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  This form provides you with
information about the study. The Principal Investigator (the person in charge of this
research) or his/her representative will also describe this study to you and answer all of
your questions. Please read the information below and ask questions about anything you
don’t understand before deciding whether or not to take part. Your participation is entirely
voluntary and you can refuse to participate without penalty or loss of benefits to which you
are otherwise entitled.
Title of Research Study:
Media and Information Processing:  How Different Individuals React to the News
Principal Investigator(s) (include faculty sponsor), UT affiliation, and Telephone
Number(s):
Joseph D. Giammo, Graduate Student, Department of Government, 471-5121
Daron Shaw, Professor, Department of Government, 471-5121
Funding source:
Personal funds
What is the purpose of this study?
The purpose of this study is to try to understand the way that different people react to the
news articles.  This survey will involve approximately 90 individuals total.
What will be done if you take part in this research study?
If you agree to participate in this research study, you will be given a survey that will ask
you for some basic information about yourself.  You will then be given a packet of current
newspaper articles to read on a variety of subjects that may interest you.  After you have
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read through the articles, you will be given a second survey to fill out, which will ask you
some questions about your opinions about the subjects that these articles talk about.
What are the possible discomforts and risks?
This study involves only minimal risks to you.  The tasks which you are asked to complete
will be similar to those you might carry out in a classroom or office on an average day.
What are the possible benefits to you or to others?
Although this study will hopefully help to improve our understanding of how people react
to different types of information in the media, there are no other particular advantages to
the participants.
If you choose to take part in this study, will it cost you anything?
 There is no cost to you for participating in this study.
Will you receive compensation for your participation in this study?
You will receive $30 upon completion of the second survey.
What if you are injured because of the study?
There is no reason to believe that any injury will result from participation in this study.
However, should any injury occur during your participation in this research, no treatment
will be provided for research related injury and no payment can be provided in the event of
a medical problem.
If you do not want to take part in this study, what other options are available to
you?
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You are free to refuse to be in the study,
and your refusal will not influence current or future relationships with The University of
Texas at Austin.
How can you withdraw from this research study and who should I call if I have
questions?
If you wish to stop your participation in this research study for any reason, you
should contact:   Joe Giammo at (512) 471-5121 .   You are free to
withdraw your consent and stop participation in this research study at any time
197
without penalty or loss of benefits for which you may be entitled. Throughout the
study, the researchers will notify you of new information that may become available
and that might affect your decision to remain in the study.
In addition, if you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please
contact Clarke A. Burnham, Ph.D., Chair, The University of Texas at Austin
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects, 512/232-4383.
How will your privacy and the confidentiality of your research records be protected?
Authorized persons from The University of Texas at Austin and the Institutional
Review Board have the legal right to review your research records and will protect
the confidentiality of those records to the extent permitted by law.  If the research
project is sponsored then the sponsor also have the legal right to review your research
records. Otherwise, your research records will not be released without your consent
unless required by law or a court order.
If the results of this research are published or presented at scientific meetings, your
identity will not be disclosed.




As a representative of this study, I have explained the purpose, the procedures, the
benefits, and the risks that are involved in this research study:
_____________________________________            ___                                                          
Signature and printed name of person obtaining consent        Date
You have been informed about this study’s purpose, procedures, possible benefits and
risks, and you have received a copy of this Form. You have been given the
opportunity to ask questions before you sign, and you have been told that you can ask
other questions at any time. You voluntarily agree to participate in this study.  By
signing this form, you are not waiving any of your legal rights.
___________________________________________________________________
Printed Name of Subject             Date
___________________________________________________________________
Signature of Subject             Date
___________________________________________________________________




Please answer the following questions by circling the response that is most appropriate:
1. How old are you?
a. 18 – 24
b. 25 – 29
c. 30 – 39
d. 40 – 49
e. 50 – 59
f. 60 – 69
g. 70 or older






f. Other.  Please specify _______________________
3. What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female
4. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
a. Less than high school





5. How long have you lived in Austin?
a. Less than 1 year
b. More than 1 year but less than 2 years
c. More than 2 years but less than 5 years
d. More than 5 years but less than 10 years
e. More than 10 years but less than 20 years
f. More than 20 years





e. Conversations with friends or coworkers
7. How often do you pay attention to the news?
a. Every day
b. At least 3 days a week
c. Once or twice a week
d. Rarely
e. Never





9. Which of the following statements most closely describes you?
a. I generally consider myself to be a Democrat
b. I generally consider myself to be a Republican
c. I generally consider myself to be a member of a political party other than
the Democrats or Republicans
d. I generally consider myself to be an independent
e. I am not interested in politics
10. How often do you play the Texas Lottery?
a. Every week
b. Once a month
c. A couple of times a year
d. Never
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11. How many books would you guess that you read in a year?
a. 1 – 5
b. 6 – 10
c. 11 – 15
d. 15 – 20
e. More than 20





Governor’s Race Too Close to Call
By Erich Rakestraw
AMERICAN-STATESMAN STAFF
Tuesday, October 15, 2002
With one month left before the November elections, the race for governor is as tight as
any in recent memory, leaving experts unwilling to make predictions about who will
emerge the victor in this hard-fought campaign.  A Texas News Service poll released
today indicates that voters are split between Republican Rick Perry and Democrat Tony
Sanchez.
The telephone survey of 886 likely voters showed 43 percent supporting Perry, with 42
percent supporting Sanchez.  That slim lead is well within the polls four percent margin
of error, resulting in a statistical dead heat.
A spokesman for the Perry campaign said that the Governor is still confident that the
people will choose him over his opponent, but the Sanchez campaign is not so sure.
“This is still anybody’s ballgame,” said Mark McKenzie, Information Director for the
Sanchez Campaign.  “We believe that the upcoming debate will be crucial in persuading
independent voters to support Mr. Sanchez.”
Brian Brox, Government Professor at the University of Texas, who has been closely
following the campaign, agrees.  “The important thing that this poll tells us,” he said, “ is
that almost one in seven likely voters is still undecided.  Any major development in the
next month, from a bad performance in the debate, to a last minute scandal, or even just a
particularly effective ad campaign could make the difference either direction.”
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Third Experimental Condition
Perry Maintains Lead in Latest Poll
By Erich Rakestraw
AMERICAN-STATESMAN STAFF
Tuesday, October 15, 2002
With one month left before the November elections, Democratic candidate Tony Sanchez
faces an uphill battle in his attempt to unseat Republican Rick Perry in the race for
governor.
A Texas News Service poll released today shows Perry maintaining a double-digit lead
over his opponent as the two candidates reach the home stretch of the campaign.  The
telephone survey of 886 likely voters showed 50 percent supporting Perry, with only 38
percent supporting Sanchez.  The poll has a four percent margin of error.
A spokesman for the Perry campaign said that the poll illustrates that the Governor’s
message is resonating with voters.  “Clearly, the people are happy with the job that
Governor Perry has done over the past two years and want to give him a chance to
continue to help improve the lives of all Texans,” said Eric Stroupe, Media Relations
Director for the Perry Campaign.
Mark McKenzie, Information Director for the Sanchez campaign disagrees.  “This race is
far from over.  Obviously we have a tough job ahead of us, but we believe that when the
voters get a chance to see the candidates debate the issues head to head later this month,
they will realize that Mr. Sanchez is the better choice for Texas.”
Brian Brox, Government Professor at the University of Texas, who has been closely
following the campaign, sees little hope for Sanchez.  “It is not impossible to imagine
Sanchez gaining ground at this point, but he really needs some help.  Although the debate
will give him a chance to reach undecided voters and to try to persuade some Perry
supporters to change sides, it will be extremely difficult to make up a 12 point deficit in




Please answer the following questions by circling the response that is most appropriate:
1. Should athletes who transfer from one university to another be required by the




2. Do you believe that athletic departments at major colleges and universities are
more concerned with winning or with following the rules?
a. Winning
b. Following the rules
3. Do you intend to vote in the November election for Governor of Texas?
a. Yes
b. No








6. Do you think that the November election for Governor of Texas will be close, or
do you think one of the candidates will win by a lot?
a. It will be close
b. One of the candidates will win by a lot
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8. Some novels aimed at children contain political messages.  When thinking about
these types of books, which of the following statements is closest to your own
opinion?
a. Parents need to closely watch which novels children are reading to make
sure that they are not being exposed to messages that the parents do not
approve of.
b. Parents should allow their children to experience a broad range of views,
even if they differ from the parents’ own beliefs.
9. In light of the events of the previous week, where a sniper has killed several
individuals in the Washington, D.C. area, do you believe that large events should
be cancelled until this individual is caught?
a. Yes, it is necessary for public safety
b. No, we cannot let criminals intimidate us
10. What should be the punishment for fleeing from a police officer who has stopped
you for speeding?
a. A fine of less than $100
b. A fine of more than $100
c. Less than a month in jail
d. More than a month in jail




12. Over the past decade, Austin’s economy has become increasingly driven by high
tech companies like Dell, IBM, and Motorola.  These companies have helped to
bring economic growth and jobs to the area, but this growth has also increased our
traffic problems and driven up the cost of housing.  In your opinion, has the
impact of these high tech companies been more beneficial or more harmful to the





Experiments 2 and 3
IRB#  2002-09-0004
Informed Consent to Participate in Research
The University of Texas at Austin
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  This form provides you with
information about the study. The Principal Investigator (the person in charge of this
research) or his/her representative will also describe this study to you and answer all of
your questions. Please read the information below and ask questions about anything you
don’t understand before deciding whether or not to take part. Your participation is entirely
voluntary and you can refuse to participate without penalty or loss of benefits to which you
are otherwise entitled.
Title of Research Study:
How Voters Make Decisions With Limited Information
Principal Investigator(s) (include faculty sponsor), UT affiliation, and Telephone
Number(s):
Joseph D. Giammo, Graduate Student, Department of Government, 471-5121
Daron Shaw, Professor, Department of Government, 471-5121
Funding source:
Personal funds
What is the purpose of this study?
The purpose of this study is to try to understand the way that individuals make decisions
about voting in different situations.  Voters rarely know everything there is to know about
candidates in an election.  Some voters may care more about the results of a particular
election than others.  Additionally, some races may be more interesting than others.  This
study will attempt to study these decisions by having you put yourself into the shoes of
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different types of voters with limited information and asking you to make the best decisions
you can in those situations.  Approximately 60 people will participate in this study.
What will be done if you take part in this research study?
If you agree to participate in this research study, you will be given a series of different
scenarios which will offer you limited information about fictitious elections.  You will then
be asked to decide whether or not you would vote in each election, and if so, how you
would vote.  After all of these elections are completed, the results will be tabulated and you
will be compensated for your participation.
What are the possible discomforts and risks?
This study involves only minimal risks to you.  The tasks which you are asked to complete
will be similar to those you might carry out in a classroom or office on an average day.
What are the possible benefits to you or to others?
Although this study will hopefully help to improve our understanding of how voters make
decisions about elections, there are no other particular advantages to the participants.
If you choose to take part in this study, will it cost you anything?
 There is no cost to you for participating in this study.
Will you receive compensation for your participation in this study?
You will $20 for participating in this survey.  You will then have an opportunity to earn
between $5 and $20 on top of that, depending on the results of these simulated elections.
What if you are injured because of the study?
There is no reason to believe that any injury will result from participation in this study.
However, should any injury occur during your participation in this research, no treatment
will be provided for research related injury and no payment can be provided in the event of
a medical problem.
If you do not want to take part in this study, what other options are available to
you?
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Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You are free to refuse to be in the study,
and your refusal will not influence current or future relationships with The University of
Texas at Austin.
How can you withdraw from this research study and who should I call if I have
questions?
If you wish to stop your participation in this research study for any reason, you
should contact:   Joe Giammo at (512) 471-5121 .   You are free to
withdraw your consent and stop participation in this research study at any time
without penalty or loss of benefits for which you may be entitled. Throughout the
study, the researchers will notify you of new information that may become available
and that might affect your decision to remain in the study.
In addition, if you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please
contact Clarke A. Burnham, Ph.D., Chair, The University of Texas at Austin
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects, 512/232-4383.
How will your privacy and the confidentiality of your research records be protected?
Authorized persons from The University of Texas at Austin and the Institutional
Review Board have the legal right to review your research records and will protect
the confidentiality of those records to the extent permitted by law.  If the research
project is sponsored then the sponsor also have the legal right to review your research
records. Otherwise, your research records will not be released without your consent
unless required by law or a court order.
If the results of this research are published or presented at scientific meetings, your
identity will not be disclosed.




As a representative of this study, I have explained the purpose, the procedures, the
benefits, and the risks that are involved in this research study:
_____________________________________            ___                                                          
Signature and printed name of person obtaining consent        Date
You have been informed about this study’s purpose, procedures, possible benefits and
risks, and you have received a copy of this Form. You have been given the
opportunity to ask questions before you sign, and you have been told that you can ask
other questions at any time. You voluntarily agree to participate in this study.  By
signing this form, you are not waiving any of your legal rights.
___________________________________________________________________
Printed Name of Subject             Date
___________________________________________________________________
Signature of Subject             Date
___________________________________________________________________
Signature of Principal Investigator             Date
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Explanation
I. Thanks for being here.  Taped to the desk in front of you is your participant
number.  It should match the number that will be on the packet you will
receive in a moment.  That number is very important.  You need to bring it
with you at the end of the session in order to get paid.  You will not be paid
without it.
II. We will conduct a series of 25 simulated elections.  You will be given
different situations and then asked how you would act in those situations.  The
outcome of the elections will determine how much money you make.
III. For each election, you will be given several pieces of information:
A. The candidates’ names and the parties they belong to (all fictional)
B. The candidates’ standings in the latest polls.  Assume for the purpose of
this exercise that this was a poll of your fellow participants taken just
before we begin.  In other words, the poll represents our best guess at how
the group will vote in the election.
C. Limited information about the candidates’ positions on some fictitious
issues
D. Limited information about your positions on some fictitious issues.
IV. In each election, one of the candidates will be worth more to you than the
other.  Part of your job is to decide which candidate is better for you.
Sometimes, that may fairly easy to figure out.  Sometimes, it may be very
difficult.
V. You then need to make 2 decisions for each election:
A. Do you want to vote?  Voting will cost you .05.  You will get paid for the
election regardless of whether or not you vote, but not voting may hurt
your candidate’s chances of winning.
B. Regardless of whether or not you choose to vote, you must decide who
you would want to vote for.  It is very important that you answer BOTH
questions for each election.
VI. 15 of the elections will have 2 candidates, 10 of the elections will have 3
candidates.
VII. At the end of each election, tear off the page and pass it to the side when
asked to do so, so that we can tally the votes and figure out how much money
you will be paid.  We will spend about 2 minutes on each election.  If you are
not finished when we ask you to pass your ballot, please let us know.
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VIII. Now we are going to give you a sample to look at and a chance to ask any




In the election for president, you must choose between John Smith, candidate for the
Plaid Party, and Mark Johnson, candidate for the Striped Party.  In the latest survey,
Smith leads Johnson by a margin of 52% to 37%, with 11% of voters undecided.  You
must decide if want to vote in the election, and if so whom you want to vote for.  Voting
will cost you 5 cents, but choosing not to vote may hurt your candidate’s chance of
winning.  Below you will find some information to help you reach a decision.
You will receive 75 cents if one of the candidates wins, but only 25 cents if the other
candidate wins.
























Opposed to In favor of Opposed to
1. Will you vote?
a. yes
b. no






In the election for president, you must choose between Cynthia Martin, candidate for the
Plaid Party, and Melissa Jackson, candidate for the Striped Party.  In the latest survey,
Martin and Jackson are tied at 45%, with 10% of voters undecided.  You must decide if
want to vote in the election, and if so whom you want to vote for.  Voting will cost you 5
cents, but choosing not to vote may hurt your candidate’s chance of winning.  Below you
will find some information to help you reach a decision.
You will receive 55 cents if one of the candidates wins, but only 45 cents if the other
candidate wins.










In favor of ? In favor of
A recent Supreme
Court decision











Opposed to In favor of ?
1.   Will you vote?
a. yes
b. no






In the election for president, you must choose between Anthony Stewart, candidate for
the Plaid Party, and George Martins, candidate for the Striped Party.  In the latest survey,
Stewart leads Martins by a margin of 47% to 42%, with 10% of voters undecided.  You
must decide if want to vote in the election, and if so whom you want to vote for.  Voting
will cost you 5 cents, but choosing not to vote may hurt your candidate’s chance of
winning.  Below you will find some information to help you reach a decision.
You will receive 75 cents if one of the candidates wins, but only 25 cents if the other
candidate wins.
























Opposed to In favor of In favor of
1. Will you vote?
a. yes
b. no







In the election for president, you must choose between Brett Anthony, candidate for the
Plaid Party, Thomas Largent, candidate for the Striped Party, and Neal Lucas, candidate
for the Spotted Party.  In the latest survey, 37% of respondents said they intended to vote
for Anthony, 35% said they intended to vote for Largent, and 28% said they intended to
vote for Lucas.  You must decide if want to vote in the election, and if so whom you want
to vote for.  Voting will cost you 5 cents, but choosing not to vote may hurt your
candidate’s chance of winning.  Below you will find some information to help you reach
a decision.
You will receive 75 cents if Lucas wins, but less if Anthony or Largent wins.  Victory for
one will pay you 20 cents, while victory for the other will pay you 30 cents.











Opposed In favor In favor In favor
A recent Supreme
Court decision











Opposed In favor ? ?
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1. Will you vote?
a. yes
b. no








In the election for president, you must choose between Elizabeth Davis, candidate for the
Plaid Party, Mary Burke, candidate for the Striped Party, and Amy Patterson, candidate
for the Spotted Party.  In the latest survey, 49% of respondents said they intended to vote
for Burke, 47% said they intended to vote for Davis, and 4% said they intended to vote
for Patterson.  You must decide if want to vote in the election, and if so whom you want
to vote for.  Voting will cost you 5 cents, but choosing not to vote may hurt your
candidate’s chance of winning.  Below you will find some information to help you reach
a decision.
You will receive 75 cents if Patterson wins, but less if Davis or Burke wins.  Victory for
one will pay you 15 cents, while victory for the other will pay you 50 cents.
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1. Will you vote?
a. yes
b. no
2.  Whether or not you are actually planning to vote, whom would you vote
for?
a.   Davis
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